POLICY FORUM

Preparing for Pan-Epidemics of Urban Yellow Fever
Daniel Lucey

The Strategic and Tactical Implications of ISIS on Southeast Asia’s Militant Groups
Zachary Abuza

Derek Reveron

Water Security in South Asia: Between State and Society
Majed Akhter

Transboundary Haze and Human Security in Southeast Asia
Helena Varkkey

Japan’s Defense Strategy in Graying Asia
Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba

Migration for Human Security? The Contribution of Translocality to Social Resilience
Harald Sterly, Kayly Ober & Patrick Sakdapolrak
The Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs is the flagship scholarly publication of the Asian Studies Program housed within the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Established in 2014, the journal aims to provide a forum for scholars and practitioners in the field of Asian affairs to exchange ideas and publish research that further the understanding of the world’s largest and most populous continent.

The views expressed in this issue do not necessarily reflect those of the Journal’s editors and advisors, the Asian Studies Program, the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, or Georgetown University.
EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor-in-Chief
Brian Spivey

Senior Editor
Jennifer Mayer

Managing Editor
Sarah Moore

Publisher
Daye Shim Lee

Associate Editors
Yuhao Du Brian Waidelich

Assistant Editors
Sophia Chawala Khoury Johnson Young Jun Jun

ADvisory Board

Amitav Acharya
American University

Charles Armstrong
Columbia University

Harley Balzer
Georgetown University

Carol Benedict
Georgetown University

Kurt Campbell
The Asia Group

Victor Cha
Georgetown University

Bruce Dickson
George Washington University

Evelyn Goh
Australian National University

Michael Green
Georgetown University

Touqir Hussain
Georgetown University

Christopher Johnson
CSIS Freeman Chair

Philip Kafalas
Georgetown University

David Kang
University of Southern California

Christine Kim
Georgetown University

Diana Kim
Georgetown University

Joanna Lewis
Georgetown University

Kristen Looney
Georgetown University

Mike Mochizuki
George Washington University

Andrew Nathan
Columbia University

Irfan Nooruddin
Georgetown University

Michael O’Hanlon
Brookings Institution

Lynn Parisi
University of Colorado

Saadia Pekkanen
University of Washington

Jordan Sand
Georgetown University

David Shambaugh
George Washington University

Gi-Wook Shin
Stanford University

Sheila Smith
Council on Foreign Relations

James Steinberg
Syracuse University

Elizabeth Stephen
Georgetown University

Robert Sutter
George Washington University

Yuhki Tajima
Georgetown University

Andrew Yeo
Catholic University of America

Send inquiries to:
SFS Asian Studies Program, Georgetown University
Box 571040, 37th and O Streets, NW
Washington, DC 20057
Email: guasiajournal@gmail.com

[ii] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
CONTENTS

Volume 3 | Number 1 | Fall 2016

1 Editor's Note

POLICY FORUM
Securing or Securitizing? Human Security in Asia

5 Introduction
   Non-Traditional Security: Concept, Issues, and Implications on Security Governance
   Mely Caballero-Anthony

14 Preparing for Pan-Epidemics of Urban Yellow Fever
   Need for More Vaccine from Eggs and Cell Culture
   Daniel Lucey

20 The Strategic and Tactical Implications of the Islamic State on
   Southeast Asia’s Militant Groups
   Zachary Abuza

31 Maritime Security Deficits and International Cooperation
   Illegal Fishing, Piracy, and Maritime Security Deficits in Southeast Asia
   Derek Reveron

37 Water Security in South Asia
   Between State and Society
   Majed Akhter

42 Transboundary Haze and Human Security in Southeast Asia
   National and Regional Perspectives
   Helena Varkkey

50 Willing and (Somewhat) Able
   Japan’s Defense Strategy in Graying Asia
   Jennifer Dabbs Scuibba
57 Migration for Human Security?
   *The Contribution of Translocality to Social Resilience*
   Harald Sterly, Kayly Ober & Patrick Sakdapolrak

**RESEARCH**

67 Revisionist Religion
   *Xi Jinping’s Suppression of Christianity and Elevation of Traditional Culture as Part of a Revisionist Power Agenda*
   Anna Scott Bell

94 Ethno-Demographic Dynamics of the Rohingya-Buddhist Conflict
   Rachel Blomquist

**INTERVIEWS**

119 State of the Field: China Studies in the Past, Present, and Future
   David Shambaugh

129 THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia
   Mark Fitzpatrick

135 Australia’s Strategy in Contemporary Asia
   Andrew Shearer

141 One Belt, One Road: A View from Hong Kong
   Simon Shen
As the specter of an existential military conflict between the world’s two nuclear superpowers faded with the ending of the Cold War, scholars and policymakers began to question some of the most basic assumptions undergirding the study of international security. How useful, after all, were the heavily militarized, bipolar security frameworks designed to manage the Cold War? What would “security” entail in the post–Cold War era? Confronted with these questions, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) published a landmark Human Development Report in 1994, claiming:

The world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives. Future conflicts may be within nations rather than between them—with their origins buried deep in growing socio-economic deprivation and disparities. The search for security in such a milieu lies in development, not in arms.¹

The integrity of the nation-state, in other words, ought to be preceded by the security of the human individual as the referential object in the study of international security.

Those interested in pursuing human-focused security identified a new set of issues as threats to international security, such as terrorism, environmental disasters, pandemics, organized crime, cyberattacks, illegal immigration, climate change, and resource exhaustion. The transnational nature of these “non-traditional” security threats requires equally non–traditional methods of engagement. Proponents of human security thereby argue that any individual state can no longer confront its security issues on its own: it will need regional (if not global) cooperation; it will need the participation of non-state actors; it will have to think holistically about the root causes of instability; and it will have to develop creative solutions that do not rely solely on its military capabilities. As Xiong Guangkai, former People’s Liberation Army general, once said: “Faced with various non–traditional security threats, actions by a single country stand no chance and international cooperation remains the only powerful and effective instrument.”²

While a call to redefine our understanding of security has helped scholars and policymakers find new, practical ways of confronting the realities of a post–Cold War world, the conceptual framework provided by human security has not been immune to criticism. Roland Paris criticizes it for being overly vague and imprecise, “encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being.”³ Other voices, emanating predominantly from non-Western countries, claim that deploying human security as a foreign policy goal provides a pretext for developed nations to interfere in the domestic affairs of developing ones.⁴

Asia in particular provides a revealing context for applying a human security paradigm, whether as an analytical tool or as a policymaking goal. That is to say, while Cold War security architecture may lay in ruins in Europe, it is still very much intact in Asia: China is still ruled by an ambitious communist party seeking to realize the gamut of its maritime-based sovereignty claims; the Korean peninsula teeters precariously along much the same lines as it did during the apogee of the Cold War; and the nuclear powers of Pakistan and India have made little progress in their decades-long border disputes. These few instances alone should make anyone hesitate to discount the relevance of traditional, nation-state security frameworks in understanding contemporary Asia.

It is precisely the juncture between these two observations—the rise of human security as a global security paradigm and the persistent legacy of traditional, Cold War security concerns in Asia—that inspired the Fall 2016 Policy Forum of the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs. As the title “Securing or Securitizing? Human Security in Asia” suggests, this issue aims to explore the relevance of human and non-traditional security in the regional context of Asia.

Of particular interest to the editorial board is the complex relationship between human and state security. How and when do threats to individuals become threats to the nation-state? To what extent are these non-traditional issues taking priority over traditional ones in the security calculuses of Asian governments? Attempting to solicit answers to these questions has provided the editorial board with the pleasure of working with scholars representing a broad array of disciplines such as geography, demography, environmental politics, microbiology, and maritime security. We are furthermore pleased to offer the views of scholars not just from the United States, but across Europe and Asia as well.

In our introduction, Mely Caballero-Anthony outlines the conceptual origins of Non-traditional Security (NTS), its capacity as a framework for both analysis and action, and the various NTS issues affecting millions of people in Asia today. Caballero-Anthony makes an intriguing case that the security paradigms of the past are no longer sufficient to ensure our security today and she encourages both scholars and policymakers to consider adopting NTS as a new international security paradigm.

In our first Policy Forum piece, Daniel Lucey—an expert in public health and infectious diseases—provides an update on the growing epidemic of yellow fever in sub-Saharan Africa and the threat it poses both to Chinese migrant workers in the region and the communities in Asia that they return home to. Having just visited both sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, Lucey reports that the world’s supply of yellow fever vaccines are spread dangerously thin and the disease’s spread to Asia could pose significant problems to Asian and global health infrastructures. It is a pertinent article about the need for governments in disparate regions of the world to cooperate.

By analyzing the most recent developments regarding terrorism in Southeast Asia, Zachary Abuza reveals the strategic and tactical influence of ISIS in the region, even as its power appears to be waning in the Middle East. Abuza provides yet another
instance where insecurity in a distant region of the world has very real, destabilizing potential for Asia. Next, Derek Reveron identifies the regional dimensions of the global problem of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing in Southeast Asia—an issue that has led to an increase in piracy in Asia’s important ocean thoroughfares.

In “Water Security in South Asia,” Majed Akhter identifies the rivalry between India and Pakistan over water resources in the Indus River valley as an issue that shapes both the communal and state security of the two countries. In the following article, Helena Varkkey shows how different Southeast Asian countries have framed and approached the problem of transboundary haze caused by peat and forest fires. While Singapore has characterized the haze as a human security issue, other governments in the region have opted to follow more traditional economic and political considerations.

Much has been made of aging populations in Asia as China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea and, of course, Japan all face the challenges associated with a geriatric public. In “Willing and (Somewhat) Able: Japan’s Defense Strategy in a Graying Asia,” Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba explores both the implications of a rapidly aging population on Japan’s defense strategy as well as how Japan might reconcile demographic problems with its more traditional security concerns.

Our Policy Forum is rounded out with a thought-provoking article jointly authored by Harald Sterly, Kayly Ober, and Patrick Sakdapolrak about the relationship between migration and climate change in Southeast Asia. By using Thailand as a case study, these scholars suggest that the time has come for a major paradigm shift on how migration is viewed as a security issue: instead of perpetuating the view that migrants and migration are security threats, we should consider how migration and migrants could be potential security solutions.

It is our hope that by engaging with this issue’s Policy Forum, the reader will gain a sense for the complexity of security in contemporary Asia—the subtle, sometimes scarcely perceptible, ways in which policymakers, society, and the environment affect one another.

In addition to the Policy Forum, this issue of the Journal features two outstanding research articles from young scholars. In a thoroughly researched and insightful piece, Anna Scott Bell explores recent developments in the regulation and repression of religion in China under Xi Jinping. She contends that Xi Jinping’s suppression of Christianity in China is part of a broader agenda to marry a market economy with political authoritarianism, buttressed by traditional Chinese philosophies.

In our second research paper, Rachel Blomquist adroitly investigates the impact of demographic disparities between the Rohingya and Buddhist populations in Rakhine state, Myanmar—an area that has been marred by communal violence in recent years. Her findings suggest that an above-average Rohingya birth rate contributes to fears among other ethnic groups of displacement and cultural extinction. As Myanmar seeks to consolidate its democratic transition, ethnic conflict in the country continues to
stand out as a significant obstacle.

This issue ends with four interviews on timely topics. First, in a must-read for young scholars of China, David Shambaugh provides our readers with his thoughtful perspective on a wide-range of issues related to the academic study of China in the past, present, and future. Next, Mark Fitzpatrick lends his expert insight into the strategic implications of deploying Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in South Korea. Andrew Shearer then shares his rich experience as national security adviser to Prime Ministers John Howard and Tony Abbott of Australia by answering our questions about a number of strategic issues that Australia currently faces in the Asia-Pacific region. Finally, we conclude by discussing China’s well-publicized “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative with Hong Kong-based scholar Simon Shen.

As always, this issue of the *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* is the result of the hard work of many individuals. First and foremost, I would like to extend the editorial board’s sincere gratitude to all of our authors, anonymous reviewers, and faculty advisors. I would further like to thank Jennifer Mayer, our Senior Editor, and Sarah Moore, our Managing Editor, for their tireless commitment and astute counsel. Their leadership throughout the publication cycle played a large part in the successful compilation of this issue. Our Associate and Assistant Editors have, likewise, been phenomenal; without their keen analytical insight and rigorous attention to detail, this issue would not have been possible. Neither would this issue exist without Professor Victor Cha’s vision and commitment to providing opportunities for his students to challenge themselves and grow as scholars. This issue is furthermore a testament to the persistent relevance of Professor Michael Green’s class “Theory and Policy in Asia,” during which the seed for this issue’s Policy Forum theme was first planted. I would like, finally, to warmly thank Daye Lee for her peerless stewardship of the *Journal* as Publisher.

I count serving as Editor in Chief for the Fall 2016 issue of the *Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs* as one of my most sincerely gratifying experiences at Georgetown. I hope you enjoy reading this issue as much as we enjoyed putting it together.

Brian Spivey
Editor in Chief
Since the beginning of the new millennium, the international security environment has changed dramatically. Although the risks of major armed conflict and interstate wars are now on the decline, the world is increasingly confronted with a number of security challenges which are non-military in nature. Examples of these non-military security challenges that threaten the well-being and security of states and societies include climate change, food and water scarcity, environmental degradation, pandemics, irregular movements of people, and transnational crimes such as cybercrime. These threats are proving to be more severe and more likely to inflict more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts. As a consequence, the security concerns of states have changed, compelling them to find new and innovative ways to address these new challenges. These, in turn, have had profound implications on the nature of security cooperation among states, as well as global governance.

To security analysts and scholars, these developments have once again brought to the fore the debates about re-thinking and re-conceptualizing security. In this regard, let me start by raising two points about the evolution of Non-traditional Security (NTS) as a concept and as an approach to security. Although reference to the developing world revolves mostly around Asia, where the concept of NTS can first be traced, progress in conceptual research and policy practice related to NTS are now seen in other regions of the world.

Non-Traditional Security: New Wine in Old Bottles?

A common trend that has been observed by a number of security scholars is the growing tendency to highlight and designate any security concern that is non-military in

---

nature as a non-traditional security issue. In Asia, concerns about environmental degradation, outbreaks of epidemiological diseases, transnational crimes, irregular migration, climate change, natural disasters, and others have now been classified as non-traditional security threats that plague the region. The appropriation of the security label attached to these concerns and threats has been a significant development. It is significant in that “security-framing” is deemed to be an effective way to bring attention to these NTS challenges, convey urgency, and command governmental resources to address them.

In tracing the evolution of the NTS concept, the experience of developing Southeast Asia is instructive in that it shows how an earlier concept of “comprehensive security” has morphed into what we now call non-traditional security. In post-colonial Southeast Asia, comprehensive security was, for a long time, considered the dominant conceptual framework about what security meant for the region. As noted by Asian security scholar Muthiah Alagappa, comprehensive security in ASEAN was understood as that which “goes beyond (but does not exclude) the military to embrace political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions.” By also embracing these non-military aspects of security, the ASEAN region could thereby achieve regional resilience and regional security. While comprehensive security provided a broader conceptualization of security beyond military threats, the main security referent was still the state. A comprehensive view of security allowed for the stability of regimes and, as consequence, reified the state as both the primary unit of analysis as well as the main actor that defines and provides security.

The concept of comprehensive security came under strong criticism—particularly in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis that hit the region in 1997-98. During that period, the emphasis on the state as the main security referent was challenged, as those affected most deeply by the crisis were vulnerable groups and communities existing outside of the state. Since then, many hoping to re-conceptualize security have put forth “human security”—and its emphasis on the chronic and complex insecurities affecting individuals and societies—as a possible framework to replace the conventional

---

2 See, for example, Mely Caballero-Anthony, Ralf Emmers and Amitav Acharya (eds.), Non-Traditional Security in Asia: Dilemmas in Securitisation (London: Ashgate 2006).
3 In this paper, ASEAN is used interchangeably with Southeast Asia. ASEAN groups the 10 states of Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam.
state-centric approach. Human security, at least in the Southeast Asian context, became an important platform to raise the developing world’s voices on (in)security.

**NTS: A Concept, an Approach, a Framework**

On the surface, one could suggest that if comprehensive security is the notion of security expanded to include non-military concerns, then NTS refers to the subset of comprehensive security threats that characteristically require non-military (but not necessarily non-state) responses to address. And though these threats or challenges may be non-military in nature, they can nonetheless lead to conflict or even war (e.g., a war over crucial but scarce resources like oil or water). Furthermore, the NTS framework considers both the state and the individual as referents of security—whereas in human security the focus is primarily on the individual. In short, proponents of NTS aim to broaden and deepen the understanding of security today such that those most at risk—non-state actors, organizations, political entities, and human individuals—play a greater role in providing or ensuring their own security.

As a practical approach, NTS is used to assess and analyze security issues from a comprehensive, needs and rights-based perspective—rather than from a purely statist or military-based understanding. The strict conceptualization of international security in terms like “national sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” is no longer considered capable of resolving the array of immediate challenges facing our world today. The transboundary nature of phenomenon today cannot be denied—consider, for example, the Asian financial crisis, which started in Thailand but quickly spread to other economies in the region and lead to the plummeting of local currencies and stock prices. The transnationality of NTS challenges was further illustrated by the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2002 and 2003, when the epidemic was transmitted from Beijing to Hong Kong, and then to Southeast Asia and rest of the world. A more recent incidence of a transboundary NTS issue is the Syrian refugee crisis.

---


which has posed well-publicized security and social challenges in Europe.

It is increasingly evident that destabilizing events can now emanate from within the state or through non-state actors, not just from other states—as was largely considered the case in the past. Today, a nation’s security, international legitimacy, and sovereignty rest not only on territorial control, but also on the integrity of its services and its ability to fulfill the basic rights of its citizens. One can even argue that NTS issues are increasingly becoming the core concerns for most governments and policy communities in Asia, as well as in some other regions.\(^\text{10}\) Consider, for example, the fact that China’s government spends as much, if not more, on domestic security than it does on its defense budget.\(^\text{11}\)

The transboundary nature of the issues makes it difficult for individual countries to effectively deal with NTS challenges by themselves, with the capacity of developing countries being particularly stretched. Thus, the effective governance of NTS issues rests on cooperation and coordination among states as well as between state and non-state actors. During the Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asian countries were forced to turn to the international community for assistance in stabilizing their currencies. Both international financial institutions as well as major regional countries like China and Japan contributed to slow the deterioration of the economic situation. The damaging consequences on regional economies prompted the establishment of various arrangements to strengthen financial security in the region, like the Chiang Mai Initiative.

Similar developments have also been seen in regional health governance. There has been, for instance, increased cooperation and coordination on health issues, exemplified by the Emerging Infectious Disease Programme of ASEAN+3 in 2004, the Surveillance and Investigation of Epidemic Situations in South-East Asia, and the Greater Mekong Sub-region Communicable Disease Control Project.\(^\text{12}\) This trend has been witnessed outside of Asia as well when the worst outbreak of Ebola in history hit West Africa in 2013 and 2014. The countries worst affected were all developing countries with limited resources and expertise. As a consequence, both the response to the widespread transmission and the post-epidemic recovery have relied heavily on assistance from international organizations, donor countries, and non-governmental organizations like Doctors Without Borders. Apart from regional mechanisms, there are also platforms to increase dialogue on NTS issues between different regions, like the EU-ASEAN Dialogue, the Asia-Europe Meeting, and EU International Development

---


People and community-level efforts are essential components to an effective response to NTS threats. Given their familiarity with the situation on the ground, local entities play a critical role in identifying and assessing the needs and challenges in relief and recovery. In the wake of the 2015 Nepal earthquake, the international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief effort demonstrated that insufficient communication and coordination between local entities was an obstacle to the recovery effort as relief materials often did not match local needs. Likewise, amid the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, effective containment of the disease relied heavily on surveillance and education campaigns executed at the community level. It is therefore important to assess NTS issues across different levels of analysis: in geostrategic terms—where states and political entities are central—and in human security terms—where the focus is on societies, communities, and individuals. Lastly, the way in which these two levels interact, influence, and reinforce each other on a particular issue—be it water scarcity, pandemics or climate change—allows for a deeper understanding of the issue at hand. More importantly, the adopting of such a comprehensive, multi-level perspective demands that we develop more extensive and innovative approaches if we are to address these multi-faceted challenges.

Scoping NTS

How then does one decide which kinds of issues and threats fall under the NTS umbrella? There does not exist, after all, a broad consensus on which issues should be considered as NTS. As a consequence, NTS issues are often contextually defined. For example, what may be NTS issues in one country—like economic security, food security, or energy security—could already be part of the traditional concept of security in the other. As one scholar has previously argued, energy security (which is now included in the rubric of NTS in Asia) had already been viewed by Japan as a traditional security issue for a long time. NTS issues are not only contested, but also complex.

To help develop a clearer conceptualization of NTS, the Consortium on Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) has offered a definition. According to NTS-Asia:

Non-traditional security issues are challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking and transnational crime. These dangers are often transnational in scope, defying unilateral remedies and requiring comprehensive—political, economic, social—responses, as well as humanitarian use of military force.¹⁷

Aside from these issues being non-military in nature, they also share common characteristics, namely:

- NTS threats do not stem from competition between states or shifts in balance of power.
- Threats are often caused by human-induced disturbances to the fragile balance of nature with dire consequences to both states and societies.
- Consequences of these threats are often difficult to reverse or repair.
- National solutions are often inadequate and thus require regional and multilateral cooperation.
- The object of security is no longer just the state (state sovereignty or territorial integrity), but also people (their survival, well-being, dignity), both at individual and communal levels.¹⁸

Moreover, NTS threats are often interlocking, with the occurrence of one NTS emergency leading to others. For example, Indonesia witnessed widespread social unrest and instability following the Asian financial crisis. In western Africa, many are concerned that the widespread transmission of Ebola has inflicted severe economic and social trauma, affecting the success of local peacebuilding efforts.¹⁹ The NTS framework allows us to identify and classify these types of issues, and with it, highlight the potential risks involved. In so doing, we can anticipate and hopefully prevent the occurrence of these types of developments.

**NTS Concerns in Asia Today**

Extreme weather events have caused severe problems in parts of Southeast Asia. Singapore, Malaysia, and northwest Indonesia have experienced their longest dry spell on

---

¹⁷ Caballero-Anthony, *An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies*. NTS-Asia is a project is funded by the Ford Foundation, and is directed by the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), in Singapore.

¹⁸ Caballero-Anthony, *An Introduction to Non-Traditional Security Studies*.

record, causing water shortages, transboundary haze pollution, and depletion of fish stocks. The region was also hit by tropical cyclone Hagupit, inflicting further devastation in the Philippines which was still reeling from the impact of Cyclone Yolanda in 2013. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 5th Assessment Report (AR5) has flagged Southeast Asia as likely the region most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

Climate change issues (mitigation and adaptation) as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) are thus high on the agenda of most governments in ASEAN.

Similarly, there is growing concern over the pursuit of civil nuclear capabilities in Southeast Asia. Because Southeast Asia is a seismically-active and cyclone-prone region of the world, should nuclear energy generation be started without the necessary precautions and governance in place, there could be catastrophic risks.

The migration of people is also proving to be a very difficult security problem to manage. Human trafficking among the labor and sex industries, the movement of refugees in countries like Myanmar, and the radicalization of populations and their emigration to conflict zones are all becoming pressing security issues for governments and communities to tackle.

Most of the concerns listed above hold true for South Asia as well: the 2009 swine flu pandemic in northern India claimed many lives as it moved to neighboring Pakistan and Nepal. It was reported that the flu impacted the daily lives of millions of people as well as the economies of the affected regions.20

The Indus waters continue to be a thorny issue between India and Pakistan. This is a classic example of not just a transboundary issue with potentially serious ramifications, but also of how a shared resource can have contending purposes on two sides of an international border. Here the contention lies in energy security (in the case for India) and water security (for Pakistan). How this issue is finally resolved will have serious consequences for both countries and the millions of people who depend on this important international river.

South Asia too has seen its fair share of unpredictable and devastating climate and weather events in recent years: temperature extremes, cyclones, droughts have taken thousands of lives and affected millions more. The Himalayas, which are an important feature in the global weather system, is one of the most vulnerable regions to predicted changes in global climate. India’s recent decision to join the United States and China in fighting climate change together is certainly a positive first step forward.

Most of the NTS challenges faced by Asia are not new and are not unique to specific regions. How these issues are framed and understood will have significant bearing on how they are approached, addressed, and—in the end—how many or how few will end up suffering. The appreciation and acceptance of NTS as a national security challenge with transboundary implications will compel states to not just cooperate, but also to create mechanisms to deal with such issues. And so moving forward, the questions that we should now be asking are:

- How do we encourage states to work with a broad spectrum of actors to address the range of insecurities affecting their own communities?
- How can we forge partnerships among different stakeholders to improve multi-level governance and in so doing address NTS challenges and promote human security?

Calls for enhanced multilateral security cooperation to address NTS challenges are certainly finding traction in many parts of the world, including in Southeast Asia. In ASEAN, the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC) is an example of an emerging regional mechanism with established institutions. The APSC is one of the three pillars constituting ASEAN’s “comprehensive” approach to a secure and peaceful ASEAN Community. The two other pillars are the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC)—which envisions a prosperous and economically competitive ASEAN region—and the ASEAN Socio-Economic Community (ASCC)—which aims to build a socially responsible ASEAN society. Within the APSC framework, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) and ADMM Plus were established to enhance security cooperation in critical NTS issues through their work in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR). Similarly, the AEC, the ASCC, and the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR) work toward food security. The ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) facilitates multilateral efforts in finding regional solutions to many of the interlocking non-traditional security challenges that affect the human security of states and peoples in ASEAN and the wider region.

So far, the results have been encouraging. APTERR in particular has produced significant results. Formulated with the cooperation of all ASEAN member states with China, South Korea, and Japan, the reserve was created in anticipation of any potential food security challenges that may arise in the region as a result of natural disasters or supply shocks in any of the member states. It is also designed to safeguard against potential international market failures (like the one in 2007-2008). Recent talk of reviving the SAARC Food Bank to mitigate food insecurity in the South Asian region during crises is a positive development as well. These examples demonstrate the growing awareness of NTS issues in Asia.

Conclusion

In the aftermath of the Cold War, as the world was said to have progressed towards a New World Order, there were questions about the future role of states, their relevance,
and their capability to provide political, social, and economic security for their populations. This was further bolstered by the spike in multilateralism and the popularity of ideas and institutions of global governance. Human rights and human security became the dominant framework in understanding global issues and challenges of the day, where states were often regarded as either barriers to or causes of the problems faced by people.

On the contrary, it is increasingly clear that states continue to be important actors. Once again we are seeing the global rise of power rivalry and geopolitics based on alliance systems. This power rivalry is most pronounced in East Asia as the United States and China compete to ensure their dominant position and influence in the region, with other regional powers like Russia, Japan, India and Australia trying to navigate themselves in this dynamic security theater. Given this reality, thinking and addressing emerging issues and challenges completely outside the framework of nation states could pose a serious threat for the lives of billions. By inherently acknowledging and referencing issues from the level of the state (top-down) and from the level of people and communities (bottom-up), the NTS framework helps identify, formulate, and address security concerns in a holistic and comprehensive manner. The two-level, integrated approach is a feature that NTS will continue to offer to the evolving security discourse in the foreseeable future.

Mely Caballero-Anthony is Associate Professor and Head of the Centre for Non-Traditional Security (NTS) Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Until May 2012, she served as Director of External Relations at the ASEAN Secretariat. She also currently serves in the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters and Security and had been a member of the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Agenda Council on Conflict Prevention.
Preparing for Pan-Epidemics of Urban Yellow Fever

Need for More Vaccine from Eggs and Cell Culture

Daniel Lucey

Asia’s previous experiences with epidemics—for example, with SARS, H1N1, and MERS—demonstrate that while the initial threat posed by the spread of deadly disease is usually significant, governments in the region ultimately tend to be proactive and effective in their responses. For example, after SARS, China and Singapore have now become world leaders in virus research and public health infrastructure strengthening. It is likely that South Korea will follow suit after its own experiences with MERS in 2015. That said, the public health infrastructure in Asia would not be able to cope with a sudden yellow fever epidemic—the possibility of which is now stark and imaginable.

The human security consequences of such an event would be manifold. For one, faced with a previously unknown disease, the media coverage of sick patients combined with the mass efforts to kill the Aedes mosquitoes that spread the disease would likely elicit widespread fear among the public. The public’s concerns about a new deadly disease in the region would be compounded by the facts that, one, no specific antiviral treatment exists for the disease and, two, global vaccine supplies are stretched dangerously thin because of ongoing yellow fever epidemics in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, as yellow fever is not endemic to Asia, the vast majority of people living there are not already vaccinated. There is also a highly variable ability to cope among Asian governments—in part related to disparities in public health infrastructure and epidemic preparedness.

The Virus

The yellow fever virus belongs to the same family of viruses as the Zika virus and Dengue virus. All three viruses are also transmitted by the same Aedes mosquitoes. “Yellow fever” is so named because this virus damages the liver and causes jaundice, thus conferring a yellow color to the white part of the eyes. In about 15 percent of people with yellow fever the disease is severe and often fatal. Failure of the liver and kidneys, with hemorrhaging, can occur. Thus, yellow fever is included among the hemorrhagic fever
viruses.\textsuperscript{1} As of today, there is no specific antiviral drug that is able to treat yellow fever. There is, however, a vaccine—first developed in the 1930s—that can confer lifelong protection.

Yellow fever is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa and South America and until March 2016, no cases of yellow fever had ever been reported from Asia.\textsuperscript{2} Currently, there is a multifocal epidemic, or “pan-epidemic” of yellow fever, requiring the vaccination of over 30 million people in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).\textsuperscript{3} Some have called the situation a “disaster waiting to happen.”\textsuperscript{4} Others have emphasized the need for governments to take proactive measures, including appropriately timed vaccination campaigns.\textsuperscript{5} This is increasingly difficult though because, as of August 2016, there is a serious shortage of yellow fever vaccines.\textsuperscript{6} A massive campaign to vaccine over 8 million persons in Kinshasa, the capital of DRC, using 1/5 of the normal dose of vaccine is taking place from August 17-28. This 1/5 dose is thought to confer protection for at least one year and possibly even longer; it will not, however, provide for the lifelong protection that the current full-dose vaccine does.\textsuperscript{7} On August 31, 2016 the World Health Organization (WHO) will convene their Emergency Committee on Yellow Fever for the second time in order to decide if a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) should be declared under the International Health Regulations (IHR).\textsuperscript{8}

Yellow Fever in Asia

Of major importance, eleven persons infected with the yellow fever virus in Angola flew home to China in March and April of 2016. These are the first persons ever diagnosed

\textsuperscript{5} Helen C.F. Maguire and David L Heymann, “Yellow Fever in Africa,” \textit{BMJ} (July 2016): 3764.
\textsuperscript{7} Thomas P Monath et al., “Yellow Fever Vaccine Supply: A Possible Solution,” \textit{The Lancet} 387, no. 10028 (April 2016): 1599-0.
with yellow fever anywhere in Asia. Thus, concern was raised over the potential for epidemics of yellow fever to occur in China and elsewhere in Asia, when Aedes mosquitoes become active during the warm weather months. These eleven persons were promptly identified, treated, and reported to the WHO in accordance with the IHR. The Chinese government quickly took several steps: (1) it sent a medical team to Angola to give yellow fever vaccination to unvaccinated Chinese nationals; (2) it optimized clinical management guideline availability for yellow fever cases; (3) and it increased measures to prevent local Aedes mosquitoes from spreading the yellow fever virus.\(^9\) While the response by the Chinese government shows how important it is that governments in different regions of the world cooperate, it also reveals that the importance of proactively assessing the potential risk of Asian migrant workers going to sub-Saharan Africa: the workers should have been vaccinated before leaving for Angola.

The reason for the lack of any (recognized) yellow fever disease in Asia in the past has been debated. Given that the Dengue virus is widespread in many parts of Asia—including southern China, Vietnam, India, Thailand—it is surprising that the same Aedes mosquitoes have not caused similar pan-epidemics of yellow fever. Some researchers hypothesize that this is because the immune response to Dengue infection also protects against yellow fever.\(^10\) Though others have also correctly pointed out that both Dengue and yellow fever can occur simultaneously in sub-Saharan Africa and South America.\(^11\) Asia should be no different in that regard. Still others argue that a yellow fever epidemic in Asia would occur only when enough persons (infected in Africa or South America) travel to Asia with the yellow fever virus still in their blood. In other words, only a dozen or so infected people returning to Asia might not be of sufficient number to spread the yellow fever disease by Aedes mosquitoes within an Asia nation, especially during a cold-weather month when mosquitoes are not active.

In this respect, there are several factors that place various regions of Asia at risk: (1) the existence of abundant Aedes mosquitoes; (2) large populations never vaccinated against yellow fever; (3) perhaps most importantly, there is a substantial increase in the numbers of people traveling to Asia (especially China) from parts of Africa during yellow fever epidemics; (4) limited experience with surveillance and clinical recognition of yellow fever.

**Capacities to Respond to Yellow Fever**

Yellow fever epidemics have historically been controlled by fighting both the mosquito vector that transmits the virus and also by vaccinating people at risk of infection. Together, the world’s six manufacturers of yellow fever vaccine make about eighty million doses a year. Of those six manufacturers, only four are prequalified by the WHO to


distribute yellow fever vaccine internationally. These four are in Brazil, Senegal, France, and Russia. The other two, in China (Beijing Tiantan Biological Products Co., Ltd) and the United States (Sanofi-Pasteur, Inc.), produce small amounts of vaccine only for their domestic markets e.g., for travelers. Unfortunately, it is difficult to quickly increase production as manufacturers are still using the same technology from the 1930s, which requires special, pathogen-free chicken eggs. This very old technology requires months to begin producing larger amounts of vaccine. Evidence for the resulting vaccine shortage during the ongoing epidemic is the fact that eight million people in Kinshasa are receiving only 1/5 doses during August 17-28, 2016.

Approximately six million doses of the vaccine are kept in emergency reserve stockpiles. However, during the widespread epidemics in Angola that began in December 2015, these stockpiles have been depleted several times. Outbreaks occurred throughout urban areas in Angola and then were recognized in Kinshasa, the capital of DRC, a city of about eleven million people. This extensive outbreak of yellow fever has resulted in the unprecedented use of a 1/5 normal dose—a strategy termed “fractional dosing” by the WHO, in the latter half of August 2016 in Kinshasa.

Today we are in a particularly high risk situation as governments would not be able to provide a full dose vaccine to everyone who needed it if yellow fever were to spread to even one more large city of ten million or more people (like Kinshasa). Therefore, if the yellow fever virus was to cause an epidemic in one such large city anywhere in Asia—let alone pan-epidemics in multiple cities—then there would be a serious shortage of vaccines. Moreover, a large surge in vaccine production in response to such a development would be precluded by the minimum six-month production process related to the use of the decades-old old technology that requires special chicken eggs.

What then could be done in the immediate future if yellow fever epidemics occurred in Asia and/or elsewhere in Africa later this year? In the case of another urban epidemic involving a large city, the only vaccine option available would be the use of fractional dosing, using either 1/5 or perhaps even 1/10 doses. In addition, the current International Health Regulations must be rigorously applied—that is to say, all travelers, workers, and business persons going to yellow fever endemic areas (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa or South America) must be vaccinated at least ten days before travel. Moreover, uninfected persons not vaccinated previously must be vaccinated before leaving those areas undergoing epidemics (e.g., Angola and the DRC now).

What can, and should, be done to prepare for urban epidemics of yellow fever in Asia (as well as elsewhere in the world), in the more intermediate future say from now until 2020? In addition to determining how long immune protection lasts after a 1/5 dose of

13 The Editorial Board, “A Yellow Fever Epidemic Made Worse by a Vaccine Shortage.”
14 Monath et al., “Yellow Fever Vaccine Supply,” 1599.
vaccine, the development of new types of yellow fever vaccines should be accelerated. For example, in July 2016 the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) announced plans to start an initial Phase I study involving 90 volunteers to test a novel yellow fever vaccine using only several genes of the virus, but with a Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA) vector to express these yellow fever virus genes and boost the protective immune response.

One important new type of yellow fever vaccine strategy is the use of cell-culture derived vaccines using cells grown in a laboratory (rather than eggs) to produce the vaccine virus. Either a live, attenuated virus or an inactivated virus (likely having a better safety profile than a live virus) could be grown in cell culture. This would allow manufacturers to produce large amounts of vaccine doses (“surge”) during or before an emergency situation, like now in the DRC and Angola. In fact, the immediate need for more vaccine could become realized very soon in other parts of Africa, such as in Brazzaville, directly across the Congo River from Kinshasa.15 One such cell-culture derived yellow fever vaccine was tested in a small study of 60 people in 2010.16

Given the potentially dire situation that we are facing, the further testing of cell culture vaccines seems warranted. In any case, the production of vaccines using cell-culture is a technology that is well-known to the U.S. FDA regulatory authorities. Vaccines to prevent other infections, such as influenza, that used eggs have already started to convert to modern cell culture technology.

**Conclusion: Policy Suggestions**

In short, it is time that we begin to develop yellow fever vaccines using cell cultures that meet regulatory requirements for licensure, as well as maximizing production of vaccines using current egg-based technology. Importantly, China and other nations in Asia could contribute to and benefit from producing yellow fever vaccine in large quantities. Only then can very large numbers of vaccine doses be made and deployed whenever and wherever they are needed—with reserves kept in multiple international stockpiles, including in Asia. This strategy is needed in order to prepare now for the moderate-risk, but very high-consequence event of the first-ever yellow fever outbreaks in Asia becoming pan-epidemics in large cities of unimmunized persons. Such epidemics would likely have major financial and political consequences, significantly disrupting international travel and trade. The threat such an event poses to public health would also be enormous.

Toward this goal of preparedness for yellow fever epidemics in Asia, it would be beneficial

---


to create a multi-partner, multi-sectoral strategic preparedness framework between nations inside and outside of Asia, and with international organizations already involved with yellow fever epidemics in Africa and South America. In the meantime, the enhanced use of yellow fever vaccine as part of childhood immunization programs and mass vaccination campaigns can hopefully create sufficient population immunity such that no further urban epidemics occur in the yellow fever endemic nations of Africa and South America.

Daniel R. Lucey is a Senior Scholar in the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law. He is also an adjunct professor of Medicine-Infectious Disease at Georgetown University Medical Center (GUMC). A physician trained in infectious diseases and public health, he has taught for 11 years at Georgetown on global emerging infectious diseases. He completed his infectious disease training and MPH at Harvard and worked in the US Public Health Service at the National Institutes of Health. He travels overseas during outbreaks such as to China and Canada during SARS; Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Egypt during avian influenza; South Korea and the Middle East during MERS; Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea during Ebola; Brazil during Zika; and China and the DR Congo for yellow fever. He anticipates more pan-epidemics in our Anthropocene Age.
The Strategic and Tactical Implications of the Islamic State on Southeast Asia’s Militant Groups

Zachary Abuza

The rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has had a profound impact on terrorism in Southeast Asia at both the strategic and tactical levels. While the overall number of Southeast Asians who have traveled to join ISIS remains relatively small, those who have done so have had a disproportionate impact on the course of Salafi jihadism in Southeast Asia. As ISIS continues to lose more territory in Iraq and Syria, it will rely on affiliates to launch attacks to prove the group maintains its lethal capabilities.

The Strategic Level

At the strategic level, ISIS has had important impacts on terrorist networks in Southeast Asia. First, ISIS reinvigorated regional terrorist networks. The Al Qaeda affiliated Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings, and subsequent attacks, was operationally defunct by 2010, following debilitating factional schisms and the arrest of over 800 members around the region. In 2009, there was an attempt to bridge the divide between two factions—one that wanted to pursue the Al Qaeda line and continue targeting the West, and another that wanted to go back to committing sectarian attacks. But before the new leadership could reorient the group’s targeting and tactics, Indonesian security forces broke up the training camp in early 2010 and neutralized some 120 militants.

There were several key splinters and affiliates that emerged out of the wreckage, including Mujihideen Islam Indonesia (MII), Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis (KOMPAK), and Mujihideen Indonesian Timur (MIT), to name but a few. But there was neither a central, unified command nor a spiritual leader. And while some cells rejected ISIS and remained loyal to Al Qaeda and its Syrian affiliate, Al Nusrah, the competition revitalized them all, as they sought recruits and ideological primacy. By late 2015, JI (now known as Neo JI) had re-emerged with some of the deepest social networks.¹

In Malaysia, where JI was all but defeated, the success of ISIS led to far more prolific recruitment efforts that stretched across the socio-economic spectrum, as well as alliances with smaller cells. In the Philippines, at least six different groups pledged allegiance to ISIS and by early 2016 there were attempts to put them into a somewhat unified command structure.

In arrest after arrest, police found that individuals had ties to multiple groups, which suggests social and kinship ties play far more important roles than organizational ones. Indeed, it is likely that our Western obsession with taxonomy and labeling overstates the number of organizations and groupings. Rather than having discernible “in” and “out” groups, we are in fact looking at a loose and fluid network. For example, a Malaysian militant, who was recently filmed in an ISIS beheading video in Syria, started his foray into jihad with Kumpulan Mujihideen Malaysia. He then traveled to Indonesia and joined JI, where he was involved with different paramilitary groups engaged in sectarian bloodletting in central Sulawesi before being arrested. He was later recruited into ISIS.²

There is very little that ideologically divides ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Al Nusrah (now renamed Jabhat Fath al-Sham).³ Al Qaeda still believes that the ISIS strategy of trying to provoke a sectarian war with the Shia may be counterproductive, but its position on the issue has been inconsistent. Where there are divisions between the groups, they usually fall to ego, personal rivalries, and the desire to control the global Salafi jihadist movement.

This has important implications for Southeast Asia, whose militant groups remain relatively split, not on ideological grounds, but due to personal relationships. Most Southeast Asian jihadists float between the Al Qaeda groups or ISIS affiliates not due to a shared, deep theological or ideological understanding, but rather on the basis of patronage. The personal relationships in these networks truly matter and the situation in Southeast Asia is very fluid. As Indonesian analyst Yohanes Sulamain explained, part of it is simply about opportunity and survival:

Those old JI guys are lying low, they know the police know them, and besides, they see there is a huge social backlash against them. It’s very difficult to find any skilled bomb makers in Indonesia, people who know how to build a car bomb that could kill many people. The

---


The *Journal* welcomes original social science research papers written on issues relevant to politics, security, economy, culture, and society of contemporary Asia, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. “Contemporary” is understood broadly as recent, but not necessarily as current. We are pleased to consider articles with historical background sections so long as such analyses are crucial for advancing core arguments.

**SUBMISSION GUIDELINES**

Submissions should be emailed to guasiajournal@gmail.com as MS Word documents. Please do not submit in PDF format. Authors should include a short bio in the email text, but must avoid any self-identification in the manuscript as we send our articles out for anonymous review.

**Document:** Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft Word, with 1-inch/2.5-centimeter margins on all sides.

**Length:** Manuscripts should be 5,000-7,000 words in length.

**Style:** Authors must follow *The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed.*

**Citations:** All citations must be formatted as footnotes. Please also include a full bibliography at the end.

**Abstract:** Authors must include an abstract (100-200 words) that effectively and concisely summarizes his/her study.

*Submissions must not be plagiarized, copyrighted, or under review elsewhere.*
current crop of jihadists is very young and they are aligning themselves with the Islamic State because they see it as the movement of the future—more active, more radical.\(^4\)

Furthermore, as JI was unable to execute attacks, ISIS affiliates stepped into the void. In January 2016, ISIS-affiliated militants launched an attack on a Starbucks in downtown Jakarta. Of the eight people killed, four were the militants; but some twenty-five others were wounded. The casualty rate was low for three reasons: they were poorly trained, they had inferior equipment, and the Indonesian police responded quickly. The low death toll in this attack though should not be considered a benchmark for future attacks.

Counterterrorism officials in Southeast Asia are bracing for increased attacks of greater lethality for five reasons. First, there are between 300 to 400 Southeast Asians fighting in Iraq and Syria with either ISIS or with what used to be Al Nusrah. Both governments and the media often state figures between 800 and 1,000, but these figures are confusing and unsubstantiated. For example, these numbers include women and children that accompanied the men, the 200 to 300 who have already been returned by Turkish authorities, as well as the estimated 100 Southeast Asians who have been killed in combat.

This is not to belittle the role of women and other noncombatants. Women have played key roles in recruitment and indoctrination for ISIS in Southeast Asia in ways that they were never allowed to under JI. Women are frequently the most important propagandists, ideologues, and recruiters for ISIS. In Malaysia, authorities have found women at the center of every major cell that they have disrupted.\(^5\) Women have never been as empowered to take a proactive place within a jihadist movement as they have been with ISIS.

Militants are starting to filter back to Southeast Asia in increasing numbers—numbers which will escalate as ISIS continues to suffer military setbacks.\(^6\) While Malaysian authorities have the legal authority to detain them, Indonesian authorities do not. Indonesian counter-terrorism officials estimate that some 60 to 100 have already returned.\(^7\) These individuals are returning with experience on the battlefield and in organizing operations. There is no shortage of willing recruits to join these organizations, but what


\(^7\) “Islamic State Linked to Suicide Bombing in Indonesian City: Police,” *Benar News*, July 5, 2016.
has been missing is organizational capacity and leadership. These skills are all the more important because traveling to Iraq, Syria, and now Libya, has become logistically so difficult.

In 2014, when Southeast Asians first started to arrive in Syria, they were largely used as cannon fodder or given menial tasks such as guard duty. By the fall of 2014, they had been organized into their own Bahasa-speaking company named Katibah Nusantara and headed by Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi (also known as Bharumsyah). Due to both experience and improved organization, they have emerged as a fairly effective combat force. Setbacks by other ISIS units have furthered the importance of Katibah Nusantara on the battlefield, which has played an important role in fighting Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

The second reason counterterrorism officials in Southeast Asia are worried is because of “outbidding,” a process whereby groups garner support and patronage from ISIS or Al Qaeda by perpetrating successful attacks. In Indonesia, some groups are loosely affiliated under the coalition group Jamaah Ansyrarul Khalifah Islamiyah (JAKI), established in November 2015. Many other groups though have been rivals or divided because of leadership issues in the past. Only by causing mass casualties will small fringe groups get the attention of large groups like the Islamic State and, at the same time, win over supporters who see such attacks, not as acts of barbarism, but of empowerment and strength. Bharumsyah, the Indonesian with arguably the deepest ties to ISIS leadership, had no role in the January Jakarta attack, but he has since called on his followers to stage attacks. Likewise, in June 2016, Indonesian authorities arrested a three person cell in Surabaya, just days before they were able to perpetrate a suicide attack. The cell was reportedly loyal to Abu Jandal, a leading Indonesian militant in Syria who is in direct competition with Bharumsyah. This was a technologically more sophisticated cell than what has been seen of late in Indonesia and a clear attempt to challenge Bharumsyah’s leadership. Not everyone agrees that “outbidding” will lead to more violence: a leading Indonesian analyst, Noor Huda Ismail, believes that the infighting has reached such a point that it has actually crippled operations.

---

12 Hodge and Stewart, “Rifts in Indonesia’s jihadist groups thwart attacks.”
A third reason analysts are worried is because not only have those in Iraq and Syria spent the past few years developing new contacts and relationships with other fellow Southeast Asian militants, their ties now include transnational jihadists. That is, Southeast Asians are now tied to their European, West Asian, and African counterparts by marriage and kinship. There is a strong likelihood that some of these itinerant jihadists will make their way to Southeast Asia where they will train, indoctrinate, and possibly perpetrate attacks.

Fourth, recent military setbacks in Iraq and Syria may compel ISIS leadership to push affiliates to stage diversionary attacks. ISIS has suffered major defeats in the cities of Mosul, Serte, Falluja, and increasingly in Raqqa itself. Other than reversing these military defeats and holding onto their territory, the only way that they are able to bolster morale within their movement is to successfully stage attacks around the world, or claim credit for lone wolf attacks done in their name such as in Orlando, Florida. As an ISIS spokesman said in a May 2016 speech, “The smallest action you do in the heart of their land is dearer to us than the largest action by us, and more effective and more damaging to them.”

The fifth and final reason officials are worried is because the security situation in the Philippine islands of Mindanao and Sulu is getting worse after years of improvement. While most of the headlines from the southern Philippines focus on the spate of kidnappings and savage beheadings of captives by the Abu Sayaf Group (ASG), these are actually the least of our worries. There are roughly six groups in the southern Philippines that have pledged allegiance to ISIS. While the ASG is one of them, it is a loose collection of groups, and only one of them has credibility amongst transnational jihadists. Both Ansharut al Khalifah Philippines and Dawlah Islamiyah, have the ideological pretensions to appeal to the Islamic State. More importantly, their ties to central Mindanao means they will be able to tap into the manpower and resources of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), whose peace process with the government has stalled. The MILF has no incentive to serve as a responsible stakeholder and police its territory. Furthermore, the indefinite delay of the peace process raises very important questions as to how long the MILF leadership can maintain command and control of their units and prevent defection to groups that are loyal to ISIS.

The Philippine groups have already attracted militants from Malaysia, Indonesia, and even Morocco. And with the nominal unification of four groups under a single command

---

in January 2016, an ISIS media arm, recognized their pledge of bay’at.\textsuperscript{16} For the first
time in many years, the governments in Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur view Mindanao as
ungoverned space that threatens regional security. And unlike all but one Indonesian
group—the MIT—the Philippine groups are poised to control territory, giving ISIS an
opportunity to declare a \textit{wilayat}, naming part of the Philippines a province of the Caliphate. If nothing else, the growing ungoverned space might make a welcome refuge for itinerant jihadis flowing out of Iraq and Syria.

\textbf{The Tactical Level}

But it is not just at the strategic level that we are seeing the role and influence of ISIS.
They have influenced militants in Southeast Asia at the tactical level in six distinct
ways.

First, since mid-2014, there have been four terrorist plots that were close to execu-
tion before being disrupted by Malaysian security forces. These included the attempted
bombing of a Carlsberg brewery, an attack in the downtown tourist district of Bukit
Bintang, and a suicide bomb attack.\textsuperscript{17} This is significantly different from the period in
which JI organized and operated in Malaysia yet never once plotted an attack there.
A major attack in Malaysia would have far greater consequences than one in Indo-
nesia and would likely provoke an intense reaction by the government. Any attack in
Malaysia would also exacerbate already tense communal relations between the Malay
majority and Chinese and Indian minorities.\textsuperscript{18}

Second, ISIS is increasingly calling for “lone wolf” attacks, such as those in Bangla-
desh, where militants tied to both Al Qaeda and ISIS have selectively targeted some
thirty atheists, LGBT activists, foreign aid workers, and other perceived enemies since
2013.\textsuperscript{19} Indonesian counter-terrorism officials are currently unsure of how to classify
the July 4th suicide bombing in Solo. The perpetrator was part of a network that was
largely broken up by police in late 2015, and appears to have been operating largely on
his own since, inspired by ISIS’s calls for Ramadan attacks.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{16} “Islamic State spreads its wings in South East Asia,” \textit{Newsgram}, March 12, 2016,
http://www.newsgram.com/islamic-state-spreads-its-wings-in-south-east-asia; Bay’at is Arabic for
“allegiance.”
\textsuperscript{17} Stuart Grudgings and Trinna Leong, “Malaysian militants bought bomb material for planned at-
\textsuperscript{18} Zachary Abuza, “Terror attack could rip apart Malaysian society,” \textit{Southeast Asia Globe}, March 7,
\textsuperscript{19} Emma Graham-Harrison and Saad Hammadi, “Inside Bangladesh’s killing fields: bloggers and out-
jun/11/bangladesh-murders-bloggers-foreigners-religion.
\textsuperscript{20} Farouk Arnaz, “Solo Suicide Bomber Was a Member of Hisbah Terror Group: Police Source,” \textit{Jakar-
bah-terror-group-police-source.
A third tactic that is in their capabilities is the so-called “barricade style attack” seen in Paris, Dhaka, and earlier this year in Jakarta. In these attacks, perpetrators armed only with small arms and low-level explosives take hostages. Such attacks require very little technical capacity, very little training or planning, and very little organization. Despite these low barriers, it has a high probability of causing mass casualties.\footnote{21}

Fourth, although militant groups in Southeast Asia, including Malay insurgents in southern Thailand, the ASG, and JI splinters in Indonesia, have all engaged in the beheading of victims, it was not until April 2016 that an ISIS-affiliated group did so in front of cameras—making it the first time it had been done so in order for it to be glorified in propaganda.\footnote{22}

Fifth, ISIS affiliation will likely lead to more sectarian attacks. In December 2015, Indonesian counter-terrorism police arrested nine individuals who were plotting to target a Shia mosque in Bogor as well as Christian churches.\footnote{23} These sectarian attacks have been enabled by government policies, such as the Malaysian and Indonesian governments’ banning of Shiism and other sects. A blind eye has also been cast by civil society and religious authorities toward the plight of Muslim minorities. When the Malaysian government did not crackdown on a senior Mufti who called the country’s minorities “\textit{kaffir harbi},” (i.e., enemies of Islam who could be killed), it gave ISIS ideological space in the public discourse.\footnote{24}

Lastly, there have been at least eleven Southeast Asian suicide bombers, including seven from Malaysia and four from Indonesia.\footnote{25} This growing number, coupled with the glorification of martyrdom, creates fertile ground for future recruits. In January 2016, Malaysian authorities arrested a suicide bomber awaiting orders from Bahrun Naim in Syria.\footnote{26}


\footnote{22} “Could Asian militants be bringing terrorism back home?” \textit{The Star}.


Counter-Terrorism

What does this all mean for counterterrorism efforts in the region? Both the Malaysian and Indonesian governments have pushed for additional powers. The Malaysian government pushed the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) through Parliament in 2015 giving it additional powers to detain people without trial, and potentially even torture suspects.27 To date, Malaysian police have arrested some 193 suspects with alleged links to ISIS, though some of the links are quite tenuous indeed; 64 have been charged in court while the remainder have been either detained without charge under POTA or are awaiting trial.28

Since the Jakarta attack in January 2016, security officials in Indonesia have been pushing for the passage of a revised counter-terrorism bill in Parliament that would allow for preventative detention, the ability to arrest people for having traveled overseas to support or fight with a militant group, and additional cyber surveillance capabilities.29 The draft law has created a backlash in Parliament: human rights activists and some parliamentarians are calling for greater oversight over the counter-terrorism police, which has been responsible for the death of some 120 suspects including one in custody.30 Islamist members of Parliament are against the bill because they see it as a tool of a corrupt secular government being used against their constituents. At the same time, Indonesia is seeking to double the size of its elite counter-terrorism police force.31 Most controversial, however, is that the Indonesian military (TNI) is trying to legally enshrine a counter-terrorism role for itself, as part of a larger campaign to wrest back powers it has lost since the end of the Suharto regime in 1998.32 While the TNI has tried to make the case that it is the only security force with the capabilities to engage in jungle warfare, few believe that it will accept a limited role as additional counter-terrorism resources are allocated.

What Indonesia needs more than anything else though is prison reform. Each of Indonesia’s militant groups actively recruits in prisons, where they have their own social networks. Indeed, prisons have proven to be one of the most fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist organizations. Indonesian prisons are notoriously open, with convicts able to access mobile phones, the internet, and social media services. Part of the planning for the Jakarta attack was carried out by Abdurrahman Aman and Bali bomber Rois from Nusakambangan Prison. A dedicated prison for convicted terrorists, so that they cannot recruit from amongst the general prisoner population, has been in the works for over two years.

Indonesia also lacks any mechanisms or resources for post-release monitoring. Indonesian officials currently have lost track of nearly 200 former terrorism convicts who have been released. There are currently an estimated 215 individuals incarcerated following terrorism convictions, with an estimated fifty to be released in 2016. Recidivism rates in Indonesia are not exceptionally high, at roughly 10 percent, but the limited capabilities of security forces to monitor them, compounds the problem.

In conclusion, ISIS poses a small but tangible threat to the governments of Southeast Asia. To date, few militants have returned from the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. As such, ISIS attacks in Southeast Asia have still been small and amateurish. The governments though have every reason to be concerned about the return of experienced militants who will be able to better organize and execute attacks. There is an active debate amongst scholars and analysts whether the military defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria will compel the organization or self-motivated supporters to execute attacks in Southeast Asia in order to prove that the organization still has power. Clearly, ISIS propaganda in Southeast Asia has picked up with the recent publication of a Bahasa language newspaper, Alfatihin. Whether ISIS’s military setbacks will lead to an exodus of militants from Iraq and Syria and back to Southeast Asia remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the past two and a half years have revitalized nearly defunct terrorist networks and indoctrinated a new generation of militants who are highly motivated by the sectarian ideology of ISIS.


Zachary Abuza is a Professor at the National War College, in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security issues, including governance, insurgencies, democratization and human rights. He is the author of Forging Peace in Southeast Asia: Insurgencies, Peace Processes, and Reconciliation (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), a comparative analysis of the peace processes in Aceh, Mindanao, and southern Thailand.
Maritime Security Deficits and International Cooperation

Illegal Fishing, Piracy, and Maritime Security Deficits in Southeast Asia

Derek S. Reveron

International security for the last thirty years has been characterized by security deficits, which I define as a government’s inability to meet its national security obligations without external support.¹ Intra-state, transnational, and regional actors challenge governments’ abilities to provide a secure environment for their citizens: the Philippines struggles with terrorism, Singapore confronts maritime piracy, and Japan must deal with an unpredictable, nuclear-armed North Korea. Even though these conflicts are isolated in Asia, the effects of these security deficits are felt throughout the world, drawing in external powers from North America and Europe. While much attention is focused on interstate rivalries created by China’s efforts to extend its territory, maritime forces in the region have been coming together to confront shared challenges caused by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and maritime piracy.

When he commanded the U.S. Seventh Fleet based in Japan, Vice Adm. Robert Thomas remarked, “One of the unique aspects of navies is that we meet and interact with each other on neutral turf. We operate in international waters and international airspace. At sea, we are mariners regardless of our nationality; in the air, we are aviators regardless of our political beliefs.”² For example, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia conduct joint patrols to secure important trade routes; sixteen countries participated in the 2013 Philippine typhoon relief operation; and ASEAN members agreed to protect the marine environment as well as promote eco-tourism and a fishery regime in East Asia.

These activities are unsurprising given that more than 70 percent of the earth’s surface is covered by water, 80 percent of the world’s population lives near a coast, and 90 percent of international commerce by volume travels by sea. These facts have long been

true, but, in recent years, awareness of the dangers to maritime security and the challenges posed by maritime security deficits has increased. The UN General Assembly is “concerned that marine pollution from all sources, including vessels and, in particular, land-based sources, constitutes a serious threat to human health and safety, endangers fish stocks, marine biodiversity, and marine and coastal habitats and has significant costs to local and national economies.” Conventions such as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code seek to prevent terrorism and other security incidents on ships and in ports. Programs such as the Container Security Initiative place customs inspectors in international ports to screen cargo. And international naval coalitions with countries as diverse as Pakistan, South Korea, and Denmark have been sending warships to promote maritime security in the Indian Ocean since the late 2000s. Because maritime forces provide forward presence and logistical capabilities, governments and nongovernmental groups are coming together to address the sources of maritime insecurity, of which IUU fishing and maritime piracy are of particular prominence.

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing

Fish provide more than 2.9 billion people with at least 15 percent of their average per capita animal protein intake. Yet IUU fishing devastates fish stocks and undermines developing countries’ food supplies. UN General Assembly Resolution 62/177 deplored the fact that “illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing constitutes a serious threat to fish stocks and marine habitats and ecosystems, to the detriment of sustainable fisheries as well as the food security and the economies of many states, particularly developing states.” The UN Food and Agriculture Organization declared that IUU fishing constitutes a serious threat to (a) fisheries, especially those of high value that are already overfished (e.g., cod, tuna, redfish, and swordfish); (b) marine habitats, including vulnerable marine ecosystems; and (c) food security and the economies of developing countries. Under UN resolutions, states are encouraged to take effective measures to deter illegal activities that undermine fisheries’ conservation and management practices. Given the importance of fish protein, the scope of the problem is global, but it has a disproportionate effect on developing countries that do not have alternate food sources, the income to afford food imports, or the maritime service forces to reduce

IUU fishing.

In Asia, several countries are making it a priority to reduce IUU fishing, which creates losses of at least $6 billion annually. Indonesia, which estimates it loses significant revenue annually to IUU fishing, launched the Global Maritime Fulcrum strategy in 2014. The strategy calls for efforts to regain control of its maritime borders and target IUU fishing vessels. Since October 2014, Indonesia has sunk at least eighty-four foreign fishing vessels and confiscated dozens more for alleged poaching. In 2015, ASEAN adopted guidelines to reduce IUU fishing with the objective “to promote regional collaboration among the ASEAN member states (AMs) in strengthening monitoring, control, and surveillance systems of fish and fishery products entering in the supply chain.” Losses to struggling societies have an immediate economic impact, but future fish stocks are jeopardized too. Consequently, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization brokered a global treaty to combat IUU fishing. Negotiated in 2009 and ratified by South Korea, the European Union, the United States, and dozens of other countries, the treaty did not enter into force until summer 2016. While it is too soon to tell if the treaty will be effective, it is a promising approach since boats involved in illegal activities must bring their catch ashore. By focusing on enforcement in ports, in addition to patrolling vast fishing grounds, this treaty is one more way for states to assert their sovereignty and reduce maritime security deficits.

At the same time that governments are sending their maritime forces to confront IUU fishing, pro-environmental groups are also seeking to reduce maritime insecurity. For example, Greenpeace and the Environmental Justice Foundation now identify over-fishing as a contributing factor to piracy. Groups such as Friends of the Earth and the Basel Action Network attempt to limit maritime pollution by targeting destructive ship disposal practices that escape state regulation; they also provide fuel for cash-strapped militaries so that they can increase patrols of ecologically important areas. To protect coral reefs against using poisons, such as cyanide, to stun and harvest tropical fish, the World Resources Institute and other groups are collaborating with the Indo-Pacific Destructive Fishing Reform Program to assist governments in Southeast Asia. To support this effort, developed countries are using their maritime services to help developing countries build capacity for fisheries management by monitoring their exclusive economic zones, patrolling their territorial waters, and securing their port facilities.

---


9 Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center/Marine Fishery Resources Development & Management Department, “ASEAN Guidelines for Preventing the Entry of Fish and Fishery Products from IUU Fishing Activities into the Supply Chain,” August 24, 2015.


Piracy

While largely a nuisance to developed countries since the nineteenth century, piracy recaptured international attention in the first decade of the 2000s. Article 101 of the UN Convention Law of the Sea defines piracy as “any illegal acts of violence or detention...committed for private ends...directed on the high seas, against another ship...in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State.” The world has lived with piracy for millennia. When U.S. commerce was threatened in the eighteenth century, Presidents Jefferson and Madison sent the Navy and the Marines to North Africa to stop the pirate attacks from the Barbary States and were mainly successful in doing so. What is different three centuries later, however, is that merchant fleets are mainly private, piracy is no longer state sponsored, and threats to sea-lanes are now thought of as a global rather than a national threat.

Up until 1994, reports of piracy and armed robbery against ships were, more or less, equally distributed around the world. As global trade increased throughout the 1990s, however, piracy increased in the key shipping lanes of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean. Since 2004 there have been on average 275 attacks around the world each year; piracy off the coast of Somalia spiked in 2008–10, trapping hundreds of Southeast Asian merchant mariners in Somalia. From 2011 to 2015, successful and attempted acts of piracy in Southeast Asia more than doubled to about 150 acts, which made the region the hub of global piracy.

A pirated vessel can produce exceptional income for the perpetrators of piracy. Acts of piracy, from crimes of opportunity against transiting vessels in the Malacca Straits to ship seizures orchestrated by organized gangs, can earn anywhere from a few thousand dollars in stolen booty to millions of dollars in ransom paid to recover a merchant ship and her crew. To date, pirates have only conducted hijacking for ransom and have not engaged in terrorism. The last decade suggests piracy is more analogous to carjacking than it is to car bombing.

Most experts agree that the problem of piracy begins ashore. Martin Murphy explains that the basic elements that facilitate piracy include large ungoverned areas, poor governance, and the inability of governments to adequately patrol their territorial waters or defend their seaports. Both state and non-state actors are attempting to improve security in ungoverned spaces through maritime security cooperation. For example, Japan has promoted the Regional Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP).

---

13 ICC International Maritime Bureau, “Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Report for the Period 1 January-31 December,” January 2016, Table 1.
to support cooperative efforts; the International Chamber of Commerce has sponsored a real-time information sharing center; and ASEAN has served as a forum to harmonize multinational counter-piracy efforts. The broader effort in the maritime space requires partners with capabilities to protect their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones.

**Overcoming Maritime Security Deficits**

As countries in Asia become more aware of the security deficits at sea characterized by illegal fishing and piracy, they have been working through multilateral organizations such as ASEAN and promoting good order at sea through treaties. Additionally, states in Asia seek external assistance to target actors who increasingly generate maritime insecurity by capitalizing on weak security structures. Countries throughout the region often lack the maritime capacity themselves to monitor, patrol, and interdict illicit activities in their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. For example, the Philippine Navy and Coast Guard combined are smaller than the U.S. Coast Guard alone. This shortcoming prevents early threat identification and effective response. To overcome these limits and reassert sovereignty, governments seek partnerships with larger and more advanced militaries.

The United States and Japan have been responding to these requests for assistance by training and equipping other countries to confront piracy, illicit trafficking, and other threats to maritime shipping lanes. Through “train and equip” grants, foreign military sales, as well as education and training programs, both countries agreed to coordinate capacity building assistance for maritime safety and security in the Asia-Pacific region. These activities are a part of maritime security force assistance, which “promotes stability by developing partner nation capabilities to govern, control, and protect their harbors, inland and coastal waters, natural resources, commercial concerns, and national and regional maritime security interests.”

Maritime security force assistance teaches navies a variety of visit, board, search, and seizure techniques, which are used when interdicting illicit trafficking and conducting counterpiracy operations. The goal is to strengthen states’ sovereignty when challenged by subnational, transnational, and regional actors. Another major benefit to cooperation is that maritime partners are empowered to enforce maritime law. Given the expansive size of the Pacific Ocean and the much smaller size of maritime forces in the region, programs like these that help governments catch up with illicit actors will persist for many years.

---

16 The views expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent the official position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
Derek Reveron is a Professor of National Security Affairs and the EMC Informationist Chair at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, R.I. and a Faculty Affiliate at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School. He specializes in strategy development, non-state security challenges, and U.S. defense policy. He has authored or edited ten books. This article is derived from Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military, Second Edition. He can be reached through http://www.usnwc.edu/derekreveron.
When used in an academic or policy context, “security” usually refers to the protection of state territory. However, the concept of security has also been extended to describe situations where the social, economic, and environmental sustainability of communities is at risk.\(^1\) It is this kind of “security” wherein scholars, development agencies, non-governmental organizations, and scholars discuss the issues of water security, food security, and energy security. There has been a marked trend in progressive academic and policy circles over the past several decades to eschew considerations of state security as “old fashioned.”\(^2\) Many progressives choose to focus exclusively on issues of community security through programming on human rights, stakeholder participation, and local entrepreneurship.

But the security of any community is always in complex interaction with the more traditional considerations of state security. States have the power to structure many aspects of community life, including the provision of communication and transport infrastructure, the provision of education and medical goods, the type of tax regime and how it is enforced, as well as the nature of the tariff and customs regime. The challenge before us, then, is to determine how state security is related to the broader goal of ensuring community security. With this understanding of security in mind, we can now examine the case of water and security in Pakistan.

The first major factor to consider in the human or community security context of Pakistan is the agro-ecological complex surrounding the Indus Rivers in Pakistan. The Indus River System is composed of its main stem, the Indus River, five major eastern tributaries—the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas rivers—and one major western tributary known as the Kabul river. The Indus and the five eastern tributaries have been


modified by engineers for over a century. The British Empire, followed by the Pakistani and Indian states, have sunk billions of dollars into developing these rivers with irrigation canals, weirs, barrages, and some of the largest dams in the world. These irrigated fields contribute to the bulk of Pakistan’s supply of food, export earnings, and livelihoods. The wheat, rice, cotton, and sugar crop is dependent on irrigation and provides food, jobs, and social meaning for over millions of people.

A second factor is the political geography of the region. The borders between the states of South Asia have been the subject of conflict and controversy throughout history. By the early 1900s, the British ruled the entirety of South Asia. British rule in the subcontinent was either exerted directly and formally or informally through proxies. In the summer of 1947, the British formally ended their Indian empire and left behind two successor states in India and Pakistan. Pakistan was a political geographical oddity, for it consisted of two wings: one along the western border of India—which was called West Pakistan until 1971 and is simply “Pakistan” today—and one along the eastern border of India—which was called East Pakistan until 1971 and is “Bangladesh” today.

The two factors described above are important to keep in mind as we identify policy interventions that can help make state security work to enhance community security in South Asia and especially Pakistan. The western border between India and Pakistan divided the Indus Basin into Indian and Pakistani parts.

The British built an irrigation system along the rivers to be operated as an integrated unit. However, with the independence of Pakistan and India, the irrigation system became a source of conflict and international controversy. At the root of this controversy is the fact that India became the “upstream riparian” on the Indus relative to Pakistan, which became the “downstream riparian.” This means that Indian territory is located at a higher elevation than Pakistani territory. Therefore, the river water flows through India before it reaches Pakistan and, consequently, water diverted for consumptive use in India is not available for use in Pakistan, ensuring a classic situation of uneven power over natural resources.

Moreover, within the federation of Pakistan, the province of Punjab is upstream relative to the province of Sindh. Thus, the upstream/downstream dynamics and the boundaries of administrative and political boundaries shape the political geography of the river. This brings me to discuss two policy areas where water can be considered through the interaction of state and community security.

---

Land reform is the first policy area that brings together state security and community security around issues of water. Land reform is vital to the long term integrity, legitimacy, and prosperity of the communities that depend on the Indus. Relative to East Asian states, land reform in South Asia—especially in Pakistan—has been weakly formulated and ineffectively implemented. The property regime currently in effect in Pakistan was inherited from the British Imperial state with only minor changes. When the British annexed the provinces of Punjab in the mid-nineteenth century, they introduced private property in land. Before this, while there had certainly been dominant and subordinate agrarian classes, this uneven power was not primarily rooted in the institution of private property in land.5

The British granted private ownership in land to their allies amongst dominant kin groups, the Sufi clergy, and the military. However, instead of allowing a truly competitive market in private land to develop, the British imperial state froze the process that they had instituted by passing the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1901. This act forbade “non-agricultural castes” from alienating land from “agricultural castes.”6 This guaranteed that the social groups amongst which the British had cultivated loyalty could manage to hold onto their land even in the face of competitive pressures, and thus effectively remain in power in the countryside. In return, these powerful landed elites maintained peace in the countryside and asserted a powerful hold over Pakistan’s rural masses.7

Over the past century, this basic system that links private property in land to state power has remained in place—despite the ostensible rupture of formal independence in 1947. Other powerful sectors of Pakistani society such as the military and industrial classes have also entered the ranks of landowners through marriage and investment. Many people in Pakistan share the perception that the state is under the control of a corrupt group of landed elites. This perception of corruption and illegitimacy makes the state vulnerable to armed and ideological attack from right-wing extremists like the Taliban. This in turn creates economic instability in the country and makes the state elite unable to focus on the goal of long term inclusive development. Thus, inequality in landownership is a major factor in the inability of the Pakistani state to function as a democratic entity committed to inclusive development.

The second policy area where state security and community security comes together around water is the democratic self-determination of regions. In domestic terms, there is intense competition between the provinces of Pakistan over the resources of the Indus Rivers. This tension exists despite the signing of the Indus Water Accord in 1991, which declared a formula for the distribution of Indus waters between the provinces of Pakistan.8 In international terms, the Indus has been a huge topic of controversy

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
between Pakistan and India for more than a decade after their independence. The signing of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement of 1960, both of which were mediated by the World Bank, brought a measure of state security for Pakistan and India by bringing in billions of dollars of hydraulic engineering investment into the region. However, this state security was bought by Indian, Pakistani, and international diplomatic and development elites at a considerable cost: the right for Kashmiri self-determination.

The Kashmir issue is inextricable from the international politics of the Indus because the three largest rivers in the system—the Indus main stem, the Jhelum, and the Chenab—flow through Kashmir before entering Pakistani territory. This means that control of Kashmiri territory is not, as most analysts normally suspect, only about religious passions but also about control of precious fresh water in the highlands for the benefit of lowland landscapes dominated by irrigated agriculture. After in depth examination of the Indus Waters Treaty and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement negotiation, it is clear that the political question of Kashmir was explicitly put aside to achieve what political elites understood as state security for Pakistan and India.

About sixty years after the signing of the Indus Water Treaty, the territorial dispute over Kashmir is still raging on, with India controlling roughly two-thirds of the disputed territory and Pakistan controlling the remainder. Both the Pakistani and Indian states deploy thousands of troops in Kashmir and maintain special control over access to and mobility within the region. India and Pakistan also withhold full and equal constitutional status for Kashmir within their respective state apparatuses. Insurgency, proxy wars, and counterinsurgency have been rife in Kashmir for decades. For many people living in the region of Kashmir, the rhythms of ordinary life are repeatedly and violently interrupted. Kashmiris were given no formal voice in the negotiations of the Indus Waters Treaty. Thus one glaring feature of the politics of the Indus in South Asia is that state security has been achieved at the cost of considerable community security.

To effectively leverage state security so that it furthers community security, the international consensus around the Indus Waters Treaty must be revisited. The Kashmir dispute must be understood as part and parcel of the geopolitics of the Indus, for the simple reason that much of the waters of the Indus system flow through Kashmir. Although political elites in both Pakistan and India seem content with the status quo in Kashmir, this should not be sufficient for people who are concerned with the question of community security in South Asia.

Community security is best achieved when political systems of rule and governance are responsive to the needs and desires of individuals and groups. This type of responsiveness and accountability is the bread and butter of democratic statecraft and it cannot

---

be achieved under conditions of large military and police presence and without constitutional equality. Approaching the politics of the Indus from a critical perspective, instead of an approach favoring the status quo, makes it necessary to revisit the question of Kashmir. Also, we must approach this question not only in terms of state security, but also in terms of community security. This will not be an easy task, but it is essential to begin it with representation from across the breadth and depth of South Asian, and especially Kashmiri, society.

Both of the policy interventions recommended here are not new. Indeed, political proposals like these have fired the imaginations of generations of progressive nationalists in South Asia who sought to make state security work for the broader goals of community and social security. Instead of discarding these ideas in favor of an exclusive focus on community security, we should revisit these policy ideas as we try to consider the complex interactions of state and community security.

Majed Akhter is Assistant Professor of Geography at Indiana University - Bloomington. His research interests include the politics of water development, drone war and imperialism, infrastructures and regionalism, Marxist and postcolonial theory, and the political and historical geography of Pakistan and South Asia. His research has been published in journals such as Antipode, Political Geography, and Critical Asian Studies. His next research project will examine how Chinese infrastructural investment in the transcontinental New Silk Road shapes the political geography and geopolitics of Pakistani state and territory.
Transboundary Haze and Human Security in Southeast Asia
National and Regional Perspectives

Helena Varkkey

Transboundary haze has been an ongoing problem in Southeast Asia for decades. Haze is defined as “sufficient smoke, dust, moisture, and vapor suspended in air to impair visibility,” and it is classified as transboundary when “its density and extent is so great at the source that it remains at measurable levels after crossing into a country’s airspace.” In Southeast Asia, haze generally originates from peat and forest fires, mostly in Indonesia. It is a classic example of an issue lying at the nexus between human security and traditional security. While traditional security is usually related to a state’s ability to defend its borders against external threats, these external threats normally refer to acts of military aggression. Thus, traditional security is mainly concerned with the ability of states to deter an external attack through the strengthening of national power and military defense. The “human” approach to security was meant to shift thinking on security away from the traditional state-centered considerations towards a more people-centered one. It expands security definitions to not only the security of national borders, but also to include a broader range of threats to a state’s peoples, including the threat of environmental pollution. This paper will discuss the transboundary haze problem in Southeast Asia from the human security perspective, focusing on how the countries involved (specifically Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia) have responded within the larger contexts of each country’s national interest.

Transboundary Causes and Transboundary Effects

Haze-producing fires have both natural and anthropogenic origins. Some fires naturally occur during the dry season; for example, when two tree branches rub against each other, sparks may be created. In other cases, fires are the result of human activity. For example, the slash and burn agricultural technique is commonly used among traditional farmers.

---


[42] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
in the region to cheaply clear small areas of forest for their subsistence plots, especially in rural parts of Indonesia. And increasingly, the more organized activities of plantation companies have also been linked to fires, either directly (by using fire to clear land) or indirectly (by disturbing the landscape in such a way that it becomes fire-prone).

An important factor in the fire-haze equation is peat. Peat is a type of soil, commonly found along coastal areas, that is identified by its waterlogged conditions. About twelve percent of Indonesia’s total land area consists of peatland, making it home to the fourth-largest peat deposit in the world.³ Peatlands act as carbon sinks, as ground litter is accumulated in anaerobic conditions that effectively lock carbon in the ground indefinitely, making them an important tool for climate change mitigation.

Because of its soft, waterlogged nature, peat is traditionally viewed as a “problem soil” in terms of agricultural activity. Hence, peat is rarely used for traditional farming. However, the rising demand for agricultural land (especially for palm oil and pulp crops) in Indonesia has resulted in peatlands being increasingly included in land parcels given out for agricultural development. While this practice is forbidden by Indonesian law, collusion between government and business elites has enabled the flaunting of these rules.⁴ As a result, around twenty-five percent of all palm oil plantations in Indonesia are now situated on peat.⁵

Left alone, peatlands are not generally conducive environments for fires. However, when peat is drained for agriculture, it dries out very quickly and becomes fire-prone.⁶ Sometimes plantations use fire to clear land in a quick and cheap manner. When this technique is used on drained peatlands, the fires often spread underground, sometimes unbeknownst to plantation owners. These underground fires are very hard to put out, as doing so essentially requires flooding the entire area. In other cases, plantations drain peatlands but do not use fire, yet the very act of draining the peat dries out the entire peat dome, often beyond plantation boundaries.⁷ As a result, peat fires are sometimes found in lands adjacent to plantations. In this way, some peat fires are indirectly related to plantation activity.

Because of the carbon-rich nature of peat, peatfires produce smoke that is sooty, thick, and heavy enough to travel long distances. Researchers have found that peatfire-produced smoke makes up about eighty percent of the transboundary haze that ends up

⁷ A peat dome is a single hydrological unit of peat area, usually in the shape of a dome.
in neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. In comparison, fires occurring on mineral soil (the second-largest contributor) produce smoke that dissipates comparatively quickly, hence not contributing much to the transboundary problem.

The transboundary nature of the haze problem becomes increasingly complex when one considers regional agribusiness patterns. Indonesia is a hotbed for regional agribusiness investment, with about fifty percent of all agricultural land in the country being controlled by foreign interests, especially Malaysian and, to a lesser extent, Singaporean companies. Hence the Southeast Asian haze can be considered transboundary in more ways than one, both in terms of the countries contributing to and being affected by the problem.

The extent to which haze crosses boundaries varies from year to year, with particularly bad years seeing the haze affecting up to six Southeast Asian countries. However, due to their proximity to the source of most of the Indonesian fires, Singapore and Malaysia are hit hardest and most regularly by transboundary haze. Therefore, patterns of engagement between Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia over transboundary haze issues provide clues for understanding how governments and regional institutions respond to non-traditional security issues in Southeast Asia.

For the governments of Singapore and Malaysia, while transboundary haze does not threaten the traditional integrity of their borders, it does constitute a human security threat that affects the well-being of their peoples—both health-wise and economically. The very young and very old are especially vulnerable to the negative health effects of haze, and both Malaysia and Singapore have seen key sectors like tourism, transportation, and aviation suffer due to limited visibility and reduced productivity caused by transboundary haze.

### Varying Patterns of Engagement

In terms of addressing transboundary haze issues, the patterns of engagement between Malaysia and Indonesia have been markedly different from those of Singapore and Indonesia. While Malaysia has been one of the most active proponents of regional cooperation within the framework of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),

---


Singapore has of late chosen to adopt a comparatively unilateral response to the problem.

ASEAN-level cooperation related to transboundary haze has taken place since the 1980s, and one of the most significant outcomes in this area has been the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP). The stated objective of the ATHP is “to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution as a result of land and/or forest fires which should be mitigated, through concerted national efforts and intensified regional and international cooperation.”¹² The ATHP is especially significant as it is the first legally binding agreement in the history of ASEAN, an organization which generally eschews compulsory approaches; after decades of minimal progress at the ASEAN level under non-binding documents, countries in the region were prepared to try a different, more compulsory approach to haze mitigation. However, while legally-binding, the traditional “ASEAN Way” values and norms (e.g., non-interference) remained ingrained in the ATHP, resulting in a document which was watered down through the consultative process to the extent that it essentially lacks dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms.¹³ Scholars have observed that such limitations to ASEAN processes have ensured the continued inability of ASEAN-level mechanisms to effectively mitigate haze, despite decades of engagement.¹⁴

Nevertheless, Malaysia (who in fact was the main proponent of the agreement) lauded the ATHP as a positive step forward in haze mitigation; Malaysia was the first ASEAN country to ratify this agreement, doing so on December 3, 2002, the same year in which the ATHP was signed. Singapore followed closely behind, ratifying the agreement in 2003. However, over the years (and following increasingly frequent transboundary haze episodes), Singapore could be observed as increasingly impatient with the ineffective ASEAN-level efforts to mitigate haze.¹⁵

A highly publicized incident followed a chain of haze-related ASEAN-level meetings in 2013 and 2014. After the Singaporean Minister of the Environment expressed frustration that Indonesia was unwilling to share its land maps with ASEAN member countries through the ASEAN Haze Monitoring System (HMS) mechanism, the Singaporean Parliament adopted the Transboundary Haze Pollution Act (THPA) in August 2014.¹⁶ This act—which is one of the few acts of extraterrestrial environmental legislation in the world—criminalizes conduct that causes or contributes to haze pollution in Singapore, which empowers Singaporeans to sue companies using fires in Indonesia that result in haze in Singapore.¹⁷ The adoption of the THPA was a marked

---

¹⁵ Indonesia ratified the agreement more than a decade later, in 2014.
¹⁶ Sian Boon Woo, “No major progress on system to monitor haze,” Today Singapore, April 3, 2014.
departure from the traditional ASEAN approach to resolving regional issues, which prioritizes diplomatic over legal solutions.\textsuperscript{18}

There are a few marked differences between Malaysia and Singapore that can explain their different styles of engagement. First, Malaysia can be seen to be in economic, environmental, and political circumstances quite similar to Indonesia. Malaysia is currently the world’s second-largest producer of palm oil, trailing closely behind Indonesia.\textsuperscript{19} Like Indonesia, Malaysia’s own forests and peatlands are currently under pressure for conversion into palm oil plantations. Malaysia also suffers from peat and forest fires on its own soil, although much of Malaysia’s internally-produced smoke does not travel across borders. Malaysia’s fire problems are also closely related to land (mis)management issues, due largely to pressure for more agricultural land.\textsuperscript{20} Many politically connected Malaysian companies are involved in these land transactions. Hence, even though there has been a significant level of public outcry over haze (mainly through mainstream and social media, and in formal complaints to the government), the Malaysian government must balance public concerns against the interests of well-connected elites and the country’s developmental trajectory as a major player in the international commodities market.

Because of these kindred circumstances, it is not surprising that Malaysia would prefer a more diplomatic/regionalist approach—as compared to harsher forms of bilateral engagement—over transboundary haze issues. The ASEAN approach to environmental cooperation and management, which upholds states’ sovereign right to exploit their own resources as they see fit, is important in terms of the continued development of Malaysia’s own lucrative agribusiness sector.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, the fact that Malaysia has its own domestic fire problems would make it both hypocritical and risky to elect for any harsher form of engagement with Indonesia, as Malaysia’s own internal practices could potentially be targeted. Hence, Malaysia’s focus on ASEAN-level haze mitigation could be regarded as an attempt to show the Malaysian public that Malaysia is “doing something” while it actually continues to focus on elite and developmental interests.\textsuperscript{22} Malaysia can often be seen to take the side of Indonesia on divisive issues at the ASEAN level when it comes to haze issues.\textsuperscript{23} For example, when Singapore was pushing for sharing land maps under the HMS, Malaysia supported Indonesia’s decision to refuse to share its maps; in fact, Malaysia also refused to share its own maps, arguing that it was against Malaysian law to do so.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{19} C. T. Ong and L. S. Chai, “Plantation (Malaysia),” Sector Update, Kuala Lumpur: Maybank, 2011.
\textsuperscript{20} The Economic Benefit of Palm Oil to Indonesia (Arlington, Virginia: World Growth, February 2011).
\textsuperscript{21} “ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.”
\textsuperscript{23} This is unique—Malaysia and Indonesia often find themselves on opposite sides on other contentious issues, like immigration, workers’ rights, and cultural conflicts.
\textsuperscript{24} Zakir Hussain, “Jakarta’s info law forbids sharing of maps,” AsiaOne, July 21, 2013.
The Singaporean context is quite different. While Singapore serves as the headquarters to several major plantation companies, the country itself is not a major site of palm oil production. Much of its agribusiness interests are located offshore. Singapore does not have any significant areas of peat or agricultural land within its territory, and it does not face any major internal fire issues. While Singaporean public outcry over transboundary haze has been similar to that of Malaysia, the Singaporean government appears to have taken these civil society concerns to heart, as evidenced by the THPA.

One of the differences between Malaysia and Singapore that is often highlighted is how their difference in size influences how both countries experience the haze. Due to its small size, whenever there is haze in Singapore, the whole country is completely shrouded. There is nowhere to run or hide. However, in the case of Malaysia, haze that reaches Kuala Lumpur, for example, may not necessarily reach Penang. Hence, Singaporeans may perceive the haze as being much more severe than that which is perceived by Malaysians. Limited agricultural land also means Singapore does not need to be concerned about the exposure of its own practices, be it questionable land transactions or possible limitations to future natural resource development. Singapore’s significantly smaller (and largely offshore) agribusiness sector removes the need to balance agriculture against the more important sectors of services, tourism, and industry. All this amounts to higher levels of political will on the Singaporean side to effectively mitigate haze.

Conclusion and Outlook

Overall, it is clear that for Singapore, the haze problem is couched as a relatively straightforward environmental problem with dire human security concerns. In a country highly reliant on human capital, the well-being of the Singaporean people can be seen to be of utmost importance, the threat to which could severely affect Singapore’s bottom line. While there is a risk of some Singaporean agribusiness companies being implicated in the legal approach that Singapore is taking in its response to haze, this is a risk Singapore seems to be quite prepared to take.

26 It is interesting to note that Malaysia and Singapore are ranked equally in terms of political representation under the 2015 Democracy Index by the Economist Intelligence Unit. However economic, democratic, and geographic factors—as are later explained—resulted in quite different responses to public outcry over the haze issue; Tan, “The ‘Haze’ Crisis,” 2015.
29 As a side note, the more technologically advanced Singapore may also be better equipped to face the legal challenges under the THPA in terms of accurately tracking the trajectory of haze from Indonesia to Singapore—and in terms of assigning blame.
For Malaysia, the problem is much more nuanced. While the haze does pose a considerable human security risk, it rarely threatens the whole population at once. And apart from environmental considerations, Malaysia must also consider the political and economic implications of taking a harder stance on haze. Malaysia must not only consider the continuity of its agribusiness activities in Indonesia, but also related domestic activities. As many of these agribusiness activities are linked to government and political elites through patronage politics and direct government ownership, there are serious political considerations to consider as well. Hence, Malaysia is continuing to place its solid support behind ASEAN haze-mitigation activities, especially the HMS and the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy. If Malaysia were to adopt a hard-line legal approach like that of Singapore, Malaysia would risk the embarrassment of its own companies, government entities, or elites being hauled up to court—and there is a risk that the activities of those companies would not only be affected in Indonesia, but in Malaysia as well. Hence, human security becomes just one of the many factors that Malaysia must consider when strategizing its approach to haze mitigation.

What can be observed here from the two quite different patterns of engagement is that human security is just one of many types of “securities” with which a state must be concerned. While the well-being of a state’s people should always be important, other securities like economic and political security also factor into states’ considerations and responses to perceived threats. For example, in the case of Malaysia discussed above, haze is a threat to micro-level (personal) human security, but effective mitigation could pose a threat to macro-level (state) economic and political security. Hence, the state will strategize to engage with the threat in a way that best upholds the overarching national interest.

It should be noted that contrary to the field of traditional security, a state’s government is not the only actor that can provide human security. Human security can be enhanced through a broader participation of different actors such as international organizations, civil society, and local communities. Hence, even if a state prioritizes other types of security, it is still possible for human security to be enhanced through the efforts of other actors. For example, the non-governmental organization CERAH in Malaysia has been focusing its efforts on encouraging communities to “speak with their wallets” and consume only certified, sustainable haze-free products. This can be seen as a

32 The ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy was developed to provide a common framework for peatland management in the region during the 2006–2020 period. As part of the strategy, ASEAN Member Countries with significant peatlands are supposed to develop complementary National Action Plans on Peatlands by describing their national focus, identifying agencies involved, and generating funds for implementing activities towards the sustainable management of peatlands. See: “Regional Policy Framework,” Sustainable Management of Peatland Forests in Southeast Asia, ASEAN Peat, http://www.aseanpeat.net/index.cfm?&menuid=42.
34 More information on CERAH can be found on the organization’s website: http://www.cerah.asia.
community-based attempt to alter (albeit subtly) the economic security-human security (im)balance toward a situation in which economic security works with human security in Malaysia, rather than against it.

Helena Varkkey is a senior lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies, University of Malaya. She focuses her research on transboundary pollution in Southeast Asia, particularly pertaining to the role of patronage in agribusiness, especially the oil palm industry and its link to forest fires and haze in the region. Her findings have been recently published in a book as part of the Routledge Malaysian Studies Series.
In 1979, Harvard professor Ezra F. Vogel published his landmark tome, *Japan as Number One*, which—as the title divulges—argued that Japan was “running rings around the US.” But sometime between 1990 and 1995, Japan surpassed Sweden to claim the title of World’s Oldest Population. The country that had once seemed poised to become the world’s next superpower was rapidly spiraling downward. Japan-watchers began to argue that an aging population was the death knell for superpower status. Certainly, without a strong economy, which seemed clearly linked to an adequate working-age population, Japan could not afford a capable defense.

Today—despite a record-breaking median age of forty-six years—Japanese policy makers led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe are rebuilding Japan’s defenses and defying those early expectations. As Japan’s population has aged, its leaders have increased their emphasis on national defense and ability to respond to security threats. Though an aging society forms an important backdrop against which leaders make decisions, the relationship between aging and defense may or may not be causal. Other internal and external factors, particularly domestic politics and growing tensions in Asia, have also shaped the direction of Japan’s strategic shift. Japanese leaders have, at the very least, realized that an aging state in a volatile region must avoid appearing weak. To build itself as a defensive power, Japan has changed prohibitive laws, increased its budget, built a network of informal alliances, and adapted its economy to the realities of population aging.

Because Japan has the world’s oldest population, its changes in national defense offer an

---


[50] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
important example worth analyzing. Although Japan will keep the title of oldest nation for at least the next several decades (because of low fertility and long life expectancy), most of the world’s developed states are also aging. Whether Japan can manage to build a strong defensive capability with an aging population may tell us more about how similarly aging states are likely to fare—especially in the Asia-Pacific region, which is home to a significant proportion of the world’s aging states.

Key Ingredients for Defense: Willingness and Ability

As Michael Auslin argued in a recent issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, Japan has wanted to develop a stronger defensive capacity since the fall of the Soviet Union, which was soon followed by North Korean military threats and the economic and military rise of China. The United States’s focus on the Middle East from 2001 onward probably also played a role in making Japan feel less secure. But even if the willingness for stronger defense was there, the ability to achieve it was not. Japan’s economic bubble burst in the 1990s and a series of leaders failed to turn the economy around. Japan had neither the leadership nor the economic foundation to increase its defensive capacity. Both of those factors have changed, albeit to different degrees. Japan has strengthened its defensive capabilities, but the fundamental social and economic changes brought by population aging prevent Japan from competing for global hegemony. The following sections explore the role population aging has played in Japan’s willingness and ability to build a strong national defense.

Willingness: Japan’s Vision

According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense in its 2015 white paper, “Defense capabilities are the nation’s ultimate guarantee of security, expressing its will and capacity to eliminate foreign invasions, and they cannot be replaced by any other means.” To avoid appearing weak, Japan has shifted its grand strategy and is working to play a more important role in the region. To that end, Japan has changed its national security structure, revised its constitution to empower the military, increased its defense budget, and expanded diplomatic ties both within the region and with other liberal states outside the region.

While he is certainly not alone in his desire to see Japan strengthen its defenses, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe champions Japan’s more prominent international role more than anyone else. During his first, brief stint in office in 2006, Abe “pushed through a number of laws to allow for greater security cooperation with Japan’s partners” and led a review of Japan’s national security structure and policy, including Japan’s ban on sending troops overseas. When he returned to office in 2013, Abe put those plans in action.

---

8 Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough.”
One of his first steps was creating Japan’s National Security Council, which coordinates the nation’s security policy.\(^9\) The national security structure has continued to evolve under Abe and includes the creation in 2015 of the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Agency (ATLA).\(^10\) Secondly, Abe shepherded a change in a couple of key laws. Most remarkably, in September 2015, the Japanese Parliament voted to change the national constitution and permit Japanese forces to operate overseas under certain conditions. The changes also allow Japan to offer military support to the United States and other foreign armed forces. While Japan’s forces are still restricted from fighting on Korean soil if the North invaded the South, the changes would theoretically allow Japan to provide logistical support to South Korea in such a case. For example, Japan would be allowed to shoot down a North Korean missile headed for the United States. Prior to this change, such missiles would have to threaten Japan directly to justify such action.\(^11\)

Another legal change was the lifting of a fifty-year ban on weapons exports. The big-name industrial conglomerates in Japan like Mitsubishi, Kawasaki, Hitachi, and Toshiba are already in the military hardware business, but have only been allowed to sell to the Japanese Self Defense Force due to the export ban.\(^12\) With the market more open, these businesses may be able to increase volume and lower production costs to compete with giants in the United States. One of the tasks of the new ATLA is to implement the new export policy.

Abe has also increased Japan’s military budget to a record high, despite the budgetary challenges of health care and pensions for a growing older population. Japan increased defense-related expenditures by 2.9 percent in 2014 and 2.8 percent in 2015 because of the “increasingly harsh security environment.”\(^13\) Abe’s 2016 request increased the budget by a further 1.5 percent.\(^14\) With these resources, Abe plans to buy 42 F-35 fighters, 17 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, 52 amphibious assault vehicles, 2 new destroyers, and several diesel submarines, surveillance drones, and maritime patrol planes. He also plans to upgrade Japan’s ballistic missile warning systems and satellites.\(^15\) Certainly, such forces are diminutive compared to those of China and the United States, but simply the fact that Japan is working to increase its defensive power in the face of population aging is significant. Whether Japan’s domestic defense manufacturers can sell enough units

---

\(^15\) Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough.”
to lower prices per unit is an important factor in Japan’s future success as a defensive power. Now, the number of units manufactured is so low that prices are sky-high, and Japan needs much lower prices in order to afford the amount of equipment that leaders need in their quest to make the country more powerful.16

Finally, Abe has increased Japan’s ties to groups like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and has new military ties with India and Australia—ties that Japan hopes will include those countries purchasing military hardware from Japan. Abe entered into strategic partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam in 2015 and signed the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement as well. Japan also has agreements to share military equipment and technology with France and the United Kingdom.17 If Japan can build its military relationships through selling defense hardware, it will build stronger alliances and a more robust domestic defense industry—not to mention increased income from military hardware sales. All of these are especially important for an aging state that may become less self-sufficient as the number of elderly dependents grows and strains resources.

Threats: Regional Flashpoints

Abe’s leadership facilitated the recent changes in Japan’s defense, but external factors drove this shift as well. The Asia-Pacific region contains multiple flashpoints that directly involve Japan and these have prompted Japanese policy makers to do what they can to avoid appearing weak. One flashpoint is the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea. In late 2012, China challenged “Japan’s de facto administration” of these islands by launching joint combat controls, threatening economic retaliation, refusing to attend a major financial conference in Tokyo, and encouraging anti-Japanese protests in China.18 To address threats in this area, Abe intends to station ten thousand Japanese troops and a network of anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles throughout the East China Sea by 2020.19 A second flashpoint is the Indian Ocean, where in 2014, China deployed a SHANG-class nuclear powered submarine (SSN) and SONG-class diesel electric submarine (SS).20 A third flashpoint is the South China Sea. This area is highly contested both because it holds valuable resources (like fish stocks and oil and gas reserves) and because it is a strategic pathway for commerce.21 Japan stated in its

16 Pollman, “The Trouble with Japan’s Defense Exports.”
17 Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough.”
19 Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough.”
annual white paper on defense in 2015 that it will “firmly, but in a calm manner, respond to China’s attempts to change the current status quo by coercion.” On top of all the various territorial claims, piracy has been a problem in the area, so even non-state actors are involved.

Japan has shown that perceived threat is a key ingredient in willingness and even an aging state will choose guns over butter if the threat level is sufficiently high. Under Abe’s leadership, the willingness to meet these goals is present—as for Japan’s ability to meet them, however, the challenge of aging is tangible.

**Ability: Economic Foundation**

Recently, Japan has worked to adapt its economy to the realities of population aging as Japanese leaders realize that a strong economy is the foundation of national power. Because population aging means a society has fewer workers and more retirees, in an aged state more people take from the economy through entitlements, and fewer contribute to it. Japan’s total fertility rate in 2015 was about 1.40 children per woman on average, well below the replacement rate of just under 2.1. Japan’s population aged 20–65 will shrink by 15 percent by 2035 and Japan’s overall population is projected to shrink by 1.5 million people by 2020 and 9.5 million between 2015 and 2035. Labor force participation rates of women and older workers have historically been low in Japan. Yet, Japanese women and men live longer lives in good health than citizens of any other state, with a healthy life expectancy of 75 and 71 years, respectively.

Realizing the resourcefulness of older workers, the government has instituted major initiatives, including liberalizing the labor market, in order to bring older workers into (or back into) the workforce. Although Japan’s working age population technically shrank by 8 percent over the last decade, the actual workforce only shrank by 1 percent because of efforts to boost participation rates of older people and women. Now, “more than half of Japanese men aged 65 to 69 hold jobs, up from about 40 percent a decade ago.” Japanese elderly have some of the highest labor force participation rates among their aged peers in other countries and often exit the workforce well past the official retirement age of sixty-two. In 2015, more Japanese women worked outside the home than did American women, thanks to new financial incentives and daycare programs that make it easier for new mothers to return to work. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe believes that raising “the share of mothers who return to work after the birth of their first child to 55 percent by the year 2020...would boost the country’s gross domestic product by 15 percent.”

---

26 Schlesinger and Martin, “Graying Japan.”

[54] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
While the fiscal strains of an aging population are real, policy is key to managing the impact and in Japan some policies ameliorate aging, while others exacerbate it. On the plus side, Japan actually pays a smaller proportion of GDP to pensioners than Brazil, a comparatively much younger country. On the minus side, Japan has chosen to only modestly increase immigration to fill labor shortages in key areas like healthcare because of the political and cultural conflicts they witness in immigration-heavy states. Without immigration or the births to replace young people, Japan is surely on a path to an increasing median age and shrinking overall population.

**Defense, Not Offense**

Other states, notably South Korea and China, are threatened by what they perceive as Japan’s increasing militarism. But, population aging is a real constraint, but despite the fact that Japan may be able to build itself as a formidable defensive power, it will not be able to build as an offensive power. Because of that limitation, comparisons to Japan’s pre-war nationalism are unwarranted. Auslin is one scholar who sees Japan as a benign power and argues that Japan is hoping to “strengthen and defend the open, liberal system that has enriched Asia and led to decades of general stability.” Inten- tions—which I label as willingness in this essay—aside, Japan will in no way have the ability to threaten the international system in the way it did during the earlier half of the twentieth century because population aging has fundamentally changed the social and economic structures of the country.

**Conclusion**

Japan is not the only aging state in its tense region—Russia, China, South Korea, and North Korea are all aging as well. The working age populations 20-64 years have already peaked in most of the world’s biggest powers and strongest economies, including Germany, Japan, Italy, the United States, South Korea, and—most recently—China and Russia. In 2015 China’s total fertility rate was only slightly higher than Japan’s. China’s population aged 20-65 will furthermore shrink by almost 10 percent by 2035. Although Japan is clearly in good company, the country does face several unique defense challenges due to its intense aging. The first of these is Japan’s pacifist culture, which is particularly common among Japan’s elderly population. Abe’s defense reforms were highly unpopular with the Japanese public. The change to allow troops to operate overseas, for example, prompted widespread protests among civil society.

A second challenge is that the Japanese population is still relatively much older than

---

28 Gady, “Japan at Peace: The Improbable Military Resurgence.”
29 Auslin, “Japan’s New Realism: Abe Gets Tough.”
other populations in both friendly and adversarial regions, so there is a natural ceiling on how many troops the country could muster even if all restrictions on the use of force were removed. The number of military-aged Japanese males peaked at nine million in 1994, then dropped 30 percent by 2000, and will number fewer than five million by 2030, when Japan’s median age will be 52 years.\textsuperscript{32}

The third obstacle Japan faces is with its biggest ally and security guarantor: the future of United States foreign policy is uncertain. The United States presidential election is looming, which creates its own uncertainties, and it will likely take several years before a new administration develops a clear foreign policy strategy. Whether the United States will complete the “pivot to Asia” begun by President Obama or stay entangled in the Middle East is an important question driving Japan’s decisions to focus more on responsibility for their own defense, a goal that intensified in the 2000s.

Japan is the first country to age so intensely, and one question that remains is to what extent Japan is a laboratory for the political, social, and economic changes an older age structure will bring. If Abe’s vision comes to fruition and Japan can remove restrictions on all things military, the country could actually become a major exporter of military hardware, a move that would both increase its economic prowess by bringing in revenue and increase its standing among peers. This would also allow Japan to develop a more sophisticated military force, capable of repelling threats and deterring adversaries. With the changes in play now, Japan could demonstrate that an aging state can hold its own in terms of defense and turn early predictions about population aging on their heads.

\textbf{Jennifer Dabbs Sciubba} is an Associate Professor in the International Studies department at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee and a Senior Fellow with the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. Dr. Sciubba has studied at the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research in Rostock, Germany, and is a former demographics consultant to the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy). She is the author of The Future Faces of War: Population and National Security and her research has appeared in multiple journals. Dr. Sciubba is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and Phi Beta Kappa.

\textsuperscript{32} United Nations, World Population Prospects.

[56] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
It is high time to broaden the perspective on the nexus of climate change, migration, and security. This can be done in at least two ways. First, while migration may be one important aspect of traditional security, a focus on human security directs our attention towards an issue that is equally important: the especially vulnerable situation and position of the migrants themselves. Second, connectedness established through migration—or “translocal connectedness”—contributes to improved livelihoods and, often, the human security of those left behind. Improved livelihoods of social units, precisely defined as “translocal social resilience,” deserves more attention than it currently receives in both social science and policy.

In past years, the dominant discourse on the climate change-migration nexus in media and policy has traditionally emphasized the potential security threat that mass migration might pose to developed countries. The current refugee situation in Europe has fueled these concerns, demonstrated by the ranking of “involuntary mass migration” as the number one security risk in the 2016 World Economic Forum’s World Risk Report, and the harsh rhetoric against refugees and immigrants in current electoral campaigns in the U.S. and various European countries. While national security may be a helpful framework for actors such as the U.S. Armed Forces, the “securitization” of the debate has been rightfully critiqued as harmful.

This is also the case in Southeast Asia: the region’s exposure to present and expected climate hazards as well as its strong and dynamic regimes of domestic and international migration have made it a hotspot for the migration debate. Indeed, a 2012 report by the Asian Development Bank

---


hypothesized an increase of existing migration flows along established networks and routes in the region in a changing climate.\textsuperscript{4}

We will thus outline in the following three sections the argument for a major paradigm shift from a one-sided traditional security perspective of migrants as a threat towards a more differentiated view on migration as a possible solution that can enhance social resilience in the face of environmental risks. We begin with (i) a critique of the three major shortcomings of a traditional security perspective, (ii) a discussion of the current shift to “migration as adaptation” and the possible ways forward in reframing the discourse from migrants as problem to migration as a solution, and then conclude with (iii) an argument for looking beyond “migration as adaptation” by taking into account translocal connections between migrants and their left-behind households, in order to understand the complex interdependencies and dynamics of the climate-migration-security nexus. This last point will be illustrated by a case study from the highly mobile and climate-impacted Southeast Asian country of Thailand.

Three Shortfalls of a Traditional Security Perspective on Climate Change and Migration

Taking a traditional security perspective on climate change and migration is myopic for a number of reasons. First, there is no universal definition of what climate change-related migration means; there is a plethora of concepts, ranging from more alarmist terms like “climate refugees” or “climate change-induced displacement,” to more cautious phrases such as “climate change-related migration” or “migration influenced by climate change.” Second, although the linkages between climate change, migration, and conflict have been researched for more than two decades, there is no clear consensus on how many climate-induced migrants there might be or to where they might be going.\textsuperscript{5} While predictions of climate-induced migrants ranging from 50 to 200 million are found to be ungrounded or even “guesstimates,” they are often cited in public and policy discourses, creating fear over the potential threat of climate-induced migration to national security.\textsuperscript{6}

To clarify, we do not deny the potential impacts of climate change on migration; indeed, there are many studies suggesting that climatic factors will likely impact people’s migration decisions in the future. But two things must be noted. First, the causal

\textsuperscript{4} Asian Development Bank, \textit{Climate change and migration in Asia and the Pacific} (Mandaluyong City: Asian Development Bank, 2009).


linkages between climate change and migration are complex, and only in a few cases (e.g. recurring/prolonged droughts or sea level rise) are the linkages clear. In most cases of slow change (e.g. in precipitation patterns or temperatures), migration may be linked with gradually declining local economic conditions. And it would not be entire communities that migrate, but rather individual household members seeking additional opportunities. Second, the majority of climate change-related migrants will move internally or regionally. We thus argue that while migrants or migration can be linked to environmental change, it is misleading to sharply delineate (and attempt to count) climate versus non-climate migrants.

Third, there is an ethical dimension to the migration discussion. A focus on the state implied in the traditional national security perspective fails to acknowledge the especially vulnerable situation (the often precarious living and working conditions, social exclusion, and economic exploitation) of migrants and their families. In addition, it is often in developed countries, especially the U.S. and European states (ironically, those that are historically responsible for most greenhouse gas emissions), where climate-related mass migration is put on research and policy agendas as a potential security threat. As the U.S.-based security think tank CNA puts it, migration has “the potential to disrupt our way of life and to force changes in the way we keep ourselves safe and secure” (emphasis added).7

Restricting the discussion of climate change and migration to a traditional security problem is not only limited to Western states. Just recently, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also adopted climate-induced migration as a potential threat in their security policies.8 Momentum for such text arose from prominent regional discussions held under the auspices of the ARF from 2008 to 2011. For example, the 2008 ARF Defense Officials’ Dialogue identified climate change as a threat multiplier, while the 2009 Dialogue included climate change in its discussions of a new security paradigm for the Asia-Pacific. At the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) 2011 workshop on Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration, Philippine Ambassador Enrique Manalo confirmed that ARF member states saw climate-induced forced migration as a transboundary threat.9

While climate change-migration-security issues are touched upon at the regional level, many countries find grappling with such complex, interrelated issues difficult. Thailand, for example, has formulated both a National Strategic Plan on Climate Change (2008-2012) and a Climate Change Master Plan (2015-2050), which provide a framework for long-term actions for both mitigation and adaptation. While they touch on energy,

---

water, and food security, there is no explicit mention of migration or human security. Interviews with officials working on climate change at various ministries unveiled that migration is often seen as a potential result of climate change, especially as related to flooding, but not necessarily as a viable adaptation strategy.¹⁰

**Human Security: “From Migration to Migrants” and “Migration as Adaptation”**

Against this background, the turn towards human security means a real change in the perspective on climate change and migration—a shift “from migration to migrants.”¹¹ Placing migrants (individuals who are threatened, vulnerable, and in need of protection) in the center treats migration not as a potential security threat for states, but rather for the migrants themselves—as well as for their households or families when (especially forced) migration leads to the loss of livelihoods, social capital, and coping capacities.¹² This view has recently entered higher policy levels. For example, the 5th report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change looks at both the livelihoods and human security of vulnerable population groups under pressure from changing climate conditions as well as the human security of climate-induced migrants.¹³ Although in ASEAN migration is marginally acknowledged in climate change specific actions, there is little reference to human security.¹⁴ However, in 2009 the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Coordinating Council agreed to enhance coordination mechanisms across policy sectors relating to political and human security issues, especially when concerned with climate change.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Alfred Gerstl argues that ASEAN governments “have realized that they have to be at least perceived as being concerned about human insecurity,” even if they are not making concrete policy strides as of yet.¹⁶

¹¹ We endorse a broader concept of human security, encompassing both freedom from fear (from violence) as well as freedom from want (from poverty, vulnerability, etc.), as initially put forward by United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 1994); Elliot, “Human Security, Climate Change, and Migration in Southeast Asia,” 2.
While a migrant-centered perspective is more encompassing than a traditional security perspective, such a viewpoint tends to imply a pessimistic view of migration. Migration is seen as a measure of last resort when local adaptation has largely failed, and as something that should be avoided. In response, “migration as adaptation,” has been brought forward by international actors such as IOM. In this alternative, migration is not seen necessarily as a result of local adaptation failure, but rather as a legitimate and viable adaptation strategy that is actively adopted by individuals and households to decrease vulnerability. Migration can be a means of adaptation through (i) diversifying livelihood portfolios, especially outside of climate-dependent agriculture; as well as (ii) strategic and timely transfer of financial remittances, ideas, and technology. Only recently has the concept gained traction in the Southeast Asian and Thai context, mostly through policy and advocacy work by IOM, as well as large research projects, and community based pilot projects in Cambodia and Thailand. At present, the topic—and the potential—of migration as an adaptation strategy does not have a prominent place in climate change adaptation policies in Thailand or in other ASEAN countries. However, this gap is not unique to ASEAN countries, as the notion that migration could be an adaptation strategy has only very recently become a popular policy option in other parts of the world. To date, the few policy solutions which relate to migration as adaptation that have entered policymakers' discourses have revolved around regional schemes of labor migration, as is seen in Pacific island states, which advocate for “migration with dignity.”

---


20 Kayly Ober and Patrick Sakdapolrak, “The Governance of ‘Migration as Adaptation:’ (Dis)Entangling Power and Politics with Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice,” (forthcoming); For research project examples, “Where the Rain Falls,” CARE International and United Nations University, http://wheretherainfalls.org/, and MECLEP, “Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Evidence for Policy (MECLEP),” IOM, https://www.iom.int/meclé; In the Cambodian project, IOM was assessing the adaptive potential of labor migration and was creating awareness among local, regional and national policy makers, see “Migration, Climate Change and Environmental Degradation,” IOM, https://www.iom.int/countries/cambodia#fm; in the Thai project, the Germany based research project TransRe (www.transre.org) is currently conducting pilot projects in two villages, consisting for example of remittance investment trainings and mentoring programs for future migrants.

In Southeast Asia, as in other parts of the world, the topic of international migration is a potentially divisive one.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, issues regarding migration have often been left “untouched” by both national and regional politics. Indeed, ASEAN member states tend to shy away from binding regional laws or mechanisms, with governments preferring regional soft law arrangements.\textsuperscript{23} There is hope, however, that as the ASEAN community strengthens and expands, more explicit cooperation and labor migration policies will have to be outlined, with perhaps migration as adaptation making a more explicit appearance in the future.\textsuperscript{24}

Although the concept of migration as adaptation means a “paradigm shift” towards a better understanding of the migration-climate change nexus, it has a number of shortcomings.\textsuperscript{25} First, with a narrow focus on remittances, other important dimensions of connectedness (e.g., networks, normative aspects, temporal change in connectivity) cannot be adequately addressed.\textsuperscript{26} Second, limited attention on the destination regions fails to acknowledge the embeddedness of migrants within their places of arrival and how it influences remittance sending. Finally, the limitation on the household and individual level overlooks other important social and political levels: community, regional, and state. This leaves the approach open to neoliberal readings primarily concerned with entrepreneurial migrants and their role for household adaptation.\textsuperscript{27} This puts the responsibility for successful adaptation on the shoulders of those who are often already the most vulnerable.

Towards a More Comprehensive View: “Translocal Social Resilience”

Social resilience can be expressed as the capacities of individuals, households and

\textsuperscript{22} Especially in regard to the large number of unregistered migrants, e.g. from Cambodia or Myanmar in Thailand, or from Thailand in Singapore or Malaysia.
\textsuperscript{26} Networks relate to the connections between migrants and rural households, particularly their social and spatial structure—the position of individuals within these networks, the strength of ties and the spatial spreading of the networks—are influencing the level of support that households can get from migrant members. Normative aspects such as expectations and obligations towards mobility, strength of support but also return migration, are important for how much and how often remittances will be sent. Temporal changes of connectivity refers to the emergence and also decay of these linkages, for example, to the question how long migrants can stay away until their connections fade and remittance sending declines.
\textsuperscript{27} Romain Felli, and Noel Castree, “Neoliberalising Adaptation to Environmental Change: Foresight or Foreclosure?,” \textit{Environment and Planning} 44, no.1 (2012).
communities to cope with risks (for example, re-seeding after a crop loss), to adapt their livelihoods (building secondary grain storage to anticipate future losses), and to transform their structural context (advocating for a better agricultural extension service). While social resilience as a concept is rooted in an individual and household-based perspective, it leans towards human security in that it sees vulnerability as the result of structural context. While social resilience as a concept is rooted in an individual and household-based perspective, it leans towards human security in that it sees vulnerability as the result of structural context. Translocal social resilience is then understood as the contribution of translocal aspects to social resilience, for example, through financial remittances the transfer of goods, ideas, and knowledge, or the introduction of new attitudes by return migrants. This implies a shift of perspective on the spatial character of the unit that we consider to be resilient—a household or community—and to understand these units not as spatially limited to the house and its surroundings, but as intrinsically connected to other places.

Translocal social resilience—in order to contribute to human security in the full sense of freedom from fear and freedom from want—can only be adequately conceptualized if the following aspects are taken into account:\footnote{translocal

\textit{Embeddedness in multilevel human–environment systems:} Individuals’ and households’ vulnerabilities, as well as their needs and capacities for adaptation, do not only result from their individual properties, but also from their embeddedness in social (e.g. gender, age, status, group), political (e.g. communal, district, regional, national), and ecological (e.g. local resources, relevant ecosystem services, hazards) contexts. This is crucial in order to understand root causes of vulnerabilities and to strengthen resilience.

\textit{Social practices:} Translocal connections, mobility, and interactions, as well as coping with and adapting to risks are regular aspects of many people’s and households’ livelihoods all over the world. Hence, understanding the nexus of migration and climate change needs an understanding of people’s vulnerability from the perspective of their everyday life and social practices.\footnote{Ben Wisner, and Henry R. Luce, "Disaster Vulnerability: Scale, Power and Daily Life," \textit{Geojournal} 30, no. 2 (1993). We define social practices here as both socially structured and habitualized "ways of doing and saying," c.f. Theodore Schatzki, \textit{The Site of the Social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change} (University Park: Penn State University Press, 2002): 72.} We emphasize this also to counter the focus on dramatic events and crises, as the latter is less helpful in uncovering root causes of vulnerabilities.

\textit{Translocal connectivity:} Rather than limiting our focus on migration as the movement of people, we should broaden our view to include translocal connections (the result of migration that happens for any number of reasons) of people and places, and all the

\footnote{Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak, "What is Social Resilience? Lessons Learned and Ways Forward," \textit{Erdkunde} 67, no. 1 (2013).}

\footnote{Sakdapolrak et al., "Migration in a Changing Climate."}

\footnote{Sakdapolrak et al., "Migration in a Changing Climate."}
networks, practices, and flows (of finances, goods, ideas, people, etc.) that they entail.

**Taking into Account Translocal Connections in Climate Change Adaptation and Human Security in Rural Thailand**

With high exposure to present and future climatic risks and its dynamic migration regimes, Thailand stands out as a strong example of how translocal connections can both strengthen the social resilience of households at places of origin and support human security.\(^{31}\) A broadened perspective on the climate change-migration nexus as outlined above can shed light on issues that otherwise would remain obscured:

1) *The capacities of migrants to contribute to increased resilience through remittances is strongly linked to the local embedding in both sending and receiving contexts.* During the severe economic and drought crisis that hit Thailand and Southeast Asia in the late 1990s, already established migration networks enabled rural households to rapidly pursue international migration as an adaptation strategy.\(^{32}\) This can also be observed today, as the worst drought in decades has pushed more and more Thai workers to pursue opportunities in new regional areas of destination, including South Korea.\(^{33}\)

2) *Translocal connections and the subsequent resource flows influence local socio-ecologic interactions.* The transfer of finances and ideas, but also return migrants (equipped with knowledge, capital, and aspirations) contribute to agricultural innovation. In turn, new crops, technologies and business models entail profound changes for local socio-ecological systems. For example, in Thailand: the increasingly rapid replacement of paddy rice with sugar cane, rubber tree, or vegetables as well as the introduction of new businesses such as chicken farming in northeast Thailand. In many cases, such local innovations are raised by return migrants, or are made possible by financial means provided through remittances.

---

\(^{31}\) Employment in agriculture accounts for 43 percent of employment in Thailand, despite substantial industrial development and urbanization processes, see “World Databank,” The World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx. Smallholder agriculture is the prevailing mode of production, especially in the north and northeast, the country’s poorest regions, see Jonathan Rigg and Albert Salamanca. “Connecting Lives, Living and Locations,” *Critical Asian Studies* 43, no.4 (2011). These areas are also most affected by climate risks such as droughts and floods. Climate projections predict an overall temperature rise and an increasing variability of rainfall, see Sopon Naruchaikusol, “Climate Change and Its Impact in Thailand,” TransRe Factsheet No. 2 (2016). This will likely result in additional stress on agriculture, affecting productivity through increasing floods and droughts. But rural places are also nodal points of social relations of exchange and transfers; internal as well as international migration has been and will continue to be a common strategy for the rural population to cope with and adapt to the seasonality of agricultural production, land pressure, and economic crisis.\(^{32}\) Patrick Sakdapolrak, “Jenseits von ‘Push and Pull’ Internationale Arbeitsmigration als Strategie der Lebenssicherung in Thailand,” *Int. Asienforum* 39, no. 1 (2008).

3) The spatial distribution of social support networks—from local to international—influences the ability of households to mobilize resources in times of need. Migrants at international destinations can usually provide higher remittances, but international migration also requires a higher initial investment, access to social networks, and knowledge of migration pathways.  

Conclusion

To conclude, we see a number of compelling reasons to extend the currently dominant security perspective on climate change and migration. First, security concerns regarding the climate change-migration nexus suffer from a one-sided focus on the security effects of migration driven by climate change, omitting consideration of the migrants themselves, and overlooking the complexity of migration decisions and patterns. Second, it is necessary to add the perspective of human security to address the special vulnerabilities of mobile and non-mobile populations. And third, and perhaps most importantly, it is not sufficient to view either the migrants or their left-behind households in isolation, rather we have to take into account the multiple dimensions of translocal connectivity between them. For the majority of cases where mobility can be attributed to climate change in one way or the other, it is this translocal connectivity that is relevant for human security, much more than the acts of migration and dislocation themselves.

When considering the relevance of economic development and social stability for political stability, it seems reasonable to assume linkages between human security and national security; thus, policies and development efforts aiming for human security can be expected to contribute to national security as well. But, as international migration—particularly the migration of the poor and vulnerable—is highly politicized, and as the debate and political actions are dominated by national egoism rather than international solidarity, we are not optimistic that efforts to build translocal social resilience will be realized in the near future. Sadly, the situation has not changed

---

34 Findings from the representative household survey of the TransRe project (1,086 households from four provinces in northern and northeastern Thailand) illustrate this: the initial costs are much higher for international migration than for domestic (on average 2,500 USD for international vs 75USD for domestic migration), but the average amount of annual remittances sent by international migrants is also much higher than those sent by domestic migrants (5,000 USD compared to 570 USD). But remittance sending depends also on household composition as well as gender and marital status of the migrants—for example, the youngest daughter is especially obliged to support her parental household and remittances usually decline when the migrants have their children within their own household. Steady cash flow for many years allow households to not only cope with unforeseen risks and events, but also to adapt new agricultural practices, to acquire productive assets such as land or machinery, and to invest in higher education of the next generation. See also Patrick Sakdapolrak, “Building resilience through Translocality,” TransRe Working Paper Series 1, http://transre.org/index.php/download_file/view/182/232.

much since Hans Georg Bohle stated in 1991, with regard to international migration: “a comprehensive ‘New Humanitarian World Order’… would be necessary to fundamentally, and with global agreement, re-organize the entire refugee-, asylum-, nationality- and labor legislation. But the way to there is still far, and there is no reason for optimistic expectations.”

Harald Sterly acts as the scientific coordinator of the TransRe project at the University of Bonn. He completed his graduate studies of Geography at the University of Cologne and specialised in development studies at the Centre for Rural Development (SLE) in Berlin. He has over ten years experience of research and research coordination in interdisciplinary and intercultural contexts. His research interests include migration, translocal linkages, and urbanization, as well as the nexus of society, development, and technology, especially information and communication technology.

Kayly Ober is a research associate and Ph.D. candidate with the TransRe Project, which analyzes the intersections of climate change, migration, and resilience, based at the University of Bonn, Germany. She has over eight years of experience working on these issues in various organizations, including the World Bank, Overseas Development Institute, and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, among others.

Patrick Sakdapolrak is a professor of population geography and demography at the Department of Geography and Regional Research, University of Vienna, Austria. He was educated at University of Heidelberg, Germany and University of Wollongong, Australia. He holds a Ph.D. from University of Bonn. His current research interest revolves around the question of how vulnerable groups cope with and adapt to social and environmental stresses. He conducted empirical research on issues related to migration, health, and resource conflicts in South and Southeast Asia as well as East Africa.

This paper explores recent developments in the regulation and repression of religion by the Chinese state under Xi Jinping. It argues that the “three rectifications and one demolition” campaign launched in Zhejiang province was not an isolated local effort, but rather is rooted in a particular ideological agenda being promoted by the Chinese Communist Party. Further, it asserts that this ideological agenda is foundational to the CCP’s drive to establish itself as a credible alternative to Western hegemonic power. This is demonstrated by a thorough examination of primary sources, including CCP media, speeches, and official documents, especially pertaining to the anti-Western ideology campaign, the demolition campaign in Zhejiang, and most significantly, Xi Jinping’s promotion of “Chinese traditional culture” in the domestic and international spheres. By illustrating a specific and coordinated program of suppressing foreign religion on the one hand, and promoting Chinese or “Sinicized” religion on the other, this paper places these efforts at the center of China’s revisionist power agenda.

During a highly-publicized speech to a work conference on religion, Chinese President Xi Jinping reasserted the absolute control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over religion, warning especially against “overseas infiltration via religious...
This long-anticipated speech informed religious leaders and regulators that the role of religion was to serve the agenda of the state. Furthermore, it confirmed a hard turn toward increased state regulation and oversight of religion, consistent with the major crackdown on Christianity that has been underway for two years in China’s eastern Zhejiang province. The content and tone of the speech came as no surprise to many observers of religion in China, who have watched events in Wenzhou and the tightening strictures on Christianity and compared them with the more tolerant— even friendly—posture the regime has taken in regard to Daoism, Confucianism and Chinese Buddhism.

In this paper, I assert that the crackdown on Christianity under Xi Jinping in Wenzhou—and in China more broadly—is part of a larger agenda. The CCP aims to blend a state-led market economy with an authoritarian government, in an alternate, distinctly Chinese political model. Where Western advocates of Christianity have long touted the Judeo-Christian roots of the liberal democratic idea, Xi Jinping has moved to quell these potential rival influences, and conversely to enhance the influence of Chinese philosophies and theologies. Unlike Confucianism, Daoism, or Chinese Buddhism, Christianity is understood as posing an ideological threat to Xi’s “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” agenda. Thus, Xi Jinping sees the suppression of Christianity as a critical step in the promotion of his new ideological project.

**Background**

In April of 2014, reports of churches being forcibly demolished began to emerge from the Wenzhou municipality of China’s Zhejiang province, meeting with widespread international condemnation. To many outsiders, whose only frame of reference for these events was the official atheism of Marxist orthodoxy, a campaign of religious repression in an avowedly communist regime was objectionable, but not unexpected. However, for others, this was a surprising and seemingly anomalous development, out of step with other...
the then widely assumed trajectory of religion in China, and particularly out of step with the easy and even intimate relationship between Party, private sector, and Protestant Christianity in Wenzhou.

Although religion remained highly regulated in China in the period leading up to Xi Jinping’s accession to power, religious and state actors had increasingly developed what Kellee Tsai terms “adaptive informal institutions,” constituted by interactions in which space for religious observance was created. These flourished to the degree that religious belief and practice were presented as contributing to the “harmonious society” project, in both its social and economic capacities—that is, to the degree that a religion was said to inculcate civic duty and spur economic growth. In fact, many foreign and domestic religious groups successfully cultivated and received state patronage for the establishment of certain explicitly faith-based educational or charitable endeavors.

Wenzhou, known colloquially as “China’s Jerusalem” for its large and visible Christian population, was the epitome of this confluence between religion and state goals. So-called “Boss Christians” wrote books and hosted seminars touting the link between Christian devotion and success in business. In view of the tremendous growth of the Wenzhou manufacturing-based economy, it is not surprising to find that local and national officials were both intrigued with the potential utility of Protestant Christianity and also, then, willing to look the other way when unregistered churches hosted public religious events or registered churches built structures whose ostentatiousness exceeded building codes limiting height and use of religious symbols.

Similarly, on a national level, Hu Jintao’s Harmonious Society (hexie shehui) and Scientific Development (kexue fazhan guan) programs elevated effectiveness and practicality over ideology. First mentioned in a speech in Jiangxi, and shortly thereafter in Hunan, President Hu characterized kexue fazhan guan as an effort to “actively explore ways of development that conform to reality.” In other words, development that is “scientific” should not pursue GDP growth at the expense of all else, but should attend to community well-being and social stability. Observers and religious actors alike accurately interpreted these emphases as signaling openness to religious participation in the Chinese public square on socially and economically utilitarian grounds. Thus, beginning

---


9 This extended to exchange programs that sent Chinese graduate students to evangelical Protestant institutions, notably Regent College’s Chinese Studies Program in Vancouver, Canada. In conversations with the author, many students in this program described their research projects as relating to the intersection of social stability, economic growth and Christian thought. See: http://www.regent-college.edu/graduate-programs/chinese-studies.


11 Ibid., 30-34.


13 Cao, *Constructing China’s Jerusalem*, 27-29.
gradually in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping (as a part of his “reform and opening up” program) and increasingly under Hu Jintao’s tenure, religious studies programs, faith-based charities, civil society groups, and others flourished, as the CCP explored ways that religion could contribute to the continued development of the Chinese market economy without jettisoning moral and ethical constraints.\footnote{The period of greater openness to Christianity described in this paper, and against which Mr. Xi’s approach is contrasted, can be dated from the publication of Document 19, in 1982, until the eviction of Beijing’s Shouwang Church in 2011. Document 19 was the first attempt to grapple with the role of religion in the reform era, reinstating regulatory structures and acknowledging the persistence of religious belief. In 2011, the public battle over the eviction of the unregistered, evangelical Shouwang megachurch by its landlord, under government pressure, signaled the end of an era for utilitarian tolerance.}

If increasing dialogue and openness to the contributions of religion, and to Christianity in particular, was characteristic of CCP practice under Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping has made a clear break with his predecessors’ approach. Xi conceives of religion in a fundamentally different way than did Hu; rather than serving as a useful—if ideologically problematic—tool for spurring economic growth, he understands it to operate at a deeper level, with the potential to challenge or sustain CCP rule. Christian groups—notably the Roman Catholic Church—have played a galvanizing role in toppling authoritarian regimes, such as in the case of Poland’s Solidarity movement. Similarly in China, Christianity has been an inspiration to human rights defenders, many of whom are practicing rights lawyers. Xi’s wariness of the impact of religion has brought Christian beliefs and practices under much higher levels of official scrutiny.\footnote{For more on the Chinese weiquan “rights lawyers” and their motivations, including a discussion of their attraction to Christianity, see Fu Hualing and Richard Cullen, “Climbing the Weiquan Ladder: A Radicalizing Process for Rights Protection Lawyers,” The China Quarterly 205 (2011): 40-59.}


Not only does this crackdown indicate a reversal, but its consequences have provoked a significant international backlash, including forceful statements by prominent U.S. lawmakers, many of whom play an important role in shaping the U.S.-China relationship. For example, as the demolition campaign continued through 2015, a bipartisan group of senators issued a statement urging President Obama to raise human rights
concerns during the upcoming bilateral summit, writing that, “under President Xi, there has been an extraordinary assault on rule of law and civil society in China.” One of the signatories, former Republican presidential candidate and Senator Marco Rubio later reiterated: “On nearly every possible front, human rights are under assault in China, and religious freedom is no exception. Zhejiang province is ground zero for this crackdown...we continue to see crosses forcibly removed and churches demolished.” Significantly, Senator Rubio went on to link these rights violations to the G20 Summit, which will be hosted in Hangzhou, Zhejiang, in September of 2016, insisting that the province adequately address its human rights deficit before the gathering.

The CCP appears untroubled by this intensified scrutiny, despite it generating a renewed interest in Chinese human rights among U.S. lawmakers. Once a perennial thorn in Beijing’s side, U.S. denunciations of Chinese rights violations have been largely sidelined since China was granted Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) in 2001. Before this seminal policy shift, normal trade relations with China required yearly renewal, a fact leveraged by some members of Congress in an effort to secure concessions from the PRC on human rights. As China’s economic dominance has grown, Washington’s ability to apply pressure on Beijing has diminished, so issues of religious freedom, rule of law, civil and political rights have taken a backseat to the stability of global markets, which increasingly depend on China.

In light of the turbulent history surrounding bilateral trade relations and their link with human rights concerns, Beijing is unlikely to welcome a return to any regular or sustained political discussion of its rights record, especially a discussion that threatens to interfere with events like the G20 Summit, as Senator Rubio intimated. This suggests that a considered, intentional, and political choice was made to absorb the consequences of the crackdown, systematically marginalizing Christianity in order to establish a more explicitly Chinese moral and ethical foundation for governance, reform, and development. Religious repression, then, is central to the broader Xi agenda, rather than merely evidence of local variation or a series of anomalous and isolated incidents.

If this is so, the question arises: why and how does religious repression fit into the Xi

---

administration's domestic and international agenda? And, as a corollary, why is the crackdown perceived to be so essential as to trump the consequences associated with international disapproval, when China has arguably benefited from decreased tension around human rights violations in its relations with other great powers—especially with the United States?23

The USCIRF 2015 report asserts that, “unprecedented violations against Uyghur Muslims, Tibetan Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and Falun Gong practitioners” had taken place in that year.24 Chinese Buddhists, Daoists, and practitioners of Confucian religious rites25 are notably absent from this list, and have not been subject to the same level of persecution.26 Furthermore, not only have these groups experienced lower levels of repression, but they have also found themselves newly valued and promoted, under the rubric of “traditional culture.”27 Liberally peppering speeches with Confucian aphorisms and affirming the contributions of Daoism and Buddhism to Chinese civilization, President Xi has proven that he is committed to filling China’s “spiritual vacuum” without allowing an opening through which Western ideologies might enter.28

Implicit within the official promotion of traditional, authoritarian expressions of Confucianism, Buddhism and Daoism is a repudiation of the Western, liberal democratic

---

23 Since the delinking of permanent normal trade relations with China (PNTR) from human rights, culminating in China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, China’s economy has reaped massive benefits. James Mann describes it thusly: “In 2000, the United States made [PNTR] privileges permanent and successfully led the way for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization. The United States runs a trade deficit with China that is now over $200 billion a year. China’s ability to sell goods in the United States is one of the driving forces behind its rapid economic growth.” See James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2007), 32, Kindle Edition.
25 While Confucianism’s status as a religion is still widely debated, for our purposes it is enough to recognize that it is a traditional value system previously condemned by the CCP that continues to be expressed at the popular and elite level. Because Confucian teaching has long placed special emphasis on filial piety, a major component of Confucian practice involves the veneration of ancestors and other notables, including Confucius himself, practices which are referred to in this section as “religious rites.” At the same time, because the rites and practices associated with veneration are not understood as having supernatural significance, and are not prescribed or regulated by any kind of central religious authority, it is not necessarily accurate to characterize Confucianism as a religion. Confucius has also enjoyed a renaissance in Chinese elite and political circles, which focus predominately on his preferential option for social order. Finally, Confucius and Confucianism have been marketed internationally as emblematic of China’s rich and lengthy intellectual tradition.
26 This is not to minimize incidents of religious repression or violations of religious freedom experienced by these groups, but merely to note that they have been considerably less.
28 For more on the “spiritual vacuum” contention and debate, see the study in Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan, Protestantism in Contemporary China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 167-168.
ideal. In this view, Chinese traditional culture and thought have produced a Chinese state appropriate to the Chinese nation; Western religion, on the other hand, produced liberal democracy, which may be appropriate to Western nations, but is decidedly not Chinese. By linking the political ideas of state capitalism (the “Chinese” model) and liberal democracy (the “Western” model) with their alleged religious-philosophical foundations, and attaching special significance to the geographic center of each, the Party is suggesting that one package—Chinese religion and the Chinese party-state—is superior to the other. Authoritarianism undergirded by indigenous, traditional Chinese philosophy and religion is lauded precisely because it is uniquely and thoroughly Chinese, free of foreign influence, and the more appropriate option for a non-Western nation.

As a result, during the Xi Jinping-Li Keqiang administration, we have seen three major developments pointing to the suppression of Western-associated religions in order to establish an alternative that offers philosophical legitimacy to the Chinese authoritarian political model. First, non-Chinese religious ideas have been linked with Western ideology, and both have been dismissed as inimical to Chinese political orthodoxy. Second, there has been an increase in positive references to traditionally Chinese religious practices and belief systems, while associated institutions have been promoted. Finally, in terms of perceptible actions taken against religions believed to provide legitimacy to rival ideologies, there has been an unprecedented crackdown on Christianity, Tibetan Buddhism, and Islam.

The politically sensitive form of Islam, practiced by Uyghur Muslims, is concentrated in Xinjiang and closely linked with separatist movements. Similarly, Tibetan Buddhism is inextricably linked with calls for Tibetan sovereignty, as exhibited by the “splittist” Dalai Lama. These faiths, while potentially categorized as “indigenous” or “traditional” religions, are perceived as posing territorial threats to the regime. Christianity, by contrast, does not pose a territorial threat; rather, it poses an ideological threat to the

29 It is important to note that Islam in China includes a diversity of ethnic groups, devotional styles and levels of discontent and assimilation with the Han Chinese majority and Chinese state. For example, China’s Hui Muslims have exhibited higher levels of satisfaction and integration than Uyghur Muslims. For more on Hui Muslims and national identity in China see Dru Gladney, Muslim Chinese: Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996).
30 USCIRF and Pew reporting both indicate that Falun Gong (FLG) has also been subject to dramatic increases in religious repression and persecution. This paper will not address the Falun Gong case, in that the reasons for its suppression are less ideological in nature, but rather are rooted in CCP fear of large gatherings and also in China’s history of heterodox new religious movements (NRMs). Thus, of the religions subject to crackdown under the Xi-Li regime, only the Falun Gong has been designated a so-called “evil cult” (xiejiao) by the Party. This suggests that, while religious freedom advocates are right to advocate on its behalf, it should not be understood to be a “religion” in the traditional sense, but instead a variety of qigong exercises, whose popularity and devotion the government has found to be problematic. The ham-fisted CCP response to FLG has exacerbated the problem, resulting in a spiral of FLG entrenchment and radicalization met with repression and persecution, in seeming perpetuity. For more on the xiejiao designation, see Karrie J. Koesel, Religion and Authoritarianism (New York: Cambridge University Press 2014): 52-56.
cultural and political components of Xi’s nationalist project. Thus, the change in state behavior towards Christian religious traditions is indicative of the threat Western ideology poses to regime survival.

“Universal values,” Western ideology, and Christianity

In the immediate wake of the church demolition campaign in Wenzhou, renowned sociologist Peter Berger reflected on its meaning in the American Interest, hypothesizing that a stagnating economic growth rate was beginning to force the regime to look beyond poverty reduction and rapid growth for legitimacy. To this end, Berger writes that, “The emerging legitimation is nationalism. Ideologically, this entails suspicion of all ideas deemed to be un-Chinese, including the idea of universal human values, and of religions seen as insufficiently indigenized,” tying this suspicion to the demolitions. In China, “universal values” refers to the notion that our common humanity implies moral and ethical principles that transcend nation, race, or ideology. Over time, these principles came to be particularly associated (by Chinese advocates and detractors alike) with the ideals of “democracy, freedom, justice, human rights and philanthropy.” While some in the CCP asserted the compatibility of the universal values concept with socialism, others countered that no political idea could be truly universal but rather is inherently local, historical, and particular. According to Maoist critics of universalism, this means that it is acceptable to draw from various non-Chinese models, but not to absolutize them. Similar debates about the universality of any value system have taken place in the West, especially in the era of postmodernism and post-colonial critical theory. As universal values have been called into question, they have also been vigorously defended, especially by scholars who adhere to Judeo-Christian religious traditions. Not surprisingly, then, like Berger, many of China’s ruling elite associate universal values claims with non-Chinese religious ideas, a status placing both religion and political

---

33 Ibid., 888.
34 Ibid., 883.
35 Critics of such value systems have pointed out the power dynamic inherent in claims of objectivity, universality, or absolutism. These power claims were often made by Western, colonial forces, who asserted that a prior grasp of Judeo-Christian ethical frameworks justified their paternalistic rule. Since the emergence of the postcolonial critical project in the academy, it has become commonplace to question claims of universal or objective values. In international relations, these ideas are most closely associated with Michel Foucault’s conceptions of hegemonic power, see especially Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language (New York: Pantheon, 1972) and, Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power,” Truth/Power: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980). For its application to postcolonial theory, see especially Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Penguin, 1979).
ideal alike in the category of objectionable foreign ideology. For example, in a training document issued by the Organization Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee the two are explicitly linked, with the document exhorting cadres to resist foreign ideological influences:

We must remain steadfast in our faith in Marxism, never lose our bearings when discussion becomes heated about Western constitutional democracy, ‘universal values,’ and ‘civil society,’ and avoid losing our sense of self under the influence of feudal superstitions and religion.37

In Ian Johnson’s investigative piece about the escalation of anti-Christian persecution in the summer of 2014, he likewise provides important context for international readers, pointing out that Christianity has long been associated with Western calls for “universal values,” to its political detriment.38 Increasingly, suspicion of universal values has been codified in new regulations and campaigns, beginning with the highly secretive Document 9, an internal Party communiqué circulated in April of 2013. It was later leaked, printed abroad and subsequently translated by the Asia Society’s ChinaFile in November of the same year.39 Document 9 issues sharp condemnations against a series of assertions, values and challenges to Chinese Communist Party rule, including broadsides against the promotion of universal values, civil society, constitutional democracy, neoliberalism and “the West’s idea of journalism.”40 These condemnations are followed closely by instructions to, “[s]trengthen leadership in the ideological sphere,” and “guide our party members and leaders to distinguish between true and false theories.” Importantly, the details of the latter instruction are given as follows: “Forcefully resist influential and harmful false tides of thoughts, help people distinguish between truth and falsehood, and solidify their understanding.”41

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
The impetus for the hardline and deeply ideological stance expressed in the document was the debate that emerged around constitutionalism during the initial leadership transition. In the period before the Xi agenda crystallized, many publicly articulated hopes that he would continue the CCP’s apparent movement in the direction of liberalism and reform. These articulations coalesced around a speech given by the newly-minted President Xi, in which he seemed, implicitly, to lend his support to constitutional reform through strengthening its implementation and accountability mechanisms. The locus of constitutionalists’ and reformers’ hopes was Xi’s statement that, “the life of the constitution lies in its implementation.” China legal scholar Rogier Creemers concluded that, “[p]arty jargon notwithstanding, the language on implementing the constitution and protecting people’s rights seems to have encouraged the pro-constitutionalist side to step up.”

As has repeatedly been the case in the history of CCP campaigns and statements, an overly generous and optimistic interpretation of the speech resulted in a misplaced confidence that calls for constitutional reform would not provoke government reprisals. The experience of Democracy Wall is instructive here: as Deng Xiaoping launched his return to power after Mao’s death, he signaled to workers, students, and other actors that they should express their discontent and desire for democratic reform by posting “big character” posters in the center of Beijing. Not long afterward, he concluded that the campaign was too politically costly and had gotten out of hand; a crackdown

42 The terms “constitutional/al/alism,” “democracy” and “constitutional democracy” are used here in the sense in which they are used in mainstream Chinese academic and political discourse. Though these terms are contested and retain some ambiguity in the PRC, they should nonetheless not be understood as interchangeable with Western liberal democracy, centered around a system of local and national direct, popular elections. Instead, they refer broadly to the democracy stipulated in the PRC Constitution, which allows for local elections to the National People’s Congress (NPC), a body that serves primarily in a consultative rather than legislative role, and is tasked in part with interpreting China’s constitution. When calls for “constitutionalism” or “constitutional democracy” are issued by Chinese academics or officials, they are most often calls for the NPC to be given greater latitude and authority, and for aspects of the constitution that receive less emphasis to be afforded greater recognition. Support for constitutional democracy should therefore not be construed as opposition to CCP rule or even as meaningful dissent. For a more extensive discussion of constitutionalism in the Chinese context, see Shi Hexing, “The People’s Congress System and China’s Constitutional Development,” and the response by Jacques deLisle, both in *China’s Political Development: Chinese and American Perspectives*, ed. Kenneth G. Lieberthal, Cheng Li, and Yu Keping (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2014): 103-130.


ensued, where the movement’s leaders were arrested.\footnote{Robert MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism: 1969-1982,” 321.} Just as the Democracy Wall movement was initially encouraged and then met with harsh suppression, the calls for more robust constitutional implementation and greater rights protections were met with the unequivocal and comprehensive statement of condemnation contained in Document 9.

**Constitutionalism and the Maoist Backlash**

The backlash against constitutionalism—in particular the first two points contained in Document 9, opposing constitutional democracy and universal values—laid the groundwork for the subsequent anti-Western ideology campaign that is still ongoing today. The central focus of the anti-Western ideology campaign has been academia and the perceived foreign intrusions that might undermine the authority of the CCP regime. According to an aggregation of the campaign’s relevant speeches and documents, presented in chronological order, the opening salvo of this ideological project was launched in June of 2014 by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) Dean Wang Weiguang in the journal *Qiushi*, published by the Party’s Central Committee. In it, Wang suggests that the values implicit and explicit in Western ideologies are intended as a kind of Trojan horse with the end goals of destabilization and regime change:

> Certain countries in the West advertise their own values as “universal values,” and claim that their interpretations of freedom, democracy, and human rights are the standard by which all others must be measured...Their goal is to infiltrate, break down, and overthrow regimes...They scheme to use Western value systems to change China, with the goal of letting Chinese people renounce the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership and socialism with Chinese characteristics, and allow China to once again become a colony of some developed capitalist country.\footnote{Weiguang Wang, “Strive to Modernize the State’s Governance Systems and Capabilities (*Nuli tu-ijin guojia zhili tixi he zhili mengli xiandaihua*),” *Qiushi*, June 16, 2014, http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/2014-06/16/c_1111106051.htm (partial translation available: http://blog.feichangdao.com/2015/02/a-chronicle-of-chinas-campaign-to.html).}

While this campaign is ongoing, two of its touchstones are an unreleased speech or series of speeches by Xi Jinping, likely given in early fall 2014 and known as Document 30,\(^{54}\) and a set of directives issued by education minister Yuan Guiren. In January 2015, the New York Times reported on Document 30 in the context of China’s Maoist resurgence,\(^ {55}\) depicting the top-secret internal document as a follow-up to the anti-constitutionalist Document 9.\(^ {56}\) According to the Times journalist Chris Buckley, it “demands cleansing Western-inspired liberal ideas from universities and other cultural institutions.” Because Document 9 was leaked and shared prodigiously throughout Chinese and Western media, Document 30 was guarded closely, and at first shared only through several work conferences devoted to conveying instructions on its adoption and implementation.\(^ {58}\) Later, portions were excerpted and referenced in state media, and it is clear that its dictates and their reverberations have been felt throughout the Chinese academy.

Building upon Documents 9 and especially 30, Education Minister Yuan made concrete the campaign’s call to purge the academy of pernicious Western ideology when he issued his so-called “Three Nevers” directive. According to Xinhu\(a\) state media, Yuan instructed teachers, administrators and officials to “[s]trengthen controls over how Western-derived teaching materials are used, and under no circumstances allow into our classrooms any teaching materials that spread Western value systems.”\(^ {59}\) To keep Western ideology out of the classroom, Yuan stated that universities must never

---


\(^{54}\) No complete, public version of the original is available in Chinese or English.

\(^{55}\) In China, Maoists are categorized as “conservative,” due to their resistance to reform and allegiance to Marxist orthodoxy, while “constitutionalists” fall into the reformist category, though this does not entail outright opposition to CCP rule. Xi Jinping has increasingly come to be seen as a conservative, and Document 30 likewise falls in this category. For an informative discussion of Neo-Maoism as conservative, see Willy Lam, “The Maoist Revival and the Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics,” \textit{China Perspectives} 2 (2012): 5-15, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/5851.


\(^{57}\) Ibid.

\(^{58}\) Ibid.

allow socialist values or Party leadership to be attacked in the classroom; never allow the constitution to be violated, and never allow teachers to vent their grievances to students, imparting a negative attitude.

By following the development of the constitutionalism debate as it morphed into the anti-Western ideology campaign, it has become clear that Xi Jinping is targeting the idea of universal values that are rooted in Judeo-Christian religions. Xi and the resurgent Maoists believe that universal values penetrate Chinese elite thinking through dissemination in the universities, and so must be intercepted and countered in the academy, before they find expression in demands for constitutional democracy. Whereas supposedly Western values, transmitted through venerable works of theology and philosophy, were valued by Hu Jintao for their potential economic utility, they have are viewed as dangerous by Xi Jinping.

The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and the Rehabilitation of “Traditional Culture”

As the number of Christians in China continues to rise—a trend that so far appears to be unaffected by higher levels of regulation and repression—its association with Western values means that this growth poses a problem for the CCP. In December 2014, scholar of Christianity in China, Richard Madsen stated:

> There seems to be a new move to try and suppress Churches. It’s connected with the nationalism of China’s government, and concerns that this is a foreign religion with connections around the world… [China’s rulers] hope the revival of traditional religions like Daoism and Buddhism will help crowd-out Christianity.

In other words, if Christianity is perceived by Xi as being uniquely insidious and foreign, the answer is to promote indigenous Chinese religion.

Elsewhere, Madsen argues cogently that the recent tendency for Chinese state leaders to emphasize Chinese traditional culture and “cultural heritage” is a matter of necessity: the post-Mao era is rife with internal contradiction and economic growth is beginning to slow. In this fragile context, the CCP has sought legitimacy in the philosophies its founding father devoted himself to purging. However, to ascribe the resurgence

---

60 Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life, “Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050,” Pew Forum (April 2, 2015), http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/. The most recent Pew religious projection data predicts that the growth of Christians will peak in 2030, and will then level off or decline.


of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist tradition predominately to fragility and desperation would misrepresent the nature of Xi’s project. Madsen, thus, aptly writes that the CCP “increasingly presents itself as protector of China’s ‘non-material cultural heritage’—the rituals and myths and sought-after virtues that link everyday life to an imagined 5000 years of glorious Chinese tradition.”

By promoting Chinese (i.e. non-Tibetan) Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, Xi attempts to—in Madsen’s words—“crowd out” the growing body of Chinese Christians as well as the potentially subversive “universal values” ideology that he understands Christianity to be lending philosophical support to. Importantly, he is at the same time providing ideological legitimation for a sustainable Chinese authoritarianism.

As Perry Link comments, a Confucian authoritarianism that neglects personal ethics and morality will not adequately resonate with either Chinese tradition or contemporary demands. Link writes:

No dream about what it means to be Chinese in the twenty-first century can feel right in Chinese culture if it omits all mention of moral behavior. Democracy advocates who speak of “rights” and “dignity” may be using foreign terms, but they are also answering a very traditional Chinese question about how people should relate to one another. China's rulers surely recognize the lacuna in their dream, but they fear the concept of citizenship because it gives the populace too much autonomy.

The challenge, then, is to articulate a Chinese-ness rooted in traditional culture and bolstered by a metaphysic that stresses order alongside morality, without entailing democracy. Xi Jinping has done exactly that in his embrace of the indigenous religious-philosophical traditions of Daoism and Confucianism, and by fully nationalizing Buddhism, which has its origins in India, but has been thoroughly integrated into the Chinese religious pantheon.

Buddhism, precisely because it has been fully “Sinicized,” has come in for special praise and held up as a model for Christianity by Chinese scholars of religion, who have played an important role in shaping China’s religious regulatory structure and policy. Zhuo Xinping, director of the Institute of World Religions at CASS has published and spoken widely on this topic, exhorting Christians in China to embrace the government’s “Sinicization” program (Zhongguohua), in order that Christianity might be made as Chinese as Chinese Buddhism, in terms of loyalty to the state and external appearance (in other words, “looking” Chinese in its rites, practices and devotions). In an essay he contributed to the Institute of World Religions’ and CASS’s discussion of

---

64 Perry Link, “What it Means to be Chinese: Nationalism and Identity in Xi’s China,” Foreign Affairs 94, no. 3 (May/June 2015).
65 Ibid.
Christianity’s need for “Sinicization,” Zhuo paints a picture of Chinese Buddhism’s foreign origins, which necessarily produced foreign loyalties.\(^{66}\) However, he asserts that Buddhism crucially assimilated to Chinese culture, in direct response to the decline of India and rise of China, a process Zhuo characterizes as “seizing the opportunity to... become a truly Chinese religion.”\(^{67}\) According to Zhuo and his colleagues, then, the solution to the problem of Western religion in China is for its members to acknowledge China’s superior political power and adapt accordingly.

This embrace of Buddhism and other religions, which would seem anathema to the Chinese Communist Party, has been accomplished through Xi’s “traditional culture” campaign. In April of 2014, Xinhua released a collection of the president’s comments on “traditional culture,” urging Party members to study them carefully.\(^{68}\) Referring to the “Chinese Dream” for which he is known, President Xi reveals that the content of the dream is the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (zhonghua renmin weida fuxi) and that this will, in part, be brought about by a re-appreciation of traditional Chinese culture.

Because Buddhism does not immediately fit into the category of indigenous philosophical or theological tradition, Xi has been keen to baptize it with “Chinese characteristics,” emphasizing the way in which it has become thoroughly integrated into Chinese traditional culture. While Director Zhuo and other Chinese religious officials and scholars have emphasized the unique, assimilative character of Chinese Buddhism in the domestic arena, as described above, Xi has also done so on the international stage. During his 2014 UNESCO speech in Paris, he recounted the history and contributions of Buddhism in China. Acknowledging its foreign origin, Xi then characterizes it as undergoing “integrated development with the indigenous Confucianism and Daoism and finally becoming the Buddhism with Chinese characteristics, thus making a deep impact on the religious belief, philosophy, literature, art, etiquette and customs of the Chinese people.”\(^{69}\)

Benjamin Kang Lim and Ben Blanchard assert that this rehabilitation of traditional faiths, including the indigenization of Buddhism, constitutes a concerted effort to provide an ideologically and spiritually unmoored nation with solid, Party-approved ground to stand on.\(^{70}\) By touting this project in his appearances abroad, Xi is signaling that this is not merely an internal strategy, but is part of the “Chinese Dream” agenda in the national and international arenas.


\(^{67}\) Ibid.

\(^{68}\) Xinhua News Agency, Xi Jinping lun zhongguo chuantong wenhua.


Confucianism has also undergone a revival under the last two PRC administrations, but with a decidedly warmer tone under Xi. Confucius' birthday in 2014 was widely celebrated with official CCP support, while the CCP utilized his name and image to support its premier expression of international soft power in the rapidly multiplying Confucius Institutes. However, in a further indication of the shift in tone, Xi himself has liberally referred to his own study of the Confucian classics.

Ian Johnson recounts Xi’s visit to Confucius' hometown, in order to illustrate his amenability to the previously maligned philosopher and his teaching: “[Xi] picked up two volumes on Confucianism and, in a reversal of the party's longtime antagonism, issued a rare endorsement: ‘I need to read these books very carefully.’”

Once again, this has not been limited to the domestic sphere, but has been enshrined in China's soft power “charm offensive,” through the establishment of “Confucius Institutes” worldwide. While these institutes are predominately used for the teaching of Mandarin Chinese, and touch very little on ethical, moral or philosophical aspects of Chinese traditional culture, it is still significant that they have been launched under the banner of Confucius and Confucianism, as China’s face to the world, when not fifty years ago Confucian temples were being smashed on orders from Mao to destroy the “Four Olds,” (referring to “old ideas, culture, customs and habits.”)

The Confucius Institutes and the appropriation of Confucius began under Hu Jintao, but Xi has made allusions to Confucian texts more explicit and has referred to them more easily than did his predecessor.

The promotion of Daoism has also experienced a surge of state support, despite being naturally less well organized than the Confucian or Buddhist societies, which have more centralized institutional structures. A post on the China Central Television (CCTV) English website informs readers that, “China is on a fast track to modernization. At the same time, many are frustrated about a perceived decline in public morals, as well as an environmental degradation. Daoism, with its belief in harmony and austerity, can help tackle spiritual dilemmas that accompany an economic boom.”

Mentioned in the UNESCO speech and elsewhere, Xi groups Daoism with Buddhism and Confucianism to form the basis of the “traditional culture” that is central to China’s rejuvenation.

---

71 Gracie, “The credo: Great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
72 Johnson, “Church-State Clash in China Coalesces Around Toppled Spire.”
An Unprecedented Crackdown and the anti-Christmas Campaign

If Christianity in China is seen as a direct threat to “traditional culture” and also as a conduit of Western ideologies promoting “universal values” that might ultimately lead to democracy and regime change, we should not be surprised to see widespread measures taken to suppress its public expression. In the last two years, since the ideological rectification campaigns have ramped up, there have been three areas where the move to contain Christianity in China has been especially stark: first, the Wenzhou church demolitions; second, the increased arrest and harsh sentencing of religious leaders; and third, state media’s rhetorical amplification of anti-Christmas movements at universities. These higher levels of repression have been observed by many organizations that provide reporting on religious freedom and human rights in China, including US-CIRF, Freedom House, Pew, and the Congressional Executive Commission on China.

In her recent work *Religion and Authoritarianism*, Karrie J. Koesel observes that:

> When religious-state collaboration collapses, authoritarian officials may return to more coercive mechanisms of control, such as introducing new rules restricting religious freedoms, refusing the registration and accreditation of religious groups, and denouncing some faiths as threats to social stability. Control may also come in more informal and uncontestable forms, such as delaying building permits or propping up rival faiths, with the intention that the targeted community will slowly wither away.\(^77\)

This is precisely what we witness in the Wenzhou church demolitions. These demolitions in Zhejiang province took place in a region characterized by high levels of church-state cooperation rather than antagonism. The coziness of the relationship between Christian actors and the local state in Wenzhou has been studied at length by scholars, including anthropologist Nanlai Cao, in *Constructing China’s Jerusalem*. In the chapter, “The Rise of ‘Boss Christians’ and Their Engagement with State Power,” he tells the stories of a number of wealthy Christian entrepreneurs and factory owners, who have used their influence to negotiate space for themselves and their churches that is neither technically legal nor prosecuted as illegal, though these churches and their activities exist in the open, and thereby, by law, should be registered.\(^78\) That is, not only are the evangelistic activities, churches, conferences and organizations left alone, as many underground churches may be—partly because they stay hidden—but they exist aboveground, and refuse to conceal their intent. Increasingly, the government had acknowledged and accommodated Christianity in the region.

The dramatic shift in the relationship between Christianity and the Chinese state under Xi, then, is why the demolitions seemed so out of the ordinary in the municipality,

---

\(^77\) Koesel, *Religion and Authoritarianism*, 31.

\(^78\) Cao, *Constructing China’s Jerusalem*, 24-41.
and elicited such widespread alarm and protest. The focal point for local Christians and government officials alike was the Sanjiang Church, notable because it was both a registered, government-affiliated church and also because it was targeted for its height and supposed ostentation, despite the fact that the project’s grandiosity had been encouraged by government officials eager to promote development. The focal point for local Christians and government officials alike was the Sanjiang Church, notable because it was both a registered, government-affiliated church and also because it was targeted for its height and supposed ostentation, despite the fact that the project’s grandiosity had been encouraged by government officials eager to promote development. Provincial secretary Xia Baolong, reportedly a close ally of Xi Jinping, was visiting the area in November of 2013, and was troubled by the way that the church’s imposing cross dominated the landscape. The cross was ordered taken down, but a standoff ensued when the church refused, a saga that ultimately resulted in its total destruction. Afterward, according to USCIRF, “at least 400 churches were torn down or had crosses forcibly removed and/or demolished…a notable increase over previous years.”

While an extensive back and forth took place in the international media as to whether the destruction that took place was aimed at Christians in particular or presaged a broader national crackdown, in the two years since, the verdict seems to be that this was an especially intense iteration of what is actually a broader campaign. Zhejiang officials alleged that action was only taken against buildings that had not received proper approval or had violated zoning restrictions or building codes, and that the “three rectifications and one demolition” campaign was equally applied to business, residences and houses of worship alike. Professor Fenggang Yang of Purdue University’s Center on Religion and Chinese Society finds the building violation justification unconvincing and disingenuous, observing that it is well known that local governments have been instructed to deny most building or renovation permits for religious structures. The ensuing shortage of worship sites ensures that religious actors will persist in their building projects, at which point the governing document on handling religious affairs, Document 19, discourages local officials from demolition or punitive action.

This gray area means that the majority of religious-use buildings have not necessarily received the proper permitting, leaving them vulnerable to shifting political winds. In short, the rapid growth of Wenzhou Christianity and subsequent lack of churches forced many religious entrepreneurs to operate in a grey zone, when providing resources adequate to the demand side, a reality predicted by Yang’s “red, black and gray

---

79 Johnson, “Church-State Clash.”
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 USCIRF, Annual Report, 34-35.
84 USCIRF, Annual Report, 33-37.
86 Ibid.
markets” model of religious supply and demand under authoritarian governance. To claim, then, that building codes alone were involved is to obscure the complex interaction between the central and local governments, and between both levels and religious actors. Additionally, in an internal document issued before the demolition and later obtained by the New York Times, the local government made clear their “aims to regulate ‘excessive religious sites’ and ‘overly popular’ religious activities, but it specified only one religion, Christianity, and one symbol, crosses.”

Due to the opacity of Chinese government processes, it cannot be said with certainty that the Wenzhou demolition campaign received central approval or support, or that it began as a directive from top leadership. That Party leaders did not explicitly disavow or move to suppress Xi’s actions, however, suggests that these measures were likely in line with central interests. As well, President Xi’s ties to Zhejiang and to Xia Baolong are extensive; Xi served as Party Secretary of the province from 2002 until 2007, and is believed to be cultivating a “Zhejiang clique,” a group of allies that includes Xia. Actions taken in Zhejiang province, then, are not incidental to the Xi agenda, and are unlikely merely to have escaped his notice.

Zhejiang’s 2015 announcement that religious believers would be specifically excluded from Party membership is further evidence that the church demolitions in that province may be tied to anti-Western policy and rhetoric at the national level. Although the Party is officially atheist, and members are naturally expected to toe this line, this has not been strictly enforced. Thus, Zhejiang’s highly publicized effort to more rigorously screen for religious belief highlights the shift in elite attitudes toward religion. Reporting on this development, the state-run Global Times cites a professor from the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, writing that, “[the professor, Li Yunlong] said that Zhejiang authorities stressed this basic requirement due to local situation, adding he hopes this will set an example to other provinces. ‘This could be a part of efforts against the penetration of Western hostile forces,’ said Li.”

While persecution has not been as pronounced in other regions, churches throughout China have faced growing constraints and found their right to exist called into question, especially in areas where Christianity is seen as posing a particular challenge to

87 Yang describes the gray market as “consisting of all religious and spiritual organizations, practitioners, and activities with ambiguous legal status,” and argues that it grows in response to tightening regulation, because of constraining supply. See Yang Fenggang, Religion in China: Survival and Revival Under Communist Rule (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 87-92.
88 Johnson, “Church-State Clash.”
Chinese traditional culture. A striking example of this tension may be found in Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, where efforts to prevent churches from being built or even expanded on this “sacred ground,” have received widespread attention and debate. Because Qufu is seen as embodying the spirit of Chinese culture and tradition, Christian churches—the embodiment and foundation of foreign ideologies—are seen by many as especially inappropriate. The campaign to prohibit Christian churches in the city has been spearheaded by Confucian scholar Zeng Zhenyu, who is also a high-ranking Communist Party official. Furthermore, the USCIRF report claims “leaders and members of both registered and unregistered churches have faced increased harassment and arbitrary arrests. Typically, leaders of house churches are more vulnerable to these types of charges, but in 2014 pastors of sanctioned churches also faced detention or arrest.” This troubling pattern has continued into 2016. For example, Pastor Gu Yuese, considered by many to be one of China’s most well-respected, state-affiliated clergy, was detained on charges of embezzlement after protesting the removal of his church’s cross. Pastor Bao Guahua, also pastor of a state church, was sentenced in February 2016 to 12 years in jail, also following resistance to the demolition campaign.

The connection between ideological purging of Western values in academia and religious suppression is tellingly illustrated in the bizarre anti-Christmas movement that took place in December 2014, and was subsequently lauded by state media. Bloomberg’s Adam Minter describes one of these scenes, at Northwest University in Xi’an as follows: “somebody has strung a banner on campus that reads: ‘Be good sons and daughters of your country, stand against Western holidays.’ And on Christmas Eve the university required all students to watch ‘Confucius-themed’ documentaries,” with students physically barred from exiting.

Minter’s account is taken from the Beijing News, and its repetition suggests that the stand against Western religious holidays is a story that the Xi administration wants told. The New York Times version of the event recounts a nearly identical instance in Wenzhou, in addition to the Northwest University episode, and ties these displays to

---


93 Sun, Confucianism as a World Religion, 174-175.

94 Beech, “Expansion of Christian Church in the Birthplace of Confucius.”

95 USCIRF, Annual Report, 33-37.


the crackdown on churches. Although most Chinese who celebrate Christmas are not doing so in a religious way, the mere association of Christianity and Western values seems to taint the holiday. Reporter Andrew Jacobs sees Leftist suspicion of Christmas celebrations as reflecting a sense that the holiday is a kind of “Trojan horse” for Western ideology. A post by officials on the university’s Communist Youth League microblog seems to confirm this view, in which the appeal of Christmas is exactly the problem: “In recent years, more and more Chinese have started to attach importance to Western festivals... In their eyes, the West is more developed than China, and they think that their holidays are more elegant than ours.”

The Chinese Dream: alternative, not integration

Many will argue that the idea of Xi Jinping establishing an alternative ideology and squelching those systems of belief and values that he believes undergird democratic ideals is less likely than a preference for decentralized religion. In this view, Buddhism, Daoism and Confucianism better lend themselves to state control because they lack an organizational model linking grassroots, local communities with a central religious authority. In contrast, many of Christianity’s best-known iterations are highly networked, such as the Roman Catholic, Anglican, or Presbyterian Churches; such organizational bases may be seen as fertile ground for organized political opposition movements. However, many of the churches that have seen their crosses destroyed or have come under additional pressure are part of the so-called “house church” movement, characterized in part by denominational non-affiliation, with no allegiance to an external organizational authority or formal association with similar churches. Additionally, the salient difference between “Chinese” and “Western” religion in Mr. Xi’s paradigm is not that one looks to a central authority and the other does not; it is the location of the authority. Even when house churches lack a formal governing structure beyond the local church, they are perceived (and perceive themselves) to possess transnational loyalties to religious communities throughout the world and to doctrines formulated outside the purview of the Chinese Communist Party.

Similarly, it might be argued Mr. Xi is a sincere admirer Confucius or Chinese Buddhism, so that any praise or promotion they receive is born of devotion rather than of a political agenda. However, this is unlikely, given that the CCP—under Xi and Li—has reiterated that Party membership is limited to professed atheists, a position we would expect to see softening rather than hardening if Xi were giving freer rein to his personal religious preferences. Admittedly, the assertions made by this paper must remain somewhat speculative, in that we ultimately are given very little insight into the thinking behind Xi Jinping’s actions. However, in realms where less ambiguous developments are unfolding, we witness Xi Jinping repudiating the integration and adaptation model

99 Minter, “Xi Jinping’s Dreaming of a Red Christmas.”
101 Ibid.
and instead embracing a grandiose vision of China’s renewed greatness, a greatness built on a strong and resilient authoritarianism.

From the sharp turn toward harsh regulation of “foreign” Christianity, juxtaposed with the newly enthusiastic and very public promotion of Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, we see that Xi Jinping and conservative elements in the Party not only understand Christianity to be a threat to the survival of the CCP regime, but also feel compelled to offer a legitimate indigenous alternative. As he continues to tout the “Chinese Dream” and Chinese “traditional culture,” astute China watchers will pay close attention to the way that traditional religion is used to shore up the efforts at national rejuvenation. In the realm of religious ideology as in the area of international norms and institutions, Xi Jinping desires not to join, integrate, or even to subvert from within; rather, he desires to demonstrate a new way altogether.

Anna Scott Bell received her Master of Arts in Asian Studies from Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service and her Master of Arts in Theology from Regent College at the University of British Columbia. Her research has focused on the relationship between religion and the Chinese state in the post-Mao period.

[88] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
References


[90] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs


Research


Ethno-Demographic Dynamics of the Rohingya-Buddhist Conflict

Rachel Blomquist

Ethno-demographic grievances define the conflict between Buddhist and Rohingya-Muslim populations in the Rakhine State of Myanmar. Nationalistic Buddhist leaders, such as the controversial monk Ashin Wirathu, maintain that the Rohingya population's rapid growth and high fertility rates threaten to overtake local Buddhist populations, reflecting local Rakhine State sentiments. This study seeks to identify quantitative and qualitative differences between the Rohingya and Buddhist populations in Rakhine State and to elucidate the theoretical and practical implications for Buddhist-Rohingya relations. Due to the government’s decision to avoid the enumeration of self-identifying Rohingya, this study has relied on several recent local surveys to reconstruct a local demographic description of the Rohingya. The “Demographic Security Dilemma” theory, which specifies expectations for minority-majority conflicts and their resolution, will be used to discuss the relevant forces that underlie the Buddhist-Rohingya conflict.

Conflict between Buddhist and Rohingya-Muslim populations in Rakhine State, Myanmar are defined by ethno-demographic grievances. Nationalistic Buddhist leaders, such as the controversial monk Ashin Wirathu, maintain that the Rohingya population's rapid growth and high fertility rates threaten to overtake local Buddhist populations; the Myanmar government has responded to related concerns by targeting the Rohingya with oppressive policies, including childbirth restrictions for Rohingya women. This study seeks to identify actual quantitative differences between the Rohingya

1 I would like to thank Georgetown University’s Asian Studies Program and the Stimson Center for their support in the making of this study. I would also like to thank Dr. Richard Cincotta and Dr. Betsi Stephen for their mentorship, expertise, and insight on this research.
and Buddhist populations in Rakhine State and to elucidate their theoretical and practical implications for Buddhist-Rohingya relations. Due to the Myanmar government's decision to avoid the enumeration of self-identifying Rohingya, this study relies on several recent local surveys to reconstruct a localized demographic understanding of the Rohingya population and finds that the Rohingya population is growing at a rate 1.5 times greater than that of most other ethnic groups in Myanmar. The "Demographic Security Dilemma" theory, which outlines expectations for minority-majority conflicts and their resolution, will be used to discuss the forces that underlie the Buddhist-Rohingya conflict.²

Introduction

Recent communal conflict in the Rakhine State of Myanmar has culminated in the displacement of the Rohingya community—a Muslim minority living in the northwestern regions of the Rakhine State. Related communal violence, including the Rakhine State riots in 2012, have resulted in the destruction of Rohingya homes and have led to a recent wave of Rohingya “boat people” seeking refuge along the shorelines and coastal waterways of neighboring Southeast Asian nations. Along with communal conflict, the Rohingya are routine targets of oppressive governmental policies. While many of Myanmar’s 135 ethnic groups have been on the receiving end of related policies, the Rohingya have been especially affected due to their singular religious minority status and perceived immigrant origin.

Studies on the Rohingya and ethnic conflict provide insight into the dynamics of communal conflict in Rakhine State. Studies focused on the Rohingya population reveal that governmental policies cause marginalization,³ with communal conflict fueled by a competition for natural resources⁴ as well as a desire to protect the Burmese Buddhist identity (communalism).⁵ More general ethnic studies reveal that concerns over safety,⁶ migratory flows, and the legacy of colonialism are also ingredients for ethnic conflict.⁷ Although these studies provide cogent insight and support the discussion of this analysis, they inadequately address a key concern of regional demography. In Myanmar, the majority Buddhist population perceives the Muslim minority as a security threat based on differentials in population growth. Particularly acute in the Rakhine State, where

² A previous version of this paper was first published in the Georgetown Security Studies Review.
the Rohingya occupy approximately thirty percent of the total population, nationalists and locals alike support claims that high fertility and rapid population growth rates threaten to overwhelm local Buddhist communities. Such fears highlight the relationship between ethnicity and demography.  

The interplay of demographic and regional ethnic relations reflects significant differences between Rohingya and Buddhist communities in the Rakhine State. A quantitative representation of these relations will contribute to previous Rohingya-focused scholarship and provide additional insight toward addressing communal violence in the Rakhine State. In examining demographic differentials between Rohingya-Muslims and Rakhine-Buddhists, this study asks the following question: “How do the total fertility rate, age structure, and rate of growth of the Rohingya compare to that of Rakhine citizens, to Myanmar’s total population, and to other distinct ethnic groups in the country?” To answer this question, this study seeks to verify whether the Rohingya’s total fertility rate and population growth rate are statistically different from those of other ethnic populations in Myanmar, as the claim that the Rohingya’s fertility rate exceeds that of the rest of Myanmar’s citizens is often used as a basis for perpetuating anti-Muslim sentiment within Myanmar.

A paucity of available data poses a significant challenge to the development of a comprehensive demographic study of the Rohingya. For example, previous restrictive governmental policies limited access to demographic data in Myanmar, and the country’s 2014 census did not include detailed information on the Rohingya (the census merely provided estimates on the number of non-enumerated persons in each state). However, for the purposes of this study, a rough estimate of Rohingya fertility and age structure can be constructed through the use of published estimates on the minority population’s birth rates and death rates.

This study uses age structures (established and reconstructed) to determine demographic changes (i.e., crude birth rate, total fertility rate, growth rate) among the Rohingya and similar youthful populations, finding that the Rohingya have a younger population and are growing at a rate 1.5 times faster than that of both Myanmar as a whole and of the total population of Rakhine State. Based on the “Demographic Security Dilemma,” a political-demographic model advanced by Christian Leuprecht, this study argues that as the Rohingya population growth rate outpaces that of other ethnic groups, the perceived threat of absolute and/or cultural extinction can escalate into a cyclical relationship of fear and response among regional stakeholders.

This paper consists of the following six sections: background, theoretical framework, methods, results, discussion, and conclusion. The background section provides a brief historical account of conflict in the northern Rakhine State since Myanmar’s declaration

---


of independence. The next section provides an overview of the field of political demography and expounds upon the Demographic Security Dilemma. The second, third, and fourth sections present methods, findings, and a discussion in which an ethno-demographic analysis of the Rohingya population elucidates differences between Rohingya and Myanmar citizen age structures, thus providing insight into the social, political, and economic consequences of Rohingya demography. The last section of the paper identifies potential shortcomings of this analysis, areas for future research, and policy implications.

It should be briefly noted here that the objective application of terminology related to ethnic relations in Myanmar requires specific definitions that preclude contentious biases. To respect the views of ethnic groups and opposition parties, yet resist the sway of obfuscating political changes, references will employ terminology from authoritative international bodies, including the United Nations and the World Bank. Myanmar officially recognizes 135 ethnic groups, which are dispersed throughout the nation. However, large concentrations of ethnic minorities live in their namesake ethnic states of Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. A comparative study on all ethnic groups is beyond the scope of this paper; therefore, this study assumes that ethnic composition coincides with regional ethnic designations (i.e., people of the Karen ethnicity live in the Karen State, people of the Mon ethnicity in the Mon State, etc.).

**Background**

Widespread persecution since independence in 1948 and the subsequent restriction of citizenship rights have contributed to Rohingya suffering. In a manner similar to other ethnic groups at the time of independence, the Rohingya sought regional autonomy, either in the form of secession or as a separate administrative state. Initially, Rohingya political activists pursued succession from Burma via unification with the newly formed Pakistan; however, agreements between the leaders of Pakistan and Burma prevented this aspiration from being realized. While moderate Rohingyas tried to engage with the government, extremist Rohingya groups formed an armed group (a mujahideen) that threatened the relationship between the Myanmar government and Rohingya moderates. By 1954, the government initiated Operation Monsoon, which factionalized the mujahideen by assassinating its leaders and imprisoning its supporters. By 1961, Rohingya leaders agreed to the formation of the Mayu Frontier Administration (MFA) as proposed by Prime Minister U Nu. The MFA was to govern

---

13 Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 51.
townships in the northern Rakhine State and to create a separate administrative division controlled by Muslims within the Buddhist Rakhine administration. However, the coup of 1962 ended Muslim hopes of self-administration, thwarting further political engagement and significantly restricting the armed activities of the Rohingya.\footnote{International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, “International Mission of Inquiry: Burma: Repression, Discrimination and Ethnic Cleansing in Arakan,” No. 290/2 (April 2000): 6.}

In 1962, General Ne Win implemented a Burmanization policy that was designed to centralize and legitimize the government while unifying the country under a single national identity. This policy intertwined social and economic mobility with assimilation into the Burmese culture, thus dismantling the successes that minority ethnic leaders, including the Rohingya, achieved under former Prime Minister U Nu.\footnote{David I. Steinberg, *Burma: The State of Myanmar* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001): 73.}

At this time, citizenship rights were also lost as the new administration issued Foreign Registration Cards (FRC) to the Rohingya.\footnote{Moshe Yegar, *Between Integration and Secession*, 56.} Operation Naga Min (Dragon King) of 1978, a demographic campaign aimed at discriminating between citizens, foreigners and illegal foreigners, further restricted Rohingya citizenship by identifying them as illegal foreigners.\footnote{Ibid., 55.} The government cemented its anti-Rohingya stance with the 1982 Citizenship Law. This legislation anchored discrimination against the Rohingya in national systems—political, social and economic—by formally establishing their status as illegal foreigners.\footnote{Benjamin Zawacki, “Defining Myanmar’s Rohingya Problem,” *Human Rights Brief* 20, no. 18 (2013): 18.} In 1991, the government launched Operation Pyi Thaya (Operation Clean and Beautiful Nation) in response to political demonstrations in the Rakhine State.\footnote{Greg Constantine, “Exiled to Nowhere: Burma’s Rohingya,” 2015, www.exiledtonowhere.com.} Operations Naga Min and Pyi Thaya triggered widespread persecution against the Rohingya, resulting in mass refugee migration across the Bangladeshi border. Recent communal violence has also contributed to the ongoing flight of Rohingya refugees from the northern Rakhine State.

**Theoretical Framework**

A preliminary analysis of the ethnic tensions in the Rakhine State correctly attributes the plight of the Rohingya to widespread persecution and denial of citizenship rights from both government and civil actors; however, an in-depth assessment uncovers additional government involvement that has contributed to the struggles of the Rohingya minority. Reports from the Irish Centre for Human Rights\footnote{Schabas, “Crimes against Humanity in Western Burma.”} and Amnesty International\footnote{Amnesty International, “Myanmar The Rohingya Minority: Fundamental Rights Denied,” London: Amnesty International, 2004.} identify governmental policies as a key contributor to human rights abuses against the Rohingya. The focus of these policies include—but are not limited to—forced labor, restrictions to movement, the confiscation of land, population control,
and the curtailment of religious practices. Simpson argues that the exploitation of natural resources in the Rakhine state exacerbates insecurity, as disagreements over the distribution of natural resources undermine attempts at peacebuilding between the government and minority groups.\textsuperscript{22} Related disputes in turn lead to a perceived lack of resources among the Rakhine minority, thereby increasing resource competition and conflict among minority groups in the Rakhine State. Walton and Hayward explore the relationship between “religious” conflict and monastic mobilization in Myanmar as well as the role that anti-Muslim propaganda from groups such as U Wirathu, the 969 Movement, and the MaBaTha play in the conflict.\textsuperscript{23} The authors find that ethno-religious violence in Myanmar, rooted in communalism, belies the defense of religion; rather, the preservation of Burmese Buddhist identity explains the violence. In terms of studies on ethnic conflict, Lake and Rothchild posit that fears of safety instigate inter-ethnic conflict, aggravated by political activists and misinformation.\textsuperscript{24} Finally, Fuller et al. develop a method to measure and assess the potential for ethnic conflict and identify three “global megatrends”—the intensification of migratory flows, higher population growth rates of minorities vis-à-vis majority ethnic groups, and the legacy of colonialism—that intensify the threat of ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{25}

Although some recent studies touch on the correlation between demography and ethnic conflict,\textsuperscript{26} few focus on that relationship within Myanmar. One study that does address Myanmar, conducted by David Dapice, attributes the inaccurate perception of a growing Rohingya population to the reality of rural-to-urban migration among young Rakhine citizens, which has increased the concentration of the Rohingya in rural Rakhine.\textsuperscript{27} However, the crux of his study focuses on the benefits of converting to a federalist form of governance and does not present an in-depth analysis of the demographic composition in the Rakhine State. Even outside of Myanmar, demography remains underrepresented in political science and foreign policy despite the influence that demographic factors have on politics, internal conflicts, and economic changes. Political demography, defined as “the study of the size, composition, and distribution of

\textsuperscript{22} Simpson, “Identity, Ethnicity and Natural Resources in Myanmar.”

\textsuperscript{23} Walton and Hayward, “Contesting Buddhist narratives.”

\textsuperscript{24} Lake and Rothchild, “Containing Fear,” 41-75.

\textsuperscript{25} Fuller et al., “Measuring Potential Ethnic Conflict in Southeast Asia,” 305-331.


\textsuperscript{27} David Dapice, “A Fatal Distraction from Federalism-Religious Conflict in Rakhine,” Department of Economics, Tufts University (October 2014): 5.
population in relation to both government and politics,” 28 identifies patterns of political identity, conflict, and change through statistical analyses of human populations. A thorough understanding of such patterns stemming from influential demographic factors (e.g., data and statistics on birth, death, fertility, and population growth) would aid in formulating social policies for the public good in areas such as early childhood education, maternal health, and the empowerment of women.

Political-demographic models, therefore, are highly pertinent to voiced demographic issues in Myanmar. One particularly relevant demographic framework, Christian Leuprecht’s “Demographic Security Dilemma,” can be applied to the situation of the Rohingya in Myanmar. 29 This model incorporates a phenomenon known as the “youth bulge,” revealing the probability of tensions occurring between populations at the subnational level based on differentials in population growth. 30 Typically, a “youth bulge” occurs as high fertility rates result in a growing population that in turn places stress on national political and economic systems. “Youthful” nations (i.e., nations with a median age of ≤ 25.0 years) face a proliferation of intrastate conflict and civil war due to an excess number of restive young men who are prone to violent behavior and political activism. Based on the “youth bulge” concept, Leuprecht’s model analyzes the interactions of a politically dominant low-fertility population and a large, more youthful minority, using the Israel-Palestine conflict as a case study. Leuprecht finds that this demographic relationship results in a cyclical action-reaction relationship of fear and response between two distinct populations.

The dilemma posed by Leuprecht can be represented through the following four stages (see Figure 1). First, the minority population maintains a higher fertility rate than the majority population. Second, the politically dominant majority perceives that the “youthful” minority population will overtake and possibly displace the majority. This perceived threat takes one or more different forms: fear of extinction in absolute numbers, fear of extinction in relation to surrounding ethnic groups, fear of cultural extinction, and/or fear of subjugation to other ethnic groups. 31 Third, the majority’s fear of displacement triggers vocal and/or physical reactions toward the minority amid calls for government action. At this point, the government may either implement welfare policies—such as family planning or women’s education—and thus end the cycle, or

30 The youth bulge family at the subnational level analyzes the relationship between the age structure of the majority and the age structure of an ethno-religious minority. Conflicts among subnational groups can occur when one of three circumstances are met: (1) both the majority and minority are youthful; (2) the majority is youthful and the minority is intermediate/mature; or (3) the majority is intermediate/mature and the minority is youthful. The Demographic Security Dilemma is an example of the third listed circumstance.
The Demographic Security Dilemma is a cycle of action and reaction between various stakeholders (e.g., a marginalized minority group, a politically-dominant majority, and a national government). As the cycle progresses and grievances remain unanswered, violence—and even civil war—may break out among different ethnic groups.


continue with the fourth step: the implementation of stringent population-control policies (e.g., limiting the number of children per woman). If more stringent policies are enforced, such a response leads back to the first phase of the cycle, as these policies limit opportunities for women and reduce access to healthcare, thereby ensuring sustained high fertility and population growth rates. As this cycle progressively repeats and the minority’s grievances remain unanswered, marginalization of the minority could escalate into violence and/or civil war. Leuprecht suggests that the cyclical relationship of conflict between a young, marginalized minority population and an older, politically dominant majority population can only be resolved through the enactment of welfare policies, a policy option which will be discussed later in this paper.

Methods

To determine demographic differences with limited available data, this study establishes a possible Rohingya age structure based on the factors of crude birth rate (CBR),
crude death rate (CDR), total fertility rate (TFR), and median age; utilizes various sources of data and demographic tools (as enumerated below); and compares Rohingya data with that of the Union of Myanmar and that of individual states in Myanmar. In terms of demographic data, the 2014 Myanmar Census provided country-level data as well as related information on individual states, and a series of publications from the UN’s Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) extrapolated Rohingya demographic data from a single urban locality (Maungdaw Township) in the Rakhine State.\textsuperscript{32} Additionally, a table of stable populations reflects a possible Rohingya age structure based on statistics from the aforementioned CEDAW publications. Model life tables and tables of stable populations (populations with an unvarying age structure growing at a constant annual rate), as presented by Coale and Demeny,\textsuperscript{33} provide life and growth rate tables based on a cross-boundary data collection that can be used to examine trends in birth and mortality rates, in which mortality and sex-age structure remain constant.\textsuperscript{34} These tables aid in understanding population changes for situations in which there is a lack of information on a specific population.\textsuperscript{35}

Population pyramids, the primary demographic tool used for this study, are often used to represent age structures. An age structure measures the distribution of a population based on age and gender, and it can also reveal the median age of a population. Age structures are divided into five-year birth cohorts (people born in the same year or period), with each cohort—divided by gender—representing a proportion of the living population.\textsuperscript{36} Past analyses of “youthful” age structures have shown that if a population has a large proportion of young people (≤ 25.0 years), then that population will continue to grow even during periods of fertility decline as the proportion of women in childbearing years remains high.\textsuperscript{37}

CBR (number of births per 1000 people) provides a measure of growth based on the total number of births within a population; CDR (number of deaths per 1,000 people) denotes the rate of decline based on the total number of deaths within a population.

\textsuperscript{32} CEDAW identified Maungdaw Township, the primary township in northern Rakhine, as having a total population of 511,785, of whom 90.4 percent were identified as Bengali. In the 2014 Census, the Union of Myanmar identified the Rohingya as “Bengali.” The CEDAW publication described this “Bengali” population as Muslims in the northern Rakhine State; thus, these Bengali are assumed to be Rohingya.


While these two factors alone reveal little about the dynamics of a population, in the case of this data-limited study, the application of CBR and CDR to a stable-population table will be used to construct an estimated population age structure for the Rohingya.\textsuperscript{38}

Total fertility rate (TFR)—a common parameter in political demography which provides a more robust assessment of population growth and change than CBR and CDR—measures “the total number of children that a woman would be expected to have if she lived out her entire child-bearing years and had the average number of children at each stage of her life as the overall average experience of all women in her society.”\textsuperscript{39} Thus, TFR describes population growth and fertility based on the potential for women to have a certain number of children under the strictures of extraneous variables, such as family planning, contraception, women’s education, etc.

Finally, the median age of a population—“the age at which exactly half the population is older and half is younger”\textsuperscript{40}—is a parameter that can be used to sort a population into one of the following categories: “youthful” (e.g., the Rohingya), “intermediate” (e.g., Myanmar at the national level), or “mature” (e.g., the United States). As there is no available median age data on the Rohingya, this study yields an estimated median age for the population based on an extrapolated Rohingya age structure.

The combination of age structure, TFR, and median age can be used to generate a more nuanced interpretation of the Rohingya population. To assess the robustness of these measures, this study utilizes two methods of verification: (1) winsorizing and trimming of a linear regression of the TFR as a function of CBR and (2) a cluster analysis of age structures for Myanmar states (see Figure 6). The linear regression of the TFR from Myanmar states identifies trends and extrapolates a possible range for the Rohingya TFR. Winsorization and trimming techniques limit extreme values in the statistical data to reduce the effect of outliers. The linear regression of the dependent variable TFR as a function of CBR utilizes trimmed data (p=10\%) of TFR and CBR for Burmese states (n=16). The six iterations of the regression of trimmed data combinations omits possible outliers, yielding the six respective coefficients of determination (R\textsuperscript{2}) ranging from .89851 to .96734.\textsuperscript{41} Additionally, cluster analyses verify similarities and differences within a dataset of age structures of Myanmar states. The clustering for similar characteristics of 16 variables (Myanmar States and Rohingya for TBR and CBR) employ the Nearest Neighbor (Single Linkage) Clustering Method utilizing the Euclidean Distance Metric. The procedure identifies each variable as a separate group and then combines the two closest variables to form a new group. After recomputing

\textsuperscript{38} In an ideal case, in which accurate demographic records were available, actual age structures, TFR, and/or growth rates would be used to understand relationships between populations.

\textsuperscript{39} Goldstone, “A Theory of Political Demography,” 17.

\textsuperscript{40} Haupt et al., PRB’s Population Handbook, 4.

the distance between the groups, the clustering algorithm then combines the next two closest groups. This process is repeated until only three groups remain.\textsuperscript{42}

**Results**

This study determines a Rohingya age structure, TFR, and possible rate of growth vis-à-vis other populations in Myanmar. Past UN statistics on the northern Rakhine State determined the Rohingya CBR as 27.2 in 2012 and the CDR as 12.4 in 2008.\textsuperscript{43} The CBR parameter reflects population growth to a greater extent than CDR, as CDR data may not correlate with “youthful” populations due to extraneous variables (e.g., availability of health services, prevalence of disease). Therefore, this analysis focuses on CBR correlations to determine the Rohingya TFR. The extant Rohingya values of CBR and CDR (27.2 and 12.4, respectively) are used to derive the Rohingya age structure for 2012 utilizing the table of stable populations identified as the Model Growth Rate Set of male and female in the South set\textsuperscript{44} with the mortality level of 17 and a reproductive rate of 1.5 (R=15.00),\textsuperscript{45} in which \( r \) is defined as the rate of increase, or “the basic index of variation for a given mortality schedule” as established by Coale and Demeny.\textsuperscript{46} The rate \( r \), denoted as a percent, is essentially the rate of increase of a stable population over one year as a difference between CBR and CDR; \( r \) as per thousand population specifies “R.” Thus the Rohingya CBR and CDR, approximating R=15 for the designated Model Growth Rate table, is used to render the Rohingya age structure for 2012.

The derived Rohingya age structure resembles a pyramid with a wide base and a narrow apex (Figure 2), indicative of a large proportion of younger cohorts (i.e., a “youthful” population). This result is expected based on the relationship of CBR (27.2) with that of the reproductive rate (1.5) as indicated in the model growth rate table. Owing to the fact that it is a reconstruction, this age structure of cohorts forms a smooth and continuous contour; in comparison, most age structures derived from actual data form discontinuous progressions in which discrete increases and/or decreases of contiguous cohorts are not always gradual or incremental.

\textsuperscript{44} In their study, Coale and Demeny developed four families, identified as North, South, East, and West sets, which highlight patterns among similar countries based on variations of mortality rates. The South set includes data from 1876-1940 and includes the countries of Spain, Portugal, and Southern Italy; these countries had high mortality rates under the age of five, low mortality rates around the ages of 40-60, and high mortality over the age of 65.
\textsuperscript{45} Coale et al., *Regional Model Life Tables and Stable Populations.*
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
Based on the reconstructed age structure, the median age of the Rohingya is within the cohort of 20-24 years of age. A winsorized and trimmed linear regression of TFR as a function of CBR for the states of Myanmar produces an estimated Rohingya TFR of 3.8, the significance of which is described below.

**Figure 2. Rohingya Age Structure in 2012**

The age structure, divided by gender, represents the number of individuals in each age cohort as a percentage of the total population, ranging from 0-4 years of age to 100+ years of age. The reconstructed Rohingya age structure shows a large percentage of the population in cohorts below the age of 25 years, thus indicating a youthful population.


According to Myanmar’s 2014 Census, the Union has a demographic structure of an “intermediate” nation with a somewhat older age structure (i.e., a proportionally older

---

population having a median age of 27.1 years); the “youthful” Rohingya age structure may have matched the Union in 1993 (Figure 3). The age structure and birth rate of

**Figure 3. Comparison of Regional Age Structures**

When comparing the age structure of regional stakeholders (Rohingya, Rakhine, and Myanmar), the Rohingya age structure most resembles Myanmar in 1993, when the United Nations Population Division classified the country as a youthful population. The Rakhine age structure, while still a youthful population, more closely resembles the modern day, intermediate age structure of Myanmar.

Note: Estimated number of persons not enumerated: Myanmar: 1,206,353; Rakhine: 1,090,000.

the Rakhine State (median age = 26 years), although reflecting populations younger than that of the Union as a whole, still exceeds that of the Rohingya. Similarly, all non-ethnic minority states in Myanmar, such as Yangon (median age = 28.3 years) and Tanintharyi (median age = 24 years), have age structures older than that of the Rohingya and appear to demonstrate the trajectories of maturing populations. Tanintharyi presents a relatively young age structure and is thus a slight outlier as compared to other non-ethnic minority states. Most ethnic minority states appear to have “youthful” populations; however, the Rakhine State and the Mon State resemble an “intermediate” age structure. Furthermore, all ethnic minority states, with the exception of the Chin State, have an older age structure than that of the Rohingya (Figure 4).

TFR trends of Myanmar states are in close alignment with their respective age structures. A TFR of 2.1 is generally understood as necessary to maintain a population at a replacement level. The Union (TFR = 2.3) and the Rakhine State (TFR = 2.2) both have TFRs near replacement level, while the Rohingya population shows a TFR of around 3.8, about 1.5 times higher than that of the Union and that of the Rakhine State. Compared to other state-level populations, the Rohingya have one of the highest TFRs and CBRs in Myanmar (Figure 5). A cluster analysis of age structures for Myanmar states reveals three distinct groups: Cluster 1 (states with TFRs near 2.1) includes all non-ethnic minority states and half of the ethnic minority states; Cluster 2 (states with TFRs near 3.5) includes Kayah State (TFR = 3.3; median age = 22.9), Kayin State (TFR = 3.4; 23.6), and the Rohingya; and Cluster 3 includes the outlier Chin State, which has a TFR of nearly 4.5 (Figure 6). This analysis finds the Rohingya age population—as well as the populations of Kayah State and Kayin State—to be “youthful.”

Deviations in the differentials of minority and majority populations in the Chin State, Rakhine State (excluding the Rohingya), and Mon State could be attributed to various factors. Differences in accessibility of services at the township level and the state level possibly account for the Chin State (TFR = 4.37; median age = 20.1 years) being the only region with a CBR and TFR higher than that of the Rohingya. Among ethnic states, recent development projects, such as the creation of model villages designed to improve the livelihoods of the Rakhine ethnic group (at the expense of Rohingya rights), may have led to a decrease in non-Rohingya birthrates and thus explain some of the demographic divergence in the Rakhine State.

In sum, the reconstructed Rohingya age structure, TFR, and median age portray a relatively “youthful” population that will continue to grow and surpass that of most other Myanmar ethnic populations if the Rohingya fertility rate continues on at its current level; the age structure of the Union and the majority of its states, on the other hand, will continue to mirror the trajectory of nations with maturing populations.
Figure 4. Age Structures of a Sample of States in Myanmar

When comparing populations across Myanmar, age structures demonstrate a trend in which minority states have age structures with a larger percent of the population under the age of 25, as compared to the relatively older populations of non-minority states.

Figure 5. Total Fertility Rate and Crude Birth Rate of States in Myanmar

As represented in a linear graph, the Rohingya Total Fertility Rate and Crude Birth Rate is one of the highest in Myanmar. In addition, this graph supports the observation that ethnic-minority states have higher growth rates than those of non-minority states.


Figure 6. Cluster Analysis of the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) and Crude Birth Rate (CBR) of States in Myanmar

The cluster analysis, as represented in a linear graph, divides populations into three categories based on similarities in TFR and CBR. The cluster analysis grouped the Rohingya with the ethnic-minority states of Kayah and Kayin, based on similar TFR and CBR. Like the Rakhine State, these states have experienced elevated levels of conflict.

Source: Same as Figure 5.
Understanding a country’s demographic landscape can provide many important insights. Demographic factors, such as age structures, TFR, and median ages, can be used to help estimate a country’s potential for economic success or the threat of economic stagnation. For example, relatively young populations, such as those found in many developing countries, have great potential for economic growth as young members of society enter the labor force; aging populations, such as those of Japan or Germany, face the threat of economic stagnation due to their shrinking, aging workforces. In other cases, demographic data, including fertility and birth statistics, can be used to shed light on human rights violations. For example, since TFR designates the number of children a woman may have over the course of her childbearing years, this measurement may reveal the efficacy of family-planning programs (if they exist), levels of education attained by females, and the quality of women’s rights. Additionally, subnational demographic factors could be used to portray a country’s prospects for democracy, potential for ethnic conflict, and the existence of minority human rights abuses.

Understanding divergent age structures in Myanmar sheds light on a number of different issues. These age structures signal the results of discrimination and oppressive policies in the state and highlight the plight that many Rohingya face as they struggle to gain citizenship rights and improve their livelihoods. The Rohingya age structure mirrors trends that typically characterize youthful populations: low education levels, poverty, religiosity, and the maintenance of traditional family patterns. Yet current Myanmar policies offer little hope for escape from an unsatisfactory lifestyle, as the cycle of fear and response dominates ethnic relations in the Rakhine State.

As the Rohingya population continues to grow and the Rakhine-Buddhist population stabilizes, Rakhine-Buddhists fear extinction in both absolute and relative numbers to the Rohingya, as the minority group occupies approximately ninety percent of the northern Rakhine State. The close proximity of these two ethnic groups as they compete for limited resources further aggravates this fear. Like the Rohingya, the Rakhine-Buddhists have historically faced land confiscations, persecution, and cultural restrictions at the mercy of the Burman-dominated regime. For example, the government has confiscated land from the Rohingya and Rakhine-Buddhists alike in order to house a large military force used to monitor conflict in the Rakhine State. The Rakhine-Buddhists have thus faced limited socioeconomic opportunities and have perceived the Rohingya as a growing ethnic out-group in direct competition for already scarce resources.

Rakhine-Buddhist fears of cultural and physical extinction (as well their ethnic subjugation by the Burman-led government) have led to unresolved grievances in which violence appeared the only recourse. Consequently, riots broke out in the Rakhine State.

in 2012, and these riots further damaged the heretofore tenuous relationship between the Rakhine-Buddhists and the Rohingya. Locals attributed the cause of the 2012 riots to the raping and killing of a Buddhist woman by a Rohingya-Muslim man, yet the Rohingya, the main target of the conflict, ascribed the cause of the riots to ongoing discrimination.\(^{51}\) During this period, hundreds of thousands of displaced Rohingya fled across the Bangladeshi border following the destruction of their homes, villages, and temples.\(^{52}\)

As disputes in the Rakhine State continue to fester and Rakhine-Buddhists’ grievances remain unanswered, Buddhist compatriots have sympathized and vocalized their support through nationalistic propaganda and anti-minority rhetoric. Echoing the apprehensions of local Rakhine-Buddhists, politicized Buddhist monks and associations—such as Ashin Wirathu,\(^{53}\) the MaBaTha, and the 969 Movement—regularly exploit demographic fears by espousing anti-Muslim rhetoric. Ethnocentric Buddhists often claim that the Rohingya, sustained by high fertility and rapid population growth rates, threaten to overwhelm local Buddhist communities in the Rakhine State. Pejorative phraseology such as “Islamisation”, “Bengali landgrabbers,” and even “terrorists” are typical references to the Rohingya in anti-minority discussions.\(^{54}\) The vocalization of grievances, combined with the lobbying power of nationalistic groups, places pressure on the Myanmar government to address this perceived demographic problem.

Although anti-Muslim rhetoric increases the spread of discrimination against the Rohingya, it is not the Rakhine-Buddhists who are culpable for the conflict with the Rohingya; rather, responsibility lies with the government of Myanmar. Since the emergence of modern Myanmar/Burma in 1948, the national government has not provided adequate support to the Rohingya, merely implementing restrictive policies that directly and indirectly affect all aspects of Rohingya life. These policies—which date back to 1962 with the Rohingya’s loss of citizenship rights—restrict access to education, limit economic opportunities, maintain high levels of poverty, and prevent women’s empowerment, thus reinforcing traditional gender relationships that support higher levels of fertility and larger families.\(^{55}\) Significant anti-Rohingya policies include: Operation Naga Min of 1978, the Two-Child Policy of 2013, and the Population Control Healthcare Bill of 2015. Operation Naga Min, a singularly prominent population control policy in which the government systematically identified illegal residents in

---


\(^{52}\) Zawacki, “Defining Myanmar’s Rohingya Problem,” 23.


problematic regions such as the northern Rakhine State, led to mass persecution and marginalization of the Rohingya that included widespread rape, destruction of villages, and arbitrary arrests. More recently, the Two-Child Policy of 2013, which primarily targeted the Rohingya and was designed to address the 2012 communal violence, implemented a two-child family planning program that has led to unsafe abortions and unregistered births. Lastly, the Population Control Healthcare Bill of 2015, designed to reduce maternal and infant mortality rates by mandating that women residing in areas with high population growth rates engage in a 36-month period of birth-spacing, serves as a particularly severe detriment to women’s rights in Muslim-majority areas and fuels tensions between the Rohingya and Rakhine citizens.

On the present course, Myanmar’s demographic dilemma will only worsen as the Rohingya sustain high growth rates and Rakhine-Buddhists continue to fear cultural and absolute extinction. A complete reversal of policies, from stringent population-control to welfare policies, might be they only way to reverse course. Welfare policies—such as family-planning services, increased access to education, access to public health, and women’s rights—can help reverse the progression of the current fear-response cycle. For example, related welfare policies have been shown to decrease fertility rates and thereby lower growth rates. Furthermore, if economic and social opportunities are increased, women can play a greater role in the economic activities of their families, and they may therefore be incentivized to have less children and smaller families. By maintaining the present stance toward the Rohingya, the Myanmar government will likely continue to escalate the conflict to new levels of intensity, which poses the risk of civil war. As the Rohingya population continues to expand under Myanmar’s present policies, young Rohingya and Rakhine-Buddhist men alike will physically express their intensifying grievances, which will produce conditions of unrest that challenge the course of democratic nation-building in Myanmar.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s demographic characteristics and their ties to communal violence and gov-

---

56 Yegar, Between Integration and Secession, 55.
ernment policy highlight the importance of understanding demographic structures in a variety of research disciplines. As demonstrated by this study, a demographic analysis of the Rohingya (focused on factors such as age structure, median age, and TFR) can provide quantitative information about a local population that may have been overlooked or expressed in less straightforward qualitative argumentation by research conducted in other disciplines. Related studies in political-demography can be used to effectively augment the research methodologies of other disciplines, such as economics, politics, and even religious studies. Of course, additional demographic studies based on more complete Rohingya population statistics will provide a fuller understanding of the effect that differential population growth has at the subnational level in Myanmar. Nonetheless, this investigation of the demographic situation of the Rohingya, while restricted by a lack of demographic data, does provide a new understanding of tensions in Myanmar that can be of use to decision makers and policy planners.

This analysis disproves that the Rohingya’s total fertility rate and population growth rate are not statistically different from the local Myanmar citizens and therefore demonstrates that Rakhine-Buddhist fears of cultural/absolute extinction are not irrational. Consequently, as the Rohingya population continues to grow at a rate 1.5 times faster than that of other groups in the country, other ethnic groups (specifically, the Rakhine-Buddhists) will have increased fears of displacement and cultural extinction, thus escalating the ongoing cycle of discrimination and violence (as outlined in Leuprecht’s Demographic Security Dilemma). These fears will reinforce repressive government policies that may aggravate the racial conflicts and exacerbate the already high Rohingya fertility rate. Myanmar’s unabated differential age structures could spiral the country into more destructive outcomes, including that include civil war. Civil war in Myanmar could create a massive transnational issue as violence spills over the borders, increases the flow of refugees, and creates security challenges throughout Southeast Asia. As the new NLD-led government builds its credibility as a democracy, conflict in the Rakhine State and the rights of the Rohingya will remain in the forefront of the international community’s views. As such, the NLD must develop solutions that account for the plight of the Rohingya by developing inclusive policies designed to increase the socioeconomic well-being of Rakhine citizens—especially the Rohingya—while phasing out policies that contribute significantly to the marginalization of minority ethnic groups.

---

Rachel Blomquist holds an M.A. in Asian Studies from Georgetown University and a B.A. in Anthropology from Creighton University. Her research interests include the impact of sociocultural trends on the regional policies of Southeast Asia and the Korean peninsula.
References


Research


The *Journal* welcomes original social science research papers written on issues relevant to politics, security, economy, culture, and society of contemporary Asia, including Pakistan and Afghanistan. “Contemporary” is understood broadly as recent, but not necessarily as current. We are pleased to consider articles with historical background sections so long as such analyses are crucial for advancing core arguments.

**SUBMISSION GUIDELINES**

Submissions should be emailed to guasiajournal@gmail.com as MS Word documents. Please do not submit in PDF format. Authors should include a short bio in the email text, but must avoid any self-identification in the manuscript as we send our articles out for anonymous review.

**Document:** Manuscripts must be typewritten and double-spaced in Microsoft Word, with 1-inch/2.5-centimeter margins on all sides.

**Length:** Manuscripts should be 5,000–7,000 words in length.

**Style:** Authors must follow *The Chicago Manual of Style, 16th ed.*

**Citations:** All citations must be formatted as footnotes. Please also include a full bibliography at the end.

**Abstract:** Authors must include an abstract (100–200 words) that effectively and concisely summarizes his/her study.

*Submissions must not be plagiarized, copyrighted, or under review elsewhere.*
Shambaugh | China Studies in the Past, Present, and Future

INTERVIEWS

State of the Field: China Studies in the Past, Present, and Future

An Interview with David Shambaugh

China's economic accomplishments and global rise has generated an enormous amount of academic and popular interest over the past several decades. In August 2016, the Journal interviewed David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science & International Affairs at George Washington University, about his perspectives on a wide-range of issues related to the study of China. What has changed about the field since the reforms of Deng Xiaoping? What are the contours of the field now and how might they change in the future?

Journal: Western scholarship on China has undergone significant changes since the Mao era. What are some of the “big questions” that China researchers have posed during the past several decades? Which questions continue to receive a great deal of attention? Are there some that have fallen by the wayside?

Shambaugh: Western scholarship on China has evolved considerably since the Mao era—as China itself has evolved. Generally speaking, during the Maoist period scholars were largely concerned with leadership politics and party-government-military institutions. Since the Mao era, the field has shifted from elite to societal-level research.

In this context, I think that the field has focused on two “big” overarching questions during the past thirty-five years. The first has to do with the manifold consequences of the economic reform program—primarily the structural shifts in the Chinese economy and the impact on different sectors of society. Both have changed dramatically and foreign scholars have done well to chronicle these changes in considerable detail. The second large question has concerned the international implications of “China’s rise.” This has dealt primarily with China’s foreign affairs and military modernization, but
also its international economic linkages and more recently its attempt to gain “soft
cuton” power” abroad.

Much of the research over the past thirty-five years fits within these two categories,
although much of it is very issue and sector-specific. As such, I would observe that
the China field as a whole and the large majority of scholars have failed to ask really
“big questions” about the trajectory of the country internally and externally (those who
work on the external domain do better). Part of the reason has to do with the sheer
complexity of China and difficulty of making large generalizations, but the other cause
is the methodological obsession of academics with theory-testing and micro-level case
studies.

Journal: What changes in methodological approaches have you observed in the disci-
pline since you began your research? In what ways have you adjusted your approach to
conducting research and presenting your findings?

Shambaugh: I believe the principal purpose of scholarship is to illuminate the empiri-
cal phenomenon one studies. If academic theories and methods can help to do this,
then fine—but I find that most scholars emphasize theory and methods as ends in
themselves, rather than means to an end (empirical explanation). They thus obscure
more than they illuminate. Articles in area studies and China studies journals are less
obtuse and therefore of greater value than mainstream social science disciplinary jour-
nals, but they tend to be excessively micro-oriented from my perspective.

I like “big picture” and “big question” research and wish colleagues would generate
more. Unfortunately, the standards for tenure and promotion in the Academy reward
those accomplished in theory and methods and disincentivize those interested in pol-
icy research and big picture issues. Area studies have been under broad-gauged assault
from the social science disciplines for many years now, which is most unfortunate.
The Cold War helped area studies, and the post-Cold War complexities demand even
greater fine-grained cultural expertise—but I find that the major doctoral programs in
the United States are not meeting the demand. There is something profoundly wrong
here. The need for young scholars to genuflect before the high priests of social science
theory is harming the advancement of knowledge in my view, and they are certainly not
contributing to policymaking. This is one reason why I believe in “professional PhD”
programs in international relations—such as those offered by Johns Hopkins SAIS,
Tufts’ Fletcher School, Denver’s Korbel School, and Washington’s Jackson School.

In thirty years as a professor at George Washington and the University of London
School of Oriental & African Studies (SOAS), I have taught and trained approxi-
mately 1,500 MA students, 20 PhD students and about 1,300 undergraduates—and I
have done my best to get them all to understand the empirical dynamics of how China
works as well as the dynamics of international relations in Asia. I give them some ex-
posure to theory, but my emphasis is always on the empirical and historical. In terms
of analytical methods, if there is one thing I emphasize it is causality and (through
research papers and future forecasting exercises) try and get my students to understand
how certain actions produce certain consequences. The world is not a goulash of data and things do not occur through osmosis; actors act and events occur for reasons and with consequences. Thus, all analysts need to think causally between independent, intervening, and dependent variables.

I also believe that adopting comparative approaches (which need not be excessively theoretical or methodological) can be increasingly useful to understanding China at its current stage of development and can offer some important insights about the challenges and possible future pathways the country confronts. China may be distinct, but it is not unique. For example, as China is now a “middle income” newly industrialized economy (NIE), we can learn much from the challenges—and responses—of other states that previously reached this stage of development (the World Bank tells us that about 100 countries have reached this stage of development since 1960). Similarly, the Chinese political system is a Leninist-type authoritarian system and all Leninist systems pass through similar and predictable stages (what I call the “Leninist lifecycle”). Thus understanding the political dynamics of communist-type regimes is vital for understanding China’s future. I utilize these two comparative frameworks—economic and political—in my latest book *China’s Future*.¹ To be sure, China will not identically follow the paths of these other countries and states—but the challenges they faced and their policy responses (both successful and unsuccessful) will shed considerable light on China’s future evolution.

**Journal:** Do you perceive a division between “generalists” (i.e., “China-as-a-whole” scholars) and “specialists” (i.e., scholars focusing on a unique aspect of China or conducting comparative studies involving China)? What does having “breadth” offer that “depth” cannot, and vice versa?

**Shambaugh:** As just noted, the vast majority of China scholars today are “specialists”—specializing in one or another sub-aspect of the country. They thus possess a lot of depth (on one or a few issues), but not too much breadth. They see the trees, but not the forest. There are precious few China scholars today who I would describe as “generalists.” This is a huge change from the 1950s-1970s, when the situation was just the opposite. That may have had something to do with the lack of access to China in those years—once China opened up to field research scholars all scrambled to find their own niche in the country. Yet, to be a generalist today one must first be a specialist in a number of issues and aspects of Chinese studies. This level of expertise can only be built over time, through interacting with a variety of levels of the Chinese system and society, and reading widely in the secondary literature. Thus, “breadth” requires “depth.” Yet, unfortunately, far too many scholars become too comfortable in their narrow “comfort zones” and work on one or a few aspects of China their entire professional careers. We should challenge these specialists to become generalists. But even those who are able to build broad and general expertise need to be humble about what they do not know. China is a huge and complex country where generalities often encounter contradictory

¹ David Shambaugh, *China’s Future* (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016).
evidence. We need to account for variation while seeking generalizations.

We should also challenge scholars today to become “public intellectuals.” This too is a huge change from the 1950s–1970s when most China specialists became involved in policy debates and expended considerable time in public education and policy advising. Today the “ivory tower” has become a prison and precious few engage non-academic communities, the media, or the government. To my mind, this is an abandonment of civic and professional duty. Recognizing this trend, and to its great credit, the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations has embarked on a multi-year “Public Intellectuals Program (PIP)” — aimed precisely at rectifying this malady. Four cohorts of approximately eighty young China specialists across the United States have participated in the PIP Program in recent years, and one can only hope that this effort bears fruit over time. If it does, then the American public will be better informed about China and some of these individuals will serve in government as during preceding generations.

Journal: What are some misconceptions about China that you currently see in U.S. academic and policy circles? Similarly, what are some misconceptions about the United States that you see in Chinese academic and policy circles?

Shambaugh: This is a good and tough question. It is often observed that misperceptions and mistrust abound in U.S.–China relations. This is true and the two dimensions are interrelated. Let me offer two examples, one on each side.

The Chinese government and people are absolutely convinced that the U.S. Government seeks to undermine and subvert Communist Party rule internally while “containing” (ezhi) China externally. They see existential threats from the United States. This produces a very defensive—even paranoid—mindset and no small degree of hostility towards the United States. Yet, there is zero evidence that this is either U.S. government policy or within U.S. capacities, even if it were policy. Quite to the contrary, there is probably no nation in the world that has done more to facilitate China’s development and rise over the past four decades than the United States. China ought to be thanking the United States rather than spitting hostile propaganda and indoctrinating its people about the United States’ evil intentions. Beijing should pay attention when the U.S. administration says it welcomes a “peaceful, stable, and prosperous China.”

It is true that the United States has long been genuinely concerned about the poor human rights situation in China—but that is much different from actually trying to subvert the regime. Similarly, the United States is concerned about China’s military modernization and increasingly assertive behavior in Asia in recent years, and Washington is working with other Asian states that share these concerns to strengthen common resolve and readiness should China turn aggressive. But this is far different from “containment.” If the United States were trying to contain China, there would not be more than 500,000


[122] Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs
Chinese students studying in U.S. universities and secondary schools, there would be no U.S. investment in China or vice versa, there would not be more than $600 billion in trade, there would be no military exchanges, there would not be 1.8 million Chinese tourists visiting America, nor would there be more than 90 official governmental dialogues every year. Thus China’s propaganda meme about U.S. subversion and containment could not be more wrong.

Another shibboleth, on the American side, is that the Chinese government controls most actions internally and externally. While the Chinese party-state does have a great deal of power (when it chooses to exercise it), much of what goes on inside and outside of China is beyond the control of officials in Beijing. China remains a geographically and bureaucratically fragmented state whereby local government actors go their own ways and act out of their own interests. Similarly, despite the severe political crackdown of recent years, Chinese society remains a remarkably open society. Social media is extremely active, people enjoy freedom in how to conduct their daily lives, more and more Chinese travel abroad (110 million last year, spending $215 billion), the private sector of the economy is booming and affording multiple new professional opportunities, and the sheer size of the country and population ensures diversity. This is also increasingly the case with Chinese actors and actions abroad, as Chinese individuals and companies are fanning out around the globe untethered to their government. Yet, Americans do not seem to appreciate these diverse realities and perpetuate oversimplified stereotypes of a controlled society and a unitary actor model of the Chinese government at home and abroad.

There certainly exist many more misperceptions on both sides of the Sino-American relationship, but these are two of the more prominent examples. I have spent my entire academic career tracking—and emphasizing—the perceptual element in the relationship, dating back to my PhD dissertation and book Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America. While it must be acknowledged that misperceptions have narrowed over time as a result of direct contact between the two societies, there still remains much misunderstanding.

Journal: Is there much shared discourse between U.S. and China scholars or are the academic realms somewhat separate and self-contained?

Shambaugh: If by “shared discourse” you are asking if American and Chinese scholars meet and interact directly, then the answer is “yes, but not that much and not enough.” But if you are asking whether Chinese and U.S. scholars share a common vocabulary and narrative, then the answer is “not really.”

There are probably a half-dozen “Track II” dialogues that operate regularly (at least once per year) and bring together American China specialists from universities and

---

think tanks with their Chinese counterparts. There are more that occur irregularly. These are very policy-oriented dialogues which examine the current menu of issues on the U.S.-China bilateral, regional, and global agenda. They receive financial support from U.S. foundations—such as the Carnegie Corporation, Ford Foundation, or Kettering Foundation. But these are not scholarly conferences per se, where academic research is presented and discussed. Maybe such purely academic conferences occur, but I am not aware of many. This is indeed very regrettable given that our two countries have interacted for more than three decades now. It is even more regrettable that there is a real dearth of collaborative research among American and Chinese scholars. So, by and large, I find that the two academic communities remain very autonomous from each other.

When it comes to actual discourse in these dialogues—narrative language and analytical concepts—there is also a gulf. Chinese use a large number of propaganda slogans and political terminology in their discussions, whereas Americans tend to be more straightforward and specific. This said, I find that many Americans also tend to be less than candid when in front of Chinese counterparts for fear of touching Chinese (hyper) sensitivities over Taiwan, Tibet, South China Sea, human rights, leaders, etc. Chinese are very reflexive and propagandistic on these and other subjects. They also refuse to discuss certain subjects in any detail (such as military issues). Having participated in a large number of these dialogues over many years, I find that the two sides still tend to talk past each other and engage in a “dialogue of the deaf.” Sometimes this can be avoided, and there are certainly dialogues where there is real candor and discussion of hyper-sensitive topics. This usually occurs with individuals who have known each other for a long time. But, by and large, I find that the discourse could be considerably better than it is.

Journal: What advice would you give to the next U.S. presidential administration in terms of handling the U.S.-China relationship?

Shambaugh: There could not be a more important but complicated question. The relationship between the United States and China is at a pivotal juncture. The relationship has become quite stressed and increasingly competitive in recent years, with deepening distrust on both sides. If not managed well, it could devolve into a fully adversarial relationship. Unfortunately, there is no “reset button” that can be pushed—the relationship is frayed for real reasons and cannot simply be wished away or changed through a desire to reset relations. Hence the principal challenge for both sides is to manage strategic competition while finding areas of tangible cooperation (what I call “cooperation”). My shorthand advice for the next administration is “tough engagement/managed competition.”

My basic advice to the next administration is to toughen up bilaterally, constrain China regionally, and selectively engage globally. On a bilateral level, in my view, U.S. policy has been excessively accommodating of China over the past eight years. On a regional Asian level this has not been the case and I am supportive of the Obama and previous Bush administrations’ broad Asian policy and how the United States has strengthened
its relations around the region to check China’s expanding power and assertiveness (although they have been strengthened on their own merits and for reasons separate from China as well).4 Globally, the Obama administration has tried to engage China on a variety of global governance issues and regional crises, although China has been generally reluctant to partner with America in the international arena.

On the bilateral level, I fault the Obama administration for being too preoccupied with the bilateral process of U.S.-China relations—maintaining the tsunami of dialogues—and not focused enough on the bottom-line outcomes of the many fraught and contentious issues the U.S. has with China. “Engagement” has become an end in itself and has not produced results in many areas for the United States. The U.S. Government seems to talk for the sake of talking. And that is exactly as the Chinese side wants it; Beijing uses these 90+ dialogues as what I describe as “deflection devices”—essentially neutralizing the United States through diplomacy while it steadily builds up its power and infringes on American interests. For example, I would propose that the next administration terminate the Strategic & Economic Dialogue (SAED)—as it is a huge waste of money, officials’ time, and accomplishes little of importance. Better to replace the SAED with two or three very high-level and very-focused summit meetings on security, economics, and human rights. The current plethora of exchanges is too unwieldy and unproductive.

Regionally, the next administration needs to pick up where the Obama and previous Bush administration left off—continuing to deepen and strengthen the United States’ bilateral relations with literally every country in the broad Indo-Pacific region. The best China policy is a strong Indo-Asian policy. The United States must realize that it is engaged in a protracted, long-term, and broad-gauged competition with China for strategic influence across this vast space—and the United States must match this realization with real resources and expenditure of officials’ time and effort.

Globally, there are issues where American and Chinese interests converge. On these areas—such as climate change, counter-terrorism and organized crime, nuclear non-proliferation, anti-piracy—the two nations should work in tandem or in parallel. On issues on which they diverge—such as North Korea or the South China Sea—the United States must pursue its own path whether Beijing likes it or not.

On balance, I would say the next administration needs to intensify what the Obama administration has already been doing in the regional and global domains, but to get much tougher in bilateral affairs. If that means threatening China with punitive measures such as sanctions or tariffs, public denunciations, withholding visas for Chinese academics and journalists (as China does for Americans), so be it. The United States should not constrain its own interests because of China’s lengthy list of sensitivities. In diplomacy, words are actions and the next administration needs to be much more

---

publicly critical of Chinese actions—domestically and internationally—that it finds problematic.

Journal: To what degree do you see practitioners in government and academic circles working together to address issues in the U.S.-China relationship? Is there much discourse or communication between the two spheres or are they talking past one another? In what ways could this relationship be improved?

Shambaugh: Unfortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, I see relatively little interaction between government officials and the academic community (including think tanks) on U.S.-China issues. I personally participate in periodic exchanges and am aware of others, but overall the amount of interaction is abysmally poor in my opinion. And the fault for this deficit lies almost exclusively with the U.S. Government. It is simply not proactive in reaching out to the academic community for advice and input, and it is really impossible for academics to be proactive and reach busy government officials. I have watched and personally participated in the academic-government relationship for decades, and have never seen the amount of interaction to be lower.

The only U.S. Government institution that reaches out and engages academics with any degree of consistency is the National Intelligence Council (NIC). The NIC does this both through its NIC Associates program (which keeps a small stable of experts on rotational consulting retainer) or by convening occasional subject-specific workshops (the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence & Research sometimes collaborates in the latter). These workshops are excellent opportunities for interaction, as they bring together Intelligence Community (IC) analysts directly with scholars, but unfortunately these sessions are usually one-way streets where the scholars are asked to present and respond to questions, while the IC analysts offer nothing in return. Thus it is a skewed interaction with little real exchange of analysis. This is most unfortunate and doesn’t have to be this way. Nor has it always been like this. For example, during the Cold War interactions and exchanges between academics and the IC were much, much greater. In the wake of 9/11—when intelligence budgets ballooned and the need for foreign area expertise was again deemed essential—one would have assumed that IC-academic interactions similarly increased. Unfortunately, not so. New bureaucratic walls have been erected by the U.S. Government (ostensibly for security concerns) and funding made available for outside consulting work has been slashed.

Aside from the IC, opportunities for scholarly interaction with executive branch officials is minimal and interaction with Senators and Congressmen/women is virtually non-existent. The only time a select group of (mainly Washington-based) scholars and think tank experts interact with National Security Council, Department of State, or Defense Department officials is before or after a major state visit, when the scholars are called in for a group briefing—the object of which is for the executive branch departments to “spin” the visit so that the scholars might be prone to relay this interpretation to the media. Hardly ever are academics contacted by policymakers actually seeking their advice. This is regrettable. There are rare occasions when high-level officials will wish to directly engage a group of scholars—Madeleine Albright was known for this
during her tenure as Secretary of State and current Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter
does this as well (it is no accident that both are ex-academics). But, to my knowledge,
it is a rare day when an assistant secretary or NSC Senior Director will reach out to an
academic for advice. These observations pertain primarily to the Obama administra-
tion and the George W. Bush administrations; before that—under Clinton and Bush
41 as well as during the Carter and Reagan administrations—the interactions were
greater. Somehow the government–academic nexus has eroded over time, and this is
not good for the nation or its foreign and national security policies.

Journal: Could you recommend a book or two about China published in the past de-
cade that stands out to you as an example of excellent scholarship? On the other hand,
what trends in contemporary China scholarship do you find troublesome?

Shambaugh: There is a lot of fine writing about China, but I would include the follow-
ing volumes on my “must read” list:

   Press, 2015).
3. Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750* (Basic Books,
   2015).
4. John Garver, *China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Repub-
   lic of China* (Oxford University Press, 2015).
   (Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2015).
   (Harvard University Press, 2015).

These books are all extremely well-written, extremely well-researched, and convey large
amounts of information through the prism of each author’s experienced eyes. They are
also what I would describe as “big picture” books (see discussion in Questions 1 & 3
above) that—unlike the vast majority of China scholarship these days—do not get
bogged down in minutiae. It is this kind of research and writing that all Sinologists
should aspire to, in my opinion. Anyone wishing to get to grips with the complexities
and realities of China today and over the past century would do well to read these eight
books.

Journal: There are a number of academic institutions offering programs related to Chi-
na studies. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these programs? What would an
ideal China studies program look like? What advice would you give to today’s under-
graduate and graduate students with an interest in studying China?
Shambaugh: The best China Studies programs are, of course, interdisciplinary. They involve taking courses on a wide variety of aspects of contemporary China—politics, economy, society, culture, foreign relations, literature, environment, demography, etc. They should also have a healthy dose of Chinese history and language. One does not need to be linguistically fluent to understand China well (I know of several individuals who work in government and the private sector who understand aspects of China extremely well without possessing any Chinese language skills), although it certainly helps to have such skills. Without Chinese language ability, though, one cannot interact in China, and thus China becomes something of an intellectual abstraction. Knowledge of modern Chinese history (including China’s interactions with foreigners) is also imperative to understanding China today. While knowledge of these specific aspects of China are all important, it further behooves one to understand how Leninist political systems and command economies function. As discussed in Question 2 above, China is not sui generis—it is a Soviet-style system “with Chinese characteristics.” If one does not understand how Soviet-style systems operate (politically, economically, and socially), one does not understand China.

I would say that one does not need a Ph.D. in order to succeed in the China field professionally. B.A. degrees are probably insufficient, but M.A. degrees are sufficient. A good Master’s program—either in Chinese Studies, Asian Studies, or International Affairs with a China concentration—is ideal for a young person who wishes to work on China or with China. There is a widespread misnomer (especially among mainland Chinese students) that a PhD is necessary—they are not. Doctoral degrees should be thought of as a professional degree just like law school, business school, or medical school—they train students for a specific profession, namely the academic profession (university teaching). Do not waste your time (eight years on average!), personal time, or precious financial resources unless you wish to be a college professor. This said, I do think there is a legitimate case for “professional PhD” programs (see Question 2 above) that are shorter in duration (four-five years) but do not lead to university teaching jobs.

David Shambaugh is an internationally recognized authority and author on contemporary China and the international relations of Asia. As an author, Professor Shambaugh has published more than 30 books, including most recently China’s Future and The China Reader: Rising Power (both 2016). He has also authored more than 20 reports, 200 scholarly articles and chapters, more than 150 newspaper op-eds, and more than 50 book reviews. He is presently Professor of Political Science & International Affairs and the founding Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University.

David Shambaugh was interviewed via email in August 2016 by B. Waidelich and B. Spivey.
On July 8, 2016, the United States and South Korea announced a decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system, following several North Korean provocations which included a nuclear test earlier in January. Following this announcement, both China and Russia have voiced their strong opposition, charging that the deployment upsets the military balance in the region. The Journal sat down with Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies-Americas (IISS-Americas), to discuss the strategic implications of THAAD deployment. Fitzpatrick provided us his insights regarding the benefits and risks of THAAD deployment, as well as the potential obstacles for the United States and South Korea in advancing this objective.

Journal: How will THAAD’s deployment factor into the relationship between the PRC & the DRPK? Despite North Korea’s nuclear test in January, could THAAD’s deployment provide an opportunity to strengthen the PRC-DPRK relationship?

Fitzpatrick: Despite all of the criticism that China raised in advance of the THAAD deployment decision, Beijing will get over this just as they got over it when Japan deployed ballistic missile defenses. They tried clumsily, in a bullying way, to influence Seoul’s decision, and they failed. There’s nothing to be gained for China to continue to insist that THAAD not be deployed once a decision has been made. If they think the decision is not final, however, then China probably will continue to press its case, so this pressure won’t evaporate right away. Seoul has to maintain its firmness of purpose and demonstrate that it’s not going to waver. There will be some period of time before THAAD is actually introduced so it is this period of time where relations between South Korea and China might be rocky.
The idea that THAAD deployment would cause China and North Korea to strengthen their very bad relationship is a misreading of the realities of Northeast Asia. Pyongyang has given China so many reasons to be concerned that the Chinese population as a whole has generally turned against North Korea. And although THAAD angers China and sparked a nationalistic campaign, it doesn’t rise at all to the level of the North Korean provocations. THAAD is a defensive system. North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are offensive systems and they do much more to undermine China’s security than does THAAD. So, one might see a small increase in the level of positive communications between Beijing and Pyongyang, but I don’t think it fundamentally alters their relationship.

**Journal:** Could THAAD’s deployment give the United States more leverage with the DPRK?

**Fitzpatrick:** I think that THAAD deployment does increase the U.S. and ROK joint leverage vis-à-vis North Korea because it adds to a tiered, layered defense against incoming North Korean nuclear armed missiles by being able to effectively knock out those missiles before they might land. The United States and South Korea have what is called “deterrence by denial.” That is, they deny North Korea the capability of actually hitting South Korean cities. Now, THAAD doesn’t make the defense perfect—nothing can—but the level of confidence will be high enough as long as North Korea is not able to launch a huge salvo: a couple dozen missiles or more. They probably don’t have that many missile launchers. The danger is that they might launch decoys and other means of confusing the American and South Korean defense. But for the time being, I think THAAD really will enhance the defenses and will provide additional leverage by denying North Korea the capability to hit South Korea with nuclear weapons.

**Journal:** U.S. and South Korean officials have stated that the THAAD system only targets North Korea; however, China has made it clear that it also considers THAAD to be a threat. How realistic are these protestations, especially considering the substantial U.S. presence already in the region? Could THAAD limit China’s second strike capability? To what degree does THAAD change the balance of power?

**Fitzpatrick:** THAAD does not fundamentally change the balance of power in so far as China is concerned. It adds only incrementally to a potential American first strike capability, which is what China is worried about. It’s not worried just about THAAD; it’s more worried about systems such as Prompt Global Strike and other ways that America has technological advantages over China.

The “Third Offset” strategy of enhanced capabilities gives China reason for concern. THAAD has the potential to peer into China, but it has a very limited potential to

---

1 The “Third Offset” strategy refers to the U.S. Department of Defense’s plan to offset the shrinking size and declining technological superiority of the U.S. military through a combination of investment in areas such as cyber and electronic warfare and re-evaluation of existing structures and programs.
track Chinese launch system ballistic missiles. My colleague, Mike Elleman, here at the IISS-Americas office has done some calculations showing that THAAD will not significantly diminish China's ability to launch ballistic missiles. And THAAD will be configured in a way that is directed only at North Korea. The mode could be changed to allow it to peer more into China, but an agreement could be struck not to allow this—which would be verifiable because there are ways of making such a move transparent.

So I think the answer to Chinese concerns is to talk about the real capabilities of THAAD, to try to enhance Chinese understanding, and to talk about some confidence building measures of transparency on the THAAD operational capabilities that would overcome China's fears.

_**Journal:** How likely is it for China to take retaliatory measures against South Korea and the United States? If so, what kind?

**Fitzpatrick:** In the short term China might feel compelled to express its displeasure, because it made such a big deal about THAAD. Maybe it feels that in order to maintain its credibility it has to show that it really meant that it doesn't like this. But I don't know what China could do that would be effective. It wouldn't take retaliatory measures against the United States or South Korea except maybe to turn down the level and frequency of exchanges. Conceivably, China might show some “smile diplomacy” toward North Korea as a means of demonstrating to South Korea that it’s not a cost-free decision. But I don’t expect any such warming of relations between China and North Korea to be significant in strategic terms.

_**Journal:** How have other neighboring countries, such as Japan, Russia and Taiwan, reacted to the THAAD decision?

**Fitzpatrick:** Russia had also opposed THAAD deployment for similar reasons. Mainly, Russia is worried about American deployment of ballistic missiles in Europe that it fears could negate the effectiveness of Russia's strategic forces. THAAD in South Korea doesn't do too much vis-à-vis Russian forces. It is marginally similar to China's, I suppose. So Russia will express displeasure, they'll say something negative, but they won't take any real action.

Japan and Taiwan, I think will be pleased because deployment of THAAD is a manifestation of America's staying power in the region. It’s another example of America’s pivot to Asia and willingness to deploy a significant set of equipment in the region. They're always worried about America's potential withdrawal and isolation. So, they would recognize THAAD as a good thing. Plus, to the extent that it would help protect them against North Korean ballistic missiles, as is the case for Japan, it adds to their defenses.

_**Journal:** Have the THAAD talks influenced the ROK's stance towards nuclear weapons development? Is it now more likely that the ROK will move towards becoming a nuclear state?
Fitzpatrick: I suspect that it is reassuring to those in South Korea who want to see a stronger U.S. security alliance, which means most of the country. I was in Seoul earlier this year speaking with academics who wanted either South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons or for the United States to deploy tactical nuclear weapons as a response to North Korea. When I argued against that and pointed out the demerits of such policy choices they said, “How can the United States more visibly demonstrate its deterrence commitments?” I just pointed out various things the United States has already done: flyovers of the B-52 and B-2, joint exercises, the ships that were deployed and so forth. THAAD is another manifestation of America's staying power, an example of something America has done physically to respond to the North Korean threat. I think it reduces the impulse among some South Koreans to want to develop their own nuclear weapons in response to North Korea.

Journal: Have North Korea’s recent provocations had a different character from those in the past? Do the numerous Musudan² missile launches as well as the supposed hydrogen bomb test earlier this year give the international community any new insights into the regime?

Fitzpatrick: North Korea's nuclear and missile tests this year have upped the stakes and things have become more serious. North Korea has taken one step after another in testing nuclear devices, testing Musudans, displaying a missile cone heat shield and testing it on land, plus two tests of submarine launch ballistic missiles. Taken together, they demonstrate that North Korea has not been deterred at all. They have not been stopped and their capabilities are getting more and more worrisome.

North Korea for several years has already had the potential to hit South Korea and Japan with nuclear weapons. It wants also to be able to hit the United States. It thinks that by being able to do so, it could decouple the United States from its allies in the region. It’s similar to what’s sometimes called the “de Gaulle question.” Back in the Cold War, French president Charles de Gaulle raised the question of whether the United States would sacrifice New York for Paris. That question has been answered in Europe. There is no reason to doubt America’s deterrence commitment to its European allies and similarly there is no reason to doubt its commitment to its Northeast Asian allies. But the North Koreans think that if they could threaten an American city, that the United States would be less willing to defend Japan and South Korea. They’re wrong about that—the United States will do just as it did in Europe and stand by its commitments. Plus, ballistic missile defenses can deter North Korea by denying the possibility that North Korea could destroy an American city.

It’s also useful to note that the trajectory of the last Musudan test launch was equivalent

² A series of intermediate-range ballistic missiles developed by North Korea named after the launching site Musudan-ri. It was first tested in April 2016 with the most recent test in June 2016 flying a range of 400 km. North Korea claims the maximum range of the Musudan missile is from 2,500 km to 4,000 km, enough to hit Guam.
to a horizontal reach of about 3,150 kilometers. That’s not far enough to reach Guam. It falls short by a couple hundred kilometers. So although North Korea bragged about being able to hit Guam, they cannot yet. I am worried that they will continue to develop longer-range systems: an intercontinental ballistic missile that uses two Musudan rockets for its first stage, for example. Then they could hit the United States. But as I say, there are ballistic missile defenses. The United States, in any case, won’t be deterred from coming to the support of its allies.

**Journal:** In the past year, relations between Russia and the PRC have warmed considerably, while the United States seems to be reinvesting with its alliances in Japan and South Korea. Can we expect to see the solidification of a power struggle in Northeast Asia between U.S.-Japan-South Korea and China-Russia-North Korea reminiscent of the Cold War?

**Fitzpatrick:** No, I don’t think this is reminiscent of the Cold War, although the trend is in that direction. But it’s not going to get to the point of the Cold War and one of the main reasons for that is that North Korea is an outlier. It doesn’t really have any friends in the world. It has a military alliance with China on paper, but not in reality. The Chinese people detest Kim Jong-un and make fun of him. They don’t like North Korea’s provocations. China maintains a military and political relationship with North Korea, but it is not at all on the order of a bloc relationship like it was in the Cold War. And although Russia and China cooperate more, there is not an alliance between the two; it’s a situation of tactical cooperation.

Meanwhile, China’s role as an international player is more nuanced than in the Cold War. It cooperates with the United States and other Western countries in many ways to maintain the international order. It really is, in the words of Robert Zoellick, a “responsible stakeholder.” So I think the days of the Cold War confrontation between blocs are over. That doesn’t mean that there isn’t a strengthening of relations between the respective parties. It is very good that the United States, Japan, and South Korea are strengthening their trilateral relationship. But it’s mainly vis-à-vis North Korea; it has nothing to do with forming forces up against China, at least not in the case of the South Korea leg of the triangle.

**Journal:** Given the many recent and upcoming changes to the security situation in Asia, including the transfer of full wartime operation control (OPCON) to South Korea, a nuclear North Korea, China’s military modernization campaign, and constitutional reform in Japan, among other developments, what are your thoughts on the current balance of power in the region? Also, how do you think the next U.S. administration should approach Asia?

**Fitzpatrick:** The developments you’ve mentioned suggest an ongoing arms race in Northeast Asia. I think that’s certainly the case, especially with China’s modernization, North Korea’s nuclearization, Russia wanting to return to the Far East, the United States increasing its pivot strategy, and South Korea and Japan both increasing their defensive capabilities. The usual projection is one of continuity of this trend. This arms
race is not racing as fast as the parties can; it’s a steady increase in capabilities although with some sharp increases, particularly in North Korea’s case. And it’s the North Korean case that needs to be dealt with by the next U.S. president. It has to be near the top of the next president’s foreign policy agenda. In the nuclear field, the Iran potential threat has been capped up for the next decade or more. North Korea thus rises to the top of the agenda. China has cooperated in many ways, agreeing to a Security Council resolution, as well as imposing sanctions on North Korea that are as strong as those that were imposed against Iran. The question is whether China will strictly implement those sanctions. Most people doubt it because China doesn’t want to put so much pressure on North Korea that it might threaten a regime collapse. China will always restrain its implementation, but it has shown a willingness to take firm measures, and I think it will continue to do so under U.S. leadership.

Within the next ten years North Korea could go one of two ways. It could become a serious threat to the United States through development of intercontinental ballistic missiles and decoys and so forth that may be able to defeat missile defenses like THAAD. Or, the United States, China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia are going to find a way to limit North Korea’s development. It won’t necessarily be done in the same way they did with Iran, but the Iran case shows that an effective combination of sanctions and diplomatic engagement can lead to a solution. In Iran’s case we had pragmatic leaders on both sides willing to make a deal. In the North Korean situation, I don’t see any pragmatism in Pyongyang. But it needs to be tested. Nobody really knows Kim Jong-un. The only American who has met him is a basketball player: Dennis Rodman. The United States has tried to reach out to Kim Jong-un, but maybe they haven’t tried hard enough or at a high enough level. The next U.S. president is going to have to deal with North Korea one way or another, probably by combining sanctions with some kind of engagement strategy.

Mark Fitzpatrick is the Executive Director of International Institute for Strategic Studies-Americas. After joining IISS in 2005, he headed their Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme in London for ten years until taking the role of Executive Director in December 2015. Mr. Fitzpatrick had a distinguished 26-year career in the U.S. Department of State with postings to the U.S. Mission to International Organizations in Vienna, in addition to Japan, South Korea and New Zealand. He received his Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and also completed a post-graduate program at the Japanese National Institute of Defense. His research focus is on non-proliferation, nuclear security and arms control.

Mark Fitzpatrick was interviewed by Sarah Moore and Young Jun Jun on July 19, 2016.
Australia’s Strategy in the Asia-Pacific

An Interview with Andrew Shearer

In this interview, the Journal sat down with Andrew Shearer to discuss a number of contemporary issues regarding Australia's strategy in the Asia-Pacific region. A former national security advisor to Prime Ministers John Howard and Tony Abbott, Mr. Shearer is uniquely positioned to answer our questions about the current state of the U.S.-Australia alliance, domestic attitudes in Australia about the Asia-Pacific, Australia’s approach to illegal immigration, and more.

Journal: How is Australia responding to decreases, perceived or real, in U.S. power in the region?

Shearer: I think there’s a strong view in Australia that the United States is going to continue playing a preponderant, strategic role in Asia for at least the next several decades, and that view is reflected in the Defense White Paper that Australia released recently.1 But there is no question that Australia is conscious of the fact that U.S. engagement is coming under more pressure in the region—that it’s more contested by China and also internally in domestic American politics. One thing that Australia is doing in response is stepping up its investment in defense, intelligence, and security. The 2016 Defense White Paper commits us to strengthening the alliance with the United States and we are also looking to broaden our strategic partnerships with other key countries like Japan and India and potentially Indonesia, Vietnam, among others.

Journal: Are there any expectations or hopes for what the United States might continue to do in Asia, especially in light of the upcoming U.S. presidential election?

Shearer: Most Americans would probably be quite surprised to know how prominent American politics is in Australia. There’s intense interest. It’s not always terribly well-informed interest, but nonetheless there’s intense interest. Broadly speaking, in government and national security circles in Australia there’s an expectation of continuing U.S. international engagement; that’s been a bipartisan tradition, obviously, in U.S. policy since the Second World War. The Trump “ambivalence,” which is probably too weak a word, about America’s role in the world is obviously attracting a lot of attention, although he hasn’t singled out the Australian alliance in the way he has Japan and South Korea.

Nonetheless, both of those alliances are fundamental to regional security, and therefore to Australia’s interests, so any tremors in the U.S.-Japan alliance would be profoundly troubling for Australia and Australians. These are not skin-deep opinions that Trump holds about alliances; his views on this go way back to the early 1980s. They’re very entrenched and so the idea that he’ll get into office, move on and accept whatever advice he gets from the State Department and the Pentagon and so forth, I don’t think we can assume that at all.

Journal: To what extent are Australia and the United States diverging in their strategic thinking toward the Asia-Pacific region?

Shearer: There is overwhelming convergence, although sometimes we differ on tactics or emphasis. As the region has become more contested in the last couple of years, there’s been much more focus on the concept of the “rules-based international order” in Australia. If you read the most recent Defense White Paper, that phrase appears fifty or sixty times. Yet if you go back to the previous White Papers it’s hardly mentioned. What I think that means is that for sixty or seventy years, Australia has been a massive beneficiary of an order fundamentally underpinned by American military power and diplomatic power—and economic power for that matter. One that’s been premised on freedom of navigation, open economic models, and what I would generally call liberal principles. Because it was so uncontroversial, it was always taken for granted in Australia that the U.S. would remain the predominant military power and that disputes would be resolved peacefully and diplomatically in accordance with international law.

Now, however, perceptions that China is a growing power and that the United States is a declining power—relatively speaking—have come together to mean that, for the first time, Australians are actually forced to think about the order and why it’s important. If you look at our geography and history, you will know that Australia is a massive continent with a very small population and is very remote from its traditional security partners. We are not part of any natural geographic bloc, such as the European Union, so our stake in the international order is huge.

Journal: How is Australia balancing the strategic interests that it has with the United States against the economic interests that it has with China?

Shearer: This supposed choice generates a certain amount of excitement from time to
time in Australian academia and, sometimes, in the media. I think managing the China relationship in the context of the U.S. alliance is becoming more complex and challenging, but at the end of the day, I don't think it's a binary choice. From time to time there will be tensions, but this is a reality facing almost every other country through our region including the United States which, by the way, has massive economic interests in China.

The key for Australia has been and hopefully will continue to be being very clear-eyed and clear-headed about our strategic interests and our values on the one hand—which are heavily invested in the U.S. alliance and our partnerships with other democracies in the region—and our interests in China on the other—which, frankly, are much more economic in nature. If we keep a clear realization that China needs us to the same extent that we need it, then we can manage our differences. Where we get into trouble is when we start succumbing to the idea that China has some kind of hold over Australia because of our economic relationship and that that’s a card they can legitimately play. I think we’ve got a reasonable track record of maintaining our integrity and ensuring that our national security interests are not traded off for our commercial interests. It's not necessarily going to be easy and China's more assertive behavior in the region is making it somewhat more difficult, but the idea that this is a unique choice that Australia faces and that we have to choose between either the U.S. alliance or closer economic ties with China is just false.

**Journal:** Whether well-founded or not, would you say there is growing popular distress in Australia that China has increasing economic leverage?

**Shearer:** Australians understand China’s economic importance very clearly. Polling shows about three quarters of Australians regard China as very important to Australia economically. That said, there is a high level of public distrust of foreign investment from China in particular. Support for the U.S. alliance remains very high. I find it interesting that the Australian public seems to grasp this duality that Australia has to deal with. I think many Australians realize, intuitively, that our hand is stronger in dealing with China if we have a strong alliance with the United States and also, for that matter, stronger strategic relations with other like-minded countries like Japan.

**Journal:** What kind of domestic obstacles does Australia face in its Asia-Pacific policy? Are there bureaucratic or political constituencies preventing Australia from making its own “pivot” to the region?

**Shearer:** To be honest, I think there are fewer domestic impediments than in the United States and perhaps that’s because the political systems differ. Just take the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) as a topical example. In Australia, there’s resistance to the TPP and to similar trade liberalization initiatives, but not to the degree that there is in the United States. There’s been no parliamentary problem in Australia legislating the bilateral free trade agreement with Japan nor for the one with South Korea. There was a bit more domestic debate around the China free trade agreement, but that one, too, is relatively straightforward. So I think there are fewer domestic political impediments when
determining trade policy, certainly. Foreign investment, though, is quite contentious in Australia and some recent Chinese investments have come in for a lot of attention. One—which was rejected—was the proposed Chinese purchase of a huge cattle property in Northern Australia.

There is also a pretty strong consensus in Australia around the new defense and security investments. That said, when the rubber hit the road in the past, certainly the Labor side of Australian politics has tended to reduce investment in defense. The Australian budget is under a lot of pressure—healthcare and social security costs, in particular—are ballooning. Sustaining the commitments that are made in the Defense White Paper is going to be difficult. It’s going to take real commitment from future Australian governments.

Journal: Over the past several decades, what do you think have been Australia’s biggest strategic mistakes in its Asia-Pacific policy?

Shearer: One of the huge mistakes we make is when we try to engage with Asia on any basis other than our national interests. In the eighties and the early nineties there was debate about Australia needing to become more “Asian” so as to be accepted as a part of the region. Many wondered whether we were accepted as a regional country or not. For example, during the early 1990s former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad—a difficult, very nationalistic figure, to put it mildly—tried to exclude Australia from regional bodies on the basis that we were not “Asian,” rather we were “white and Western.” I think at different times, Australia played into that trap by indulging in ideas like “Australia’s a monarchy, not a republic, therefore, we are not really accepted in the region,” whereas the reality is it doesn’t make a blind bit of difference. No one in Asia cares about our constitutional arrangements. I think the region’s much more interested in engaging Australia because of what we have to offer. We’re politically stable, we’re economically successful, we’re a tolerant, liberal democracy, we respond generously whether it’s to natural disasters or humanitarian assistance tasks like flying vital supplies to Japan after the tsunami disaster or trying to find the Malaysian airlines plane lost somewhere in the Indian Ocean. There’s a level of both good intent and capability in Australia that I think is genuinely appreciated around the region.

Many people from Asia want to educate their children in Australia too, so that’s another example of the very strong history of engagement between Australia and the rest of the region. I think that’s the right model, but that’s not to say it doesn’t need to be updated. The Abbott government introduced the New Colombo Plan, which is basically building on a highly successful scheme during the fifties, sixties, and seventies where Australia educated much of the Southeast Asian elite and built fantastic contacts and networks of affection for Australia. Now when we deal with members of the Malaysian Cabinet or the Indonesian Cabinet, quite often they were educated in Australia and have connections with Australia. Under the New Colombo Plan, young Australians are sent out into the region to do internships and postgraduate degrees and work with civil society and so forth, which means that they will build language abilities and social networks in the region. This type of practical approach to engagement with
Asia that focuses on our strengths and doesn’t involve some kind of artificial changing of Australia’s nature is the way we’re most successful in Asia. When we’ve tended to make mistakes, it’s been because we’ve departed from that.

Journal: How do those in Australian security circles feel about Japan’s increased defense spending and willingness to share more of the burden of maintaining security in Asia?

Shearer: There’s a very strong consensus in Australia that this is a good thing and there is a keenness to embed Japan more securely in regional security architecture. The changes to expand the limited role of the Japanese Self-Defense Force are significant. The defense spending increase is welcome, but it’s also, frankly, pretty modest. Japan only spends about one percent or even less of their GDP on defense, so there would actually be an appetite in Australia to see Japan spend more and contribute more regionally. It has to be done sensitively and within the overall framework of the U.S. alliance, of course. Japan is working more closely with India, as well as with Australia. Australians accept that Japan has been an exemplary international citizen for more than sixty years and that it has made very important contributions to the stability and prosperity of Asia. Japan’s wartime history is not an unimportant part of its relationship with Australia but, as early as 1957, Australia signed the Agreement on Commerce with Japan and started the process of putting the wartime past in context and focusing on what the two countries could achieve together. That’s still very much the case. To put it bluntly and succinctly, Australia has largely moved on when it comes to its wartime past with Japan.

Journal: At a talk you gave at Georgetown earlier this spring, you mentioned that European nations were knocking down Australia’s door trying to figure out how it had solved its refugee and migrant problems. With migration being such a huge topic in Europe and in North America at the moment, to what extent do you think that Australia can serve as an example for other nations?

Shearer: I think it’s really important not to oversimplify this. Australia’s geography is unique and the Australian government’s border security policies succeeded largely because of that geography. What I would say, though—and this is the part of Australia’s example that others may learn from—is that it takes a very clear understanding that border security is vitally important not only to national security, but also to the integrity of a healthy immigration program. A so-called “open door policy” will in time undermine not only national security, but also the domestic consensus that supports healthy migration. Australia maintains one of the most generous humanitarian settlement programs in the world, due in large part to the fact that its borders are secure. That’s a critical insight and you can see that reflected in some of the recent changes in European policy. The reality is that if the public thinks that the borders are under control and that the government is managing the flow of people into the country, there is a high level of public support for immigration.

Journal: In Asia’s Cauldron, Robert Kaplan calls the South China Sea a “humanist
dilemma,” in the sense that because there exists a great deal of confusion over what international law actually permits in the region it is a domain for pure power politics. What is your take on this view of the South China Sea?

Shearer: This is interesting because it’s about the intersection between power politics, institutions, and values. Frankly, I think it’s more about power and control than “territory” in a strictly legal sense. China’s activity in the South China Sea is really a test of our rules-based order which has guided how disputes should be managed and resolved and that, for a long time, has been accepted by everyone. The important thing for Australia is that this is a test in the region that we live in. I accept that Australia is more distant than some of the other countries with an interest in the South China Sea, but if we allow a situation today where disputes are resolved by coercion, intimidation, or picking off the weaker countries one by one, then that will do very serious damage to regional order. If we can’t encourage all countries, including China, to play by the rules of the pre-existing order, then we are going to have even less chance of doing so in ten years or twenty years when China will likely be even more powerful. From an Australian point of view, something like sixty percent of our trade passes through the South China Sea. That’s a vital national interest for Australia, even though we are not a claimant in the territorial disputes and we’re not terribly proximate. In any case, a world where a country controls those waters or where those waters are contested is a very different world for Australia than the one we have enjoyed for the last seventy years or so.

Andrew Shearer is currently a senior adviser on Asia-Pacific Security at CSIS. He was previously a national security adviser to Prime Ministers John Howard and Tony Abbott of Australia where he played a leading role in implementing Australian foreign, defense, and counter-terrorism policies. Mr. Shearer has more than 25 years of experience in intelligence, national security, diplomacy, and alliance management. He holds a master’s degree in international relations from the University of Cambridge and honors degrees in law and arts from the University of Melbourne.

Andrew Shearer was interviewed by Jennifer Mayer and Brian Spivey on May 23, 2016.
One Belt, One Road: A View from Hong Kong

An Interview with Simon Shen

China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative has triggered a number of heated debates around the globe. Perhaps the world’s largest platform for regional collaboration, OBOR is seen as an attempt by China to leverage its growing economic power in order to build a network of mutually beneficial economic and political ties across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. In August 2016, the Journal interviewed Simon Shen, a rising international relations scholar from Hong Kong, about his perspectives on China’s ambitious global strategy. From his unique perspective in Hong Kong, Simon Shen explained China’s strategic objectives with OBOR as well as the internal and external challenges China faced.

Journal: Hong Kong was once China’s gateway to the world, but it now faces competition from the mainland, and Hong Kong-mainland relations have also deteriorated in recent years. What is Hong Kong’s place in the OBOR initiative? Most of the OBOR projects are currently led by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), how do Hong Kong private businesses fit in the OBOR initiative?

Shen: From the Hong Kong government’s perspective, Hong Kong could play the role of a “super-connector” that helps bring China and the OBOR regions together. Specifically, Hong Kong can supply OBOR with fundraising platforms, an offshore renminbi market, mature legal/arbitration services, and professional management experience. This is also where Beijing hopes to utilize Hong Kong’s comparative advantage, namely its advanced financial-service and professional-service sectors.

If properly coordinated, the private businesses of Hong Kong could play a significant role in the Maritime Silk Road areas of OBOR, as these businesses have long maintained
good business networks in Southeast Asian countries. However, investing in OBOR regions (especially Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East) requires a great deal of infrastructural experience that most Hong Kong entrepreneurs lack; therefore, they are generally waiting for more favorable terms for entry.

Journal: To what extent have mainland policymakers/academics been critical of OBOR? How about those in Hong Kong? How does the Hong Kong public feel about the OBOR initiative?

Shen: There are some voices in mainland academia calling for a more cautious approach to OBOR’s implementation due to the high levels of risk in related regions (e.g., political instability, terrorism). The “hedging” policy of most OBOR countries would also minimize the strategic gains from China. Additionally, Chinese academics have long criticized the inefficiency of China’s overseas investments. The major concern is that the bulk of these investments are led by SOEs, which tend to downplay market rules and often don’t take full responsibility when their investments fail. Mainland analysts have called on Chinese authorities to learn from their previous failures in overseas investments.

In Hong Kong, some legislators have doubts about Hong Kong’s role in OBOR; these legislators have suggested that more direct investments—rather than deals struck in faraway, unknown regions—would be more beneficial to the youth of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong public is also skeptical about OBOR precisely because of the dubious nature of Hong Kong’s role in the initiative; the actual benefits that the Hong Kong public could enjoy from such participation are not yet clear.

Journal: Hong Kong Chief Executive C.Y. Leung has made it clear that Hong Kong should participate fully in OBOR and reap the economic benefits therein. Do you think OBOR is in some part a vehicle aimed at linking Hong Kong and mainland China more closely? How important is OBOR in terms of maintaining the mainland China-Hong Kong governance relationship of “one country, two systems”?

Shen: The impact of OBOR on the Hong Kong–mainland relationship is rather limited at present. The future impact will depend on the dynamics of Hong Kong-mainland interaction in broad social, political, and economic areas. If the general relationship between Hong Kong and the mainland goes well, Hong Kong’s participation in OBOR could further facilitate exchange and cooperation between the two sides. However, if social or political tensions between Hong Kong and the mainland continue to rise, OBOR can offer only limited help, and deepened OBOR linkages could easily lead to resentment from the public. The arrangement of “one country, two systems” is Hong Kong’s core institutional advantage, and it is also Hong Kong’s greatest institutional capital for participation in OBOR. Without “one country, two systems,” Hong Kong

1 According to the Chinese State Council, the “One Belt, One Road” initiative consists of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.
would be no more competitive in this initiative than Shenzhen and other developed, coastal mainland cities.

Journal: As you just mentioned, tensions between Hong Kong and the mainland would ease if Hong Kong were allowed to leverage its institutional advantage within OBOR. However, an “anti-mainland” sentiment seems to be rising in Hong Kong society today. Do you think this trend will pose a persisting challenge for Hong Kong’s participation in OBOR?

Shen: Indeed, relations between Beijing and Hong Kong today are structurally constrained. While it’s not possible to fully elaborate on the issue in this interview, in a broad sense, the Hong Kong public is currently concerned about the political rights, economic welfare, and social freedoms granted under the structure of “one country, two systems,” while Beijing is more concerned about how Hong Kong would contribute to China's foreign policy strategy. Therefore, Beijing tends to intervene in Hong Kong’s social and political institutional settings in a way that would serve the purpose above. There are different perceptions and expectations from each side toward the other, and there is a lack of efficient communication between the two. The “anti-mainland” sentiment in Hong Kong and the corresponding criticisms from Beijing are the reflection of such constraints. This structural pattern will be a persisting challenge to Hong Kong’s participation in OBOR.

To untie the knot, Beijing needs to directly address the doubts of Hong Kong public regarding the actual benefits that they will be able to enjoy through participating in OBOR. Hong Kong also needs to more rationally consider the utilization of its comparative advantage within the OBOR initiative. Efficient communication and thorough understanding between the two sides are necessary for Hong Kong to succeed in OBOR.

Journal: In September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping brought up the idea of a “Silk Road Economic Belt,” an idea which gradually developed into OBOR. What are the key drivers, both economic and otherwise, behind China’s OBOR initiative? Why did China announce it at that particular time?

Shen: From the economic perspective, China today suffers from overcapacity, and the Chinese economy is at a critical point of structural transformation. Most of the regions targeted by OBOR are undersupplied in the areas of investment and infrastructure. China hopes to export its production capacity into these regions while pushing forward domestic structural transformation at the same time.

From the strategic point of view, since 2009 China has observed the relative decline of the United States’ hegemonic power in global affairs, especially in the OBOR regions. China could take the strategic opportunity to project its influence in OBOR regions, which could eventually result in a China-led regional cooperation structure that differs from the one led by the United States. The change in global power distribution since 2009 has been the direct factor inducing China’s OBOR initiative. China now has
both the willingness and the capacity to pursue its own “rules of the game.”

*Journal:* What stage is the OBOR initiative at now? Is it clear who or which Chinese government departments/agencies are in charge of the initiative?

*Shen:* OBOR is still in a very early stage, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is OBOR’s only concrete institutional setting that is currently functioning. Many cooperation contracts and memorandums have been signed between China and other countries of OBOR regions, but we have yet to see the implementation of the proposed projects. Indeed, there is no single department or agency that is in charge of the initiative. OBOR involves various departments and agencies at different levels of the administration. What is clear is that all kinds of funding and resources have to be linked in order to achieve the objectives of OBOR.

*Journal:* OBOR involves over sixty countries and is expected to contain six regional “economic corridors.” What are China’s priorities in OBOR, given that its economic and human resources are limited? How is China convincing other OBOR states that these projects are in their economic interest?

*Shen:* China’s priority in OBOR is building and facilitating connections among different geographic regions. Building a network of information, trade and logistics, and cultural exchange is at the core of this initiative. China is not going to do everything on its own, though the Chinese government wants to play a leadership role and exert its influence. Basically, the Chinese government seeks cooperation with local counterparts in different regions in order to facilitate the implementation of various projects. This, however, requires a good understanding of local conditions as well as strong management skills.

*Journal:* The former Silk Road has been viewed by many as a symbol of the far-reaching soft power of ancient China. Based on President Xi’s “China Dream” vision, how do you think China should advance its soft power through OBOR? What has China’s record been like so far?

*Shen:* In order to advance its soft power in OBOR regions, China must pay close attention to regional differences and find ways to fit the “Chinese Dream” into local contexts. If local societies view China as a self-focused hegemon, they won’t buy China’s deals. Indeed, this is exactly what happened with the Myitsone Dam project in Myanmar. Beyond economic considerations, the people of Myanmar took environmental, historical, and cultural factors into account. China’s investment in the Myitsone Dam was mostly based on cooperation with high-level government officials in Myanmar and lacked direct contact with members of the general public. This is what China must avoid in order for it to advance its soft power through OBOR.

*Journal:* What about OBOR do you think is most misunderstood in the West?
Shen: The West should not view OBOR as something aimed at replacing the U.S.-led global order. China is proposing its own rules to complement the existing global governance structure. For example, take the AIIB, the most concrete institutional setting of China’s OBOR initiative today. On the demand side, numerous research reports have pointed out that Asia critically lacks infrastructure. The resources and agendas of the Asia Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank are not meeting the demands of Asian infrastructure development. On the supply side, due to the prolonged institutional reform process of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, China sees its voice and space in the existing global economic and developmental governance rather limited. Therefore, in the AIIB setting where China is one of the most important stakeholders, China hopes to spur infrastructure development in Asia and bring the voices of China and other “south countries” into global governance. AIIB is not meant to replace the ADB, World Bank, or other existing global governance institutions. In fact, with the participation of other major stakeholders in existing global financial institutions—such as the UK, France and Germany—AIIB can better coordinate with other institutions to effectively allocate the resources and promote regional development. In this sense, AIIB is supposed to complement the roles ADB and World Bank play in global development. Institutional complementation is beneficial to global society, but institutional confrontation is not.

Simon Shen is a Hong Kong-born international relations scholar who has earned both international recognition and local prominence. He holds a master’s degree from Yale University and a doctoral degree from the University of Oxford. Dr. Shen is currently Associate Professor & Director of the Global Studies Programme at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is also the Lead Writer in Global Affairs, Hong Kong Economic Journal. As an author, Dr. Shen has published more than 70 academic articles and publications including 13 articles in leading SSCI journals such as China Quarterly, China Review, and Journal of Contemporary China.

Simon Shen was interviewed via email in August 2016 by Yuhao Du.
Front cover photo: Pakistan Humanitarian Aid (Swat Valley, Pakistan on November 24, 2010).
INTERVIEWS WITH

David Shambaugh
_on Chinese Studies in the Past, Present, and Future

Mark Fitzpatrick
_on THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia

Andrew Shearer
_on Australia’s Strategy in Contemporary Asia

Simon Shen
_on Hong Kong’s View of “One Belt, One Road” Initiative

Revisionist Religion:
Xi Jinping’s Suppression of Christianity and Elevation of Traditional Culture as Part of a Revisionist Power Agenda

Anna Scott Bell

Ethno-Demographic Dynamics of the Rohingya-Buddhist Conflict

Rachel Blomquist